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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Problem o:r the Dissertation 
This dissertation proposes to discover and analyze the meanings 
assigned to the term 11valuen in modern psychological theory and re-
search. 
For many years, theology and philosophy have recognized an area 
o:r human experience to which the term "value II might be given. Only 
these disciplines have attempted to circumscribe and de:rine this area. 
Science, tacitly recognizing the existence of such an area, preferred 
to focus its attention elsewhere, limiting itself to the study of what 
it designated as "pure :racts.tt1 In time, however, the intellectual 
climate began to change. A :rew early psychologists, such as WUndt 2 
and his one-time student ~terberg,3 did recognize such an area and 
1. See Everette w. Hall, M:>dern Science and Human Values (Princeton, 
N. J". : D. Van Nostrand Co. , Inc. , 1956), :ror an easily read history 
which sharply distinguishes scientific thought :rrom philosophical val-
ue theory. John M. Fletcher, trScience and the Problem of Human Val-
ues, 11 Sci. mon., 54 (1942), p. 263, suggests a current basis for psy-
chological and scientific study o:r values in terms of feeling, percep-
tual, or human experiences. 
The periodical abbreviations used in this dissertation conform to 
the code adopted by the American Psychological Association in its Pub-
lication Manual (Washington, D. C.: American Psychological Associa-
tion, Inc., 1957), PP• 56-60. 
2. Wilhelm Wundt, Ethik (2. Umgearbeitete Aufl.; Stuttgart: Ferdinand 
Enke, 1S92). 
3. Hugo Mt!lnsterberg, The Eternal Values (Boston; Houghton Mi.f:rlin 
Co., 1909) • 
1 
attempted to study it. But not until the early 1930's did other psy-
cholo&ists begin to pay serious attention to this aspect of human be-
havior and exp erlence. In 1931 , Allport and Vernon published A Study 
of Values, the first psychological test designed to measure an indi-
vidual's relative values.1 With this marking a beginning, the inter-
2 
est of psychologists in values has steadily mounted and the quantity 
of psychological discussion and research has steadily (though not uni-
formly) increased. 
At the same time, however, there is some preliminary evidence 
_ which indicates that psychologists do not necessarily mean the same 
thing when they use the term "value. n In the initial stages of scien-
tific work in a particular area, one may expect a certain amount of 
confUsion, inconsistency, and overlap in both theory and research. 
All of these things have been true of psychology as it has attempted 
precisely to describe and understand the date provided by this experi-
ence. Nevertheless, it would seem that an appropriate time has ar-
rived for some systematic examination of the meanings given to this 
key term in psychology. To date, this has not been done. This is un-
fortunate, for, in order to understand differences in present theory 
and research, to give focus and greater relevance to fUture research, 
and to· open possible avenues of communication with other disciplines 
purporting to study the same thing, an awareness of the definitions 
of value actually being used in psychological theory and research 
would seem to be highly desirable, if not absolutely necessary. 
1. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. This test will hereafter be referred 
to as the SV_. 
3 
B. Definitions 
A question which immediately arises has to do with the prelimin-
ary definition to be given to the term "value" by this study. It has 
already been suggested that theology and philosophy have recognized an 
aspect of experience to which the term value could be applied, and 
that this has been at least tentatively acknowledged b,y some psycholo-
gists as we11.1 Thus, although no clear picture emerges of this area, 
there is a prima facie case for its existence. 
With this in mind, no attempt will be made to give an explicit 
definition of value in advance, since this study is itself designed to 
survey the definitions given for the word by psychologists when they 
investigate and theorize concerning values. The use of the word "val-
ue, 11 then, will be the only definitional requirement for the consider-
ation of the work of a psychologist. If an individual believes and 
states clearly that he is dealing with values, whatever this may mean 
to him, then his work will be included in order to discover what the 
term does in fact denote as he uses it. Thus, the way will be open to 
examine any possible meanings assigned to the term, without excluding 
a priori any of the sometimes divergent approaches which form the 
heart of the dissertation. 
c. Limi ta tiona 
This study is concerned specifically with the meanings given to 
the term "value" by psychologists who claim to be investigating value. 
1. The difficulty in defining this aspect is noticeable even in dic-
tionary definitions, which tend to be ambiguous or circular. 
4 
Although definitions of value do exist within the contexts of other 
social sciences, theology, and philosophy, they will be excluded from 
explicit consideration in this study.1 At the same time, however, 
this dissertation will not carry on its task in isolation from the 
specifically theological and philosophical context within which it is 
written. Points of contact with philosophical theories of value will 
be suggested (but not elaborated) both within the bodies of the chap-
ters and in footnotes when appropriate. 
Another limitation has already been indicated: i.e. 1 only psycho-
logical material will be studied. As used here, it will be considered 
to be psychological primarily if the author's professional affiliation 
or dominant interest is in psychology. With few exceptions, the mate-
rial will have been indexed in Psychological Abstracts as well. With 
this beginning, the basic work to be analyzed will be found in a vari-
ety of sources~ books, published and unpublished articles, offprints 
and reprints, theses, dissertations, and personal communications. 
In addition, only psychology's attempts to deal with values in 
a general sense will be discussed; there will be no survey of particu-
lar types or classes of value. This limitation is necessary since a 
few psychologists have been concerned, for research purposes, solely 
1. The well known study by Philip E. Jacob, Changing Values in Col-
lege (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957), uses a preference (Group 
Three) type of definition. However, the framework was more sociolog-
ical than psychological, was by a political economist and not a psy-
chologist, and so has been excluded from consideration in this disser-
tation. Of interest in this connection is the study of Jacob's defi-
nition(s) of value in John E. Smith, Value Convictions and Higher Edu-
cation (New Haven, Conn.: The Edward w. Hazen Foundation, 1958). 
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with particular types of values, such as aesthetic, religious, etc.1 
Such work is not under scrutiny here. 
It has already been suggested, finally, that psychologists• in-
terests in values increased rather sharply with the publication of the 
SV. Thus, the basic data are relatively recent, and the year 19.30 may 
safely serve as the terminus a guo of the work which is the foundation 
of this study. 
These, then, are the preliminary limiting factors. Although oth-
er limitations may arise from the very nature of the material itself, 
only these rather broad criteria of inclusion are laid down in ad-
vance. Within them, the study aims to be comprehensive and exhaustive 
in its coverage of this area of interest to American social scientists. 
D. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
Based upon extensive preliminary surveys of the relevant theoret-
ical and research data, psychological theory and reaeBJ:ch. in values 
were systematically arranged into tentative categories or clusters, 
each stressing a particular meaning given to value. Different psy-
chologists, that is, emphasize different things as being critical to 
the definition and comprehension of values or value experience. These 
different emphases, further, tend to form recognizable clusters marked 
by common beliefs about the necessary meanings to be assigned to the 
term "value.tt Group One, for instance, finds the key to defining val-
ues in their relation as needs or need satisfactions to the inherent 
1. E. g., see Jozef B. Cohen, "A Scale for the Measurement of Atti-
tude toward the Aesthetic Value," Jour. Psychol., 12 (1941 ), 75-79. 
biological requirements of the human organism. Others see the pecul-
iar defining characteristics of values in their motivational signifi-
cance as predisposing sets (Group Two), their operation as behavioral 
preferences (Group Three), as beliefs (Group Four), or as environmen-
tal relationships (Group Five). These constellations provide the 
methodological framework of the dissertation in terms of 'Which the 
theoretical and research data will be classified and studied. 
Within each chapter, the theory will be studied first with the 
6 
corresponding research following. It is e~ected that on the basis of 
this initial analysis certain substantive dimensions will emerge com-
mon to all the groups, but on \<rhich each may vary somewhat. That is, 
although certain aspects of the definitions will tend to be revealed 
by the classifications used here, other aspects may emerge in the 
process of the study which may also be used to describe individual 
theoretical positions. These aspects have no ideal nor norm implied 
in them, but would be entirely descriptive. Since, however, neither 
the nature nor even the certain presence of such dimensions is clearly 
present in the preliminary surveys, the final dispositions of this by-
pothesis must await the concluding sUllliilary. 
Some space will then be e~licitly devoted to the discussion and 
evaluation of each group in terms of a set of formal or normative 
evaluative criteria. Such criteria do imply certain ideals or norms 
in terms of which the clusters can be compared. For convenience, they 
may be broken down into four areas around which the discussion will 
pivot: rational, empirical, heuristic, and philosophical relevance. 
The term llrational 11 will be used in the sense suggested by 
Brightman, when he defined reason as na logically consistent and co-
7 
herent method of interpreting experience."1 Thus, the comments in 
each of these sections will have to do with the clarity, logic, and 
consistency with which terms and concepts are handled by representa-
tives of the group.2 The empirical discussions, relating to the oper-
ational data and scientific evidence marshalled by each group, will 
deal with the manner and degree to which the categories are related to 
empirical data for support and verification. The heuristic sections 
will cover the ability of each group to generate discussion and fur-
ther ideas, argument, or experiment leading to more research. They 
will deal broadly with the groups t abilities to stimulate further 
knowledge or theory. These criteria, it is believed, would be regar-
ded by many as constituting a broadly-conceived scientific evaluation.3 
The fourth category, not, strictly speaking, a criterion, will 
provide an opportunity to set the work of each category against pos-
1. Edgar S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1940), P• 536. 
2. Brightman's nine norms of reason are helpful for a total critical 
approach, but are somewhat broader than the limits of this particular 
section. As listed in Nature and Values (New York: Abingdon-Cokes-
bury, 1945), PP• 106-107, they are: 
"Be consistent (eliminate all contradictions). 
"Be systematic (discover all relevant relations). 
"Be inclusive (weigh all available experiences). 
"Be analytic (consider all the elements of which every complex 
exists). 
"Be synoptic (relate all the elements of any whole to its proper-
ties as a whole). 
IIBe active (use experimental method). 
"Be open to alternatives (consider many possible h~otheses). 
"Be critical (test and veri:fy or falsi:fy hypotheses). 
nBe decisive (be committed to the best available hypotheses)." 
3. Cf. Calvin s. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), PP• 10-15. 
sible relevant philosophical theories of value. It will not attempt 
to develop the relations between them in detail, but simply to indi-
cate where possible bridges of communication seem to exist. 
Each group thus will be dealt with fully as it comes. In the 
concluding chapter, the results of the analysis, classification, and 
discussion will be summarized in a series of broad conclusions con-
earning the outcome of the initial,hypotheses, facts and relationships 
emerging but not predicted, and the nature of psychological value the-
ory and research as a whole. Together with this will be a final sec-
tion suggesting some still unsolved problems for psychological value 
research in the years ahead and possible methodology for dealing with 
them. 
E. Previous Relevant Research 
Although much has been written concerning values themselves, to 
date there has been little work which has attempted either to classifY 
or to study psychological value theory and research as a whole. Some 
backgroUnd material is available, however, and will be treated in two 
broad groupings, depending on whether the context of the work is psy-
chological or philosophical. 
1. Psychological 
An early article by Raths suggested some possible ways of measur-
ing values of students in an educational core course at Ohio State 
University through analysis of their essays) In addition, more than 
1 • IDuis Raths, fiApproaches to the Measurement of Values, 11 Educ. Res. 
Bull., 19 (1940), 175-82. 
9 
twenty different techniques for stimulating students to change their 
values were suggested. Unfortunately, the meaning of the term "valuett 
seemed to be taken for granted and so was never defined, while the es-
say analysis suggested was unsystematic and ad hoc. 
In 1942, another, more thoughtful, article appeared. 1 Af'ter sum-
marizing some of the value research up to that time, Raths suggested 
that this research raised certain questions, such as: What are values? 
Are personalities infinitely varied or may they somehow be classified? 
If central tendencies or predispositions to act in conformity with a 
pattern of values exist, how is this to be explained? What is the re-
lation between situational context and values? The author concluded 
by suggesting that projective techniques for value appraisal and study 
might provide some answers for such questions. His queries showed a 
fine sense of some of the key problems in value research, both then 
and now. 
At about the same time as Rath's first article, Butler's disser-
tation attempted, from a combination of experimental and social psy-
chological vie"Wpoints, an analysis of value in the light of contempo-
rary experiments together with a consideration of certain social prob-
lems based on that analysis. 2 The growth of values in the individual 
was traced, and their role in the canalization of drives described. 
1. Raths, ttAppraising Changes in Values of College Students,n J. ed. 
~' 35 (1941-42), 557-64. 
2. Judson Rea Butler, "Social Psychology of Values~'· (unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, Boston University, 1940). 
10 
Attention was then turned to the conflict of values between social 
groups, and, in this connection, the relatively hierarchical nature of 
values. However, the author's definition of value did not seem to be 
consistently adhered to, no acquaintance was shown with much of the 
basic writing and research in values current at that time, and no 
clear conclusions appear to have been reached as a result of the sur-
vey. 
Some years later, Friedman authored a lengthy publication on the 
problems involved in measuring values. 1 Many of these turned out to 
be similar to those involved in measuring attitudes and interests. 
Her desire was to deal with the methodology of value measurement, as 
it might contribute toward understanding whether or not educational 
goals were being realized. This was done first by classifying motiva-
tional and philosophical value theories. These consisted of various 
combinations: feeling, attitude, and/or action; preference; consumma-
tmry activity; and definitions setting forth one of the essential 
qualities of value without claiming it to be the whole. The problem 
involved in locating and quantifying values and evaluating various 
types of research methods in values as they seemed to measure the same 
things were discussed, concluding with the presentation of some origi-
1 • Bertha B. Friedman, Foundations of the Measurement of Values 
("Teachers College Contributions to Education," No. 914; New York; 
Columbia University Teachers College Bureau of Publications, 1946). 
See also the reviews of this volume: Anonymous, Nerv. Child, 6 ( 194 7), 
476-77; Ernest J. Ohave, Amer. sociol. Rev., 12 (1947), 237-38; Andrew 
L. Oomrey, Psychometrika, 12 (1947), p. 237; Elizabeth Duffy, Psychol. 
Rev., 44 (1947), 290-91; Louis Guttman, Amer. J. Soc., 53 (1947-48), 
P• 333; J. B. Stroud, J. educ. Pyschol.,_38 (1947), p. 313; and Ba-
bette Samelson Whipple, J •. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,.42 (1947), 373-74. 
nal research data concerning various ways of measuring values. The 
study suffered, unfortunately, from an overattention to detail and a 
disappointing lack of originality when actual value measurement was 
undertaken. 
Clawson attempted to build a systematic exposition of applied 
psychology around the basic idea of value situations.1 His work was 
marred, however, by some inconsistencies in treatment and a certain 
superficiality in the evidence used: i.e., advertisements, newspaper 
headlines, movie plots, ~· 
11 
In 1955, Creegan authored an outline designed to describe recent 
trends in the psychology of values. 2 He seems to have found diffieul-
ty in fulfilling the promise of his title, and succeeded primarily in 
discussing his own definition of value in terms of shock or surprise, 
leaving the field of the psychology of values as a whole relatively 
unexplored. 
In an article dealing with the problems faced by therapists in 
regard to their prevailing values as confronted by seemingly contra-
dictory therapeutic goals, Lowe proposed a classifications of value 
systems which was perhaps more philosophical than psychological.3 
These classes were: naturalism, represented in psychology by Skinner; 
1. (Clayton) Joseph Clawson, Psychology in Action (New York: Macmil-
lan and Co., 1946). 
2. Robert F. Creegan, "Recent Trends in the Psychology of Values, 11 in 
Abraham Aaron Roback (ed.), Present Day Psychology (New York~ Philo-
sophical Library, 1955), PP• 949-72. 
3. c. Marshall Low·e, II Value Orientations--an Ethical DilellliD.a, 11 Am.er. 
Psychol., 14 (1959), 687-93. 
12 
culturalism, represented by some statements of the American Psycholog-
ical Association, Adler, Sullivan, Horney, Shaffer, and Shoben; human-
ism, by Fromm and Rogers; and theism, by Allport and Jung. 
Perkins presented a review of research dealing with various back-
ground factors influencing values. 1 He organized his material around 
subject areas having to do with the genetic development of values, 
social and cultural influences on the development of values, genetic 
development of personality and ego-structure in relation to values, 
and the influence of the school environment on the value system of pu-
pils. The material covered did not deal with values themselves, but 
factors affecting values, thus almost totally neglecting the litera-
ture basic to this study; nor did the author make clear his criterion 
for including material in the survey. Nevertheless, the study pro-
vides a helpful resource to consult for information on problems relat-
ed to various factors connected with values and value development. 
Probably the best article is that of Dukes in which he summarized 
and discussed the research literature in values according to the stat-
ed purpose of the research: (1) individual differences in values, (2) 
origin and development of values within the individual, and (.3) influ-
ence of an individual's values on his cognitive life. 2 His discussion 
of technical strengths and shortcomings is sound, although he does not 
deal directly with conceptual differences. Some of the material which 
1. F. Theodore Perkins, JtResearch Relating to the Problem of Values, 11 
Cal. J. elem. Educ., 2.3 (1954), 22.3-42. 
2. William F. Dukes, "Psychological Studies of Values, 11 Psychol. 
Bull. J 52 (1955), 24-50. 
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he covered under the heading of values does not necessarily seem to be 
so intended by the original authors, leaving his criterion of inclu-
sion unclear, as was Perkins'. He concluded as a result of this sur-
vey that, 
regardless of any possible incompleteness or incongru-
ity in theory or experiment, or of the interpretation 
given the data which have been gathered in this area, 
their [val11e researchers tJ contributions to psychology 
seem rather outstanding. Here the integration of the 
time-honored categories of conation, cognition, and af-
fection is actualized, rather than being merely paid 
lip service, and clinician and experimentalist find 
problems of mutual interest.1 
2. Philosophical 
Several philosophers have suggested classifications of value the-
ory which, though wider and somewhat different in intent, also provide 
helpful background to this study. These are found commonly as cate-
gories either of value theories themselves or ethical theories. Some 
interesting parallels to the groupings in this study may be noted. 
Clarke's early work suggested that value theories could be divid-
ed into those which were basically subjective, objective, or neutral.2 
Subjective theories included those defining value as a feeling aroused 
by an object, desire for an object, or interest in an object. Neutral 
theories included value as a quality of objects as related to subjects 
and conditioned by judgment, or as a determination of the subject-ob-
je~t situation. Objective theories included values as an indefinable 
1. Ibid., PP• 43-44• 
2. Mary Evelyn Clarke, A Study in the Logic of Value (London: Uni-
versity of London Press, .. 1929). 
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predicate apprehended either b.1 feeling or judgment, a relation among 
objects, or an objective. Lepley used the rather common philosophical 
11schoo111 classification of idealism, realism, pragmatism, and logical 
empiricism. 1 Perry's important work used other approaches in which 
value was described as irrelevant to interest, the qualified object of 
interest, and as the object of qualified interest, to develop his o~m 
2 definition as any object of any interest. Wieman's opening pages 
suggested a classification according to the element of human existence 
used in establishing the 11where and what 11 of value: subjective, con-
textual, and transcendental.3 The symposium edited b.1 Lepley present-
ed an excellent display of current philosophies of value, which were, 
however, unclassified and rather strongly biased toward an empirical 
or scientific approach of some kind.4 
Suggestions have also been made for classifying various types of 
ethical theories. Brightman indicated that these might be: the Aris-
totelian, in which the good life is that of the fullest, most harmon-
ious, and balanced development of man's powers; the Epicurean, in 
which the best life is that embodying the most pleasure; the Chris-
tian, in which the principles of the good life are love and sacrifice; 
1 • Ray Lepley, Verifiability of Value ( 11Columbia Studies in Philoso-
phy, n No. 7; New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), PP• S-16. 
2. Ralph Barton Perry, General Theory of Value (Cambridge, Mass.; 
Harvard University Press, 1926), PP• 27-146. 
3. Henry Nelson Wieman, The Source of Human Good (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1946), pp. 3-16. 
4. Ray Lepley (ed.), Value: A Cooperative Inquiry (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1949). 
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and the Kantian, in which morality is a matter of the will itself jud-
ged by its own 11self-consistency. n1 Tsanoff used somewhat the same 
categories when he classified types of ethical theories into hedonism, 
evolutionary naturalism, formal rigorism, and perfectionism.2 Hill's 
thoughtfUl examination of twentieth century theories dealt with them 
as approbative, process, psychological, metaphysical, and intuitive.3 
If one wishes, some idea of the history of value theories may be 
found in pertinant sections of Cox's dissertation,4 and the German 
opus by Kraus.5 Probably the best short history is that by Urban in 
the Encyclopedia Brittanica. 6 Selected readings from some of the the-
orists are available in Melden,7 Clark and Smith,S and Rand.9 
1. MOral Laws (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1933), pp. 15-21. 
2. Badoslav A. Tsanoff, Ethics (rev. ed.; New York; Harper and Bros., 
1955), PP• 61-143· 
3. Thomas English Hill, Contemporary Ethical Theories (New York: Mac-
millan Co., 1950). Cf. Hill's Ethics in Theory and Practice (New 
York~ Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1956), Part I, pp. 23~204. 
4. David Franklin Cox, "Karl Marx's Philosophy of Value~ ~(unpublished 
Ph. D." dissertation, Boston University, 1952), pp. vii-xviii. 
5. Oskar Kraus, Die Werttheorien: Geschichte und Kritik (Bri:hmt Rud-
olf M. Rohrer, 1937 • 
6. Wilbur Marshall Urban, ttValue, Theory of, 11 Encyclopedia Brittah-
ica, Vol. XXII (1957), PP• 962-64. 
7. A. I. Melden (ed.), Ethical Theories: A Book of Readings (2nd. 
ed.; New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955). 
S. Gordon H. Clark and T. V. Smith (eds.), Readings in Ethics (New 
York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1931). 
9. Benjamin Rand, The Classical Moralists (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1909). 
CHAPTER II 
VALUES AS NEEDS 
With a background of relevant information established, it is pos-
sible to turn to Group One of theory and research, which approaches 
the problem of definition through the use of the concept of ttneed. tt 
Upon this emphasis all the members agree, although within somewhat 
different contexts and 1orl.th somewhat different results. 1 The theoret-
ical work will provide the means for beginning the study of this con-
stellation. 
A. Theory 
In terms of theory, Maslow's elucidation of values as needs is 
the most extensive, in which he emphasizes the constitutional basis of 
values, suggests their vertical hierarchical organization, and indi-
cates their possible classification horizontally as common and idio-
1. See AbrahaJII. H. Maslow, "Preface to M:>tivation Theory," Psychosom. 
Med., 5 (1943), p. 90; Gardner Murphy, .,Personality (New York; Harper 
and .Bros., 1947), pp. 180,272, and Experimental Social Psychology 
(rev. ed.; New York: Harper and Bros., 1937), p. 198; Erich Fromm, 
"Values, Psychology, and Human Existence, " in Maslow ( ed. ) , New Knolf-
ledge in Human Values (New York: Harper and .Bros. 1 1959) 1 p. 151 , and 
Man .for Himself (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1947), p. 7. Since 
Murray does not define value in terms of needs, he is not discussed in 
this context. However, his definition and treatment of the concept o.f 
needs or drives is helpful background reading. See Henry A. Murray, 
Explorations in Personality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 
pp. 54-115. 
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syncratic or B- (Being) and D- (Deficiency) values. Goldstein further 
elaborates health as the highest value, and MUrphy describes value de-
velopment primarily through the process o.f canalization and, to a les-
ser degree, o.f conditioning. Fromm's psychoanalytic orientation with-
in this total group suggests the necessity .for understanding man's 
given situation and his inherited and learned personality as prerequi-
sites to understanding his values. A group o.f briefer, similar .formu-
lations will also be indicated. 
1. Maslow's Generic Definition o.f Values as Needs 
Abraham Maslow 1s concern with human values and the problems o.f 
mankind underlies much o.f his work in psychology.1 It is appropriate, 
therefore, that his concept o.f the nature o.f values is the .first to be 
examined. 
Basically, Maslow sees human values as needs or need grati.fica-
tions.2 These two terms are used almost interchangeably with eaeh 
othe;and with a third term, ttcapacity.n3 Needs themselves are de.fin-
ed in terms o.f health as those things conceptually derived .from ob-
servable behavior whose absence breeds illness, whose presence pre-
vents illness, whose restoration cures illness, which are preferred by 
the deprived person over other satisfactions under certain (very com-
1. Maslow, ttA Philosophy o.f Psychology," in Johnson E. Fairchild 
(ed~), Personal Problems and Psychological Frontiers (New York: Sheri-
dan House, 1957), pp. 225-26. 
2. MOtivation and Personality (New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), PP• 
6-7. C.f. "Psychological Data and Value Theory, 11 in Maslow, New Know-
ledge in Human Values, pp. 122-24. 
3. "Psychological Data and Value Theory,tt p. 122. 
.1S 
plex)£ree choice situations, and which are £ound to be at a low ebb or 
1 fUnctionally absent in the healthy person. This conception o£ the 
character o£ a need determines, then, his understanding of a value and 
its constitutional basis, hierarchical nature, and possible horizontal 
classification. 
a) Constitutional basis 
Values, according to this view, are first of all biologically 
rooted, 11in some sense, and to some appreciable degree, constitutional 
or hereditary in their deter.mination.»2 They are "instinctoid," yet 
without being 11instinctive. 113 The exact degree of this physiological 
basis is as yet not completely worked out, and there seems to be some 
evidence from Maslow's point o£ view that it may even vary with the 
degree of self-actualization attained.4 He does insist, however, upon 
this point. 
b) Hierarchical nature 
Values also are hierarchical in terms of an order of strength and 
of priority.5 This is Maslow's concept of the relative prepotency of 
1. "Deficiency Motivation and Growth Motivation, 11 in Marshall R. 
Jones (ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: 1955 (Lincoln, Neb.: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1955), p. 4. 
2. Motivation and Personality, p. 136. 3. Ibid., pp. 136-45. 
4. Personal correspondence, Sept. 1, 1960. 
5. "Psychological Data and Value Theory," p. 123. Of. C. A. Mace, 
UHomeostasis, Needs, and Values," Brit. J. Psychol., 44 (1953), p. 
201. MUrphy also suggests a need classi£ication as visceral, activi-
ty, sensory, and "emergency responses," Personality, pp. 105-24. How-
ever he does not deal with them directly in a hierarchical manner, 
thus leaving this particular point unsettled in his system. 
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needs, and is central to his concern with the nature o£ values.1 He 
states clearly that "the chie£ principle o£ organization in human mo-
tivational li£e is the arrangement o£ needs in a hierarchy of less or 
greater priority or potency.u2 When the most basic needs are satis-
£ied, new and higher needs emerge to dominate the organism. When 
these in turn are satisfied, a new set emerges, and so on.3 
These need groups, or values, listed in ascending order, include: 
(1) The physiological.--These are autonomous relative to each 
other, other motivations, and the total organism; and £or many o£ them 
it is possible to exhibit a fUndamental, localized, somatic basis £or 
the need or drive.4 Upon their satis£action depends the satis£action 
of all the other needs of the organism.5 
(2) The sa£ety.--These needs are those which have to do specif-
ically with health and even the very existence of the organism. 6 
(3) The love.--These involve love and belongingness, and are 
probably better investigated than any except the physiological.7 
1. ttPre£ace to Motivation Theory," pp. 88, 90. 
2. Motivation and Personality, p. 107. 
3. Ibid., p. 83. Love needs may prove to be an exception to this. 
4· Ibid., p. 81. 
5. ttDeficiency Motivation and Growth Motivation, 11 pp. 17-18. 0£. 
ttPower Relationships and Patterns of Personal Development,tt in Arthur 
Kornhauser (ed.), Problems of Power in American Democracy (Detroit~ 
Wayne State University Press, 1957), p. 115. 
6. MOtivation and Personality, pp. 85-88. 
?. Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
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(4) The esteem.--These are the needs which involve a stable, 
generally high personal evaluation of the individual by himself and by 
others. They include the desires for adequacy, mastery, and control 
over the world together with those for status, recognition, or appre-
ciation in the sight of others.1 
ment, 
(5) Self-actualization.--This refers roughly to self-fulfill-
to the tendency for~ perso~to become actualized in 
what he is potentially. This tendency might be 
phrased as the desire to become more and more what one 
is, to become everything that one is capable of becom-
ing.2 
c) Horizontal groupings 
As distinguished from vertical, hierarchical classifications of 
values, there are, according to Maslow, some possible horizontal 
groupings as well. One type is that of common and idiosyncratic val-
ues. The basic values are common to all mankind, because they are 
commonly shared needs; on the other hand, peculiarly individual needs 
involve individual values.3 MUrphy makes the same point by noting 
that the strength of established canalizations (values) depends upon 
two factors: organic preferences and/or the initial selectivity and 
1. Ibid., P• 90. 
2. Ibid., pp. 91-92. Maslow also postulates hierarchies of cognitive 
and aesthetic needs, but has been so far unable to develop this theory 
well. Cf. MOtivation and Personality, pp. 93-98, and "Some Theoreti-
cal Consequences of Basic Need-gratification," J. Pers., 16 (1947-48), 
p. 403. 
3. ttPsychological Data and Value Theory," p. 122. 
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the relative frequency of opportunities for specific responses. 1 Each 
of these two factors gives rise to both common and unique values; the 
latter being culturally determined provides both for a degree of uni-
for.mi ty within a culture and diversity among cultures; the former sug-
gests that there are needs common to all mankind and yet some peculiar 
to individuals. 2 
In an address published in 1959, Maslow suggested another classi-
fioation of values, partially overlapping both common and individual 
ones. In peak experiences, for average people, and more regular ex-
periences, for self-actualizing people, perception take place of things 
apart from their relation to the perceiving individual. This he calls 
11B-oognition. 11.3 
If, during these peak experiences involving B-cognition, says 
Maslow, one may actually perceive reality completely apart from the 
individual, then the values perceived would be those of reality it-
self. These he suggests might be called "B-values,n values of Being, 
as opposed to 11D-values, 11 values perceived in a deficiency motivated 
way. These values, if they exist, seem to be: 
(1) wholeness, integration, unity, harmony, and inter-
connectedness (2) necessity, perfection, completeness 
and inevitability (.3) aliveness, good functioning, 
1 • Murphy, Personality, p. 162. 2. Ibid. , p. 181 • Cf. p. 162. 
~. "Cognition of Being in Peak Experiences, 11 mimeographed 1956 presi-
dential address, Division of Personality and Social Psychology, Ameri-
can Psychological Association. Cf. William James's description of the 
noetic quality of mystical states in Varieties of Religious Experience 
(New York: I.Dngmans, Green, and Co., 1902), Lectures XVI and XVII. 
spontaneity and process (4) richness, di££erentiation, 
intricacy, and complexity (5) beauty, awefulness (6) 
goodness, rightness, peacefulness, desirability, (7) 
uniqueness, idiosyncracy and expressiveness (8) e££ort-
lessness, ease o£ achievement, lack o£ strain or striv-
ing, and finally (9) occasionall,, but not always an 
element o£ humor or playfulness. 
2. Goldstein 1 s. Concept o£ the Highest Value 
Goldstein, sharing Maslowts broad theoretical base, has dealt 
more specifically with the relations between sel£-actualization, 
22 
health, and value. De£ining sel£-actualization much as does Maslow in 
terms o£ the realization o£ the individual 1s intrinsic and harmonious 
£ulfillment o£ all his capacities, he then goes on to de£ine health as 
the experience o£ adequacy between the individual's demands and capac-
ities such that he is able to accept and endure su££ering and greater 
sel£-actualization.2 
Because of the key place which health holds in relation to man's 
essential nature and the inherent striving £or its actualization, 
health is the basic value, an understanding o£ which is necessary to 
an understanding o£ man (and vice versa). 
Health thus appears as the prototype o£ value. It may 
even be considered ~ value, £rom which all other 
values experienced under special conditions become 
comprehensible. It acquires this signi£icance, be-
cause it guarantees man's sel£-realization.3 
1. ucognition o£ Being in Peak Experiences, 11 p. 12. Punctuation is 
the author's. 
2. Kurt Goldstein, "Health as Value, 11 in Maslow, New Knowledge in Hu-
man Values, pp. 181-82. Cf. Goldstein, Human Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 171-200. 
3. llHealth as Value," p. 188. 
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3. Murphy's Treatment of Value Development 
MUrphy, too, has focused his attention on one aspect of values: 
their development. Within his total 11bio-socialtt theory of individual 
development, he postulates three groups of determinative factors: the 
original constitution, conditioning and canalization, and organism-en-
vironment interaction.1 His explicit treatment of value development, 
however, is only in terms of the second of these, conditioning and can-
alization.2 
a) Conditioning 
Conditioning is the process by which a stimulus, ordinarily bio-
logically inadequate to arouse a response, becomes sufficient to do so 
through repeated presentation and association with a biologically ade-
quate stimulus.3 It acts to initiate a preparatory but not a consum-
matory response; it is not of itself satisfying.4 It is easily 
changed or extinguished.5 Conditioning provides also for the choice 
6 
of symbols which express value. 
b) Canalization 
Of more importance in the development of individual values is 
canalization, or channeling, the process by which a drive tends, upon 
1. Personality, pp. 294-95. Cf. George G. Thompson, Child Psychologz 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Bo., 1952), pp. 123-74, 552-59. 
2. Cf. Experimental Social Psychology, pp. 202, 237-40. 
3. Personality, p. 982. 4. Ibid. , p. 164. 
5. Human Potentialities, p. 65. 6. Personality, p. 272. 
repeated experience, to be satisfied by specific objects or respons-
es.1 Canalizations initiate and modify consummatory responses; they 
are biologically satisfying.2 They may be displaced by other canal-
izations or fall into disuse, but are never truly subject to extinc-
t . 3 J.on. Canalization defines what values are and provides, together 
with frequent conditioning reinforcement, for their continuity.4 
4. Frommts Psychoanalytic Approach 
The psychoanalytic approach to an understanding of values is ex-
amplified by Erich Fromm, but complicated somewhat by the fact that at 
no point does he venture an explicit definition of value? Neverthe-
less, the implicit definition which he holds becomes reasonably clear 
when one has examined Fromm1s to~ar concerns, the work he has done in 
relation to value, and the ways in which he uses such terms as nval-
ue," nvalue judgment; n ttgood, tt ttethical, 11 ttmoral, n ltvirtue, tt and 
"norm. 11 To do this, one must first examine his idea of man's si tua-
tion and personality, and then that of man's values. 
a) Man's situation 
Man's situation is basically dichotomous, perhaps even paradoxi-
cal. He is torn from the primary union with nature which is a charac-
teristic of animal existence and he knows it. 6 
1. Ibid., pp. 162, 981. Of. Human Potentialities, p. 64, which may 
clarify difficulties in Fro~ 1 s discussion in Man for Himself, P• 59. 
2. Personality, p. 166. 3 • Ibid. , p. 168. 4· Ibid., P• 273. 
5. Of. J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals, and Society (New York: Internation-
al Universities Press, 1945). 
6. Escape from Freedom (New York: Binehart and Co., incJ, PP• 24-25. 
Self-awareness, reason, and imagination have dis-
rupted the 11harmony" which characterizes animal exis-
tence. Their emergence has made man into an anomaly, 
into the freak of the universe. He is part of nature, 
subject to her physical laws and unable to change 
them, yet he transcends the rest of nature. He is set 
apart while being a part; he is homeless, yet chained 
to the home he shares with all creatures. Cast into 
the world at an accidental place and time, he is 
forced out of it, again accidentally. Being aware of 
himself, he realizes his own powerlessness and the 
limitations of his existence. He visualizes his own 
end: death. Never is he free from the dichotomy of 
his existence; he cannot rid himself of his mind, even 
if he should want to; he cannot rid himself of his 
body as long as he is alive--and his body makes him 
want to be alive.1 
Set against the background of these historical and existential 
dichotomies--the former correctable and the latter not--2 is the pat-
tern of man's needs which characterize the other aspect of his situa-
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tion. They include: (1) the need to unite with and relate to other 
human beings, which is satisfied only by productive love; (2) the need 
to transcend one's passive situation as a creature, which can be met 
by creativity or, when stifled, by destructiveness; (3) the need for 
rootedness, which is satisfied by a sense of creative solidarity and 
relatedness with men and nature; (4) the need for a sense of identity, 
which is satisfied by the experience of oneself as the active subject 
of onets own powers; (5) the need for a system of intellectual orienta-
tion, which is met by the use of one 1s reason to grasp the world b.1 
1. Man for Himself, P• 40. 
2. Ibid., pp. 41-43, Escape from Freedom, pp. 24-39, and The Sane 
Society (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1955), pp. 3-11, 22-26, all sum-
marize this basic distinction at different length. A detailed know-
ledge of these dichotomies does not seem necessary to the understand-
ing of Fromm's basic position concerning man 1s situation. 
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thought; and (6) the need for an object of devotion, which, together 
with the need for a system of orientation, is satisfied by a religion.1 
b) Man t s personality 
In the identity of the human situation, men are alike; in regard 
to their personalities, they become unique. As Fromm sees two compo-
nents in man's situation, likewise he sees two components in man's 
personality: temperament and character. 
Temperament refers to the ~ of reaction and 
is constitutional and not changeable; eharacter is 
essentially formed by a person 1s experiences •••• 
If a person has a choleric temperament, for instance, 
his mode of reaction is 11quiek and strong. " But v1hat 
he is quick and strong about depends on his kind of 
relatedness, his character. If he is a productive, 
just, loving person he will react quickly and strong-
ly when he loves, when he is enraged b.1 injustice, 
and when he is impressed by a new idea. If he is a 
destructive or sadistic character he will be quick 2 and strong in his destructiveness or in his cruelty. 
Of temperaments there are four types which out across all of the 
character orientations: the sanguine and cholericL temperaments, 
marked by quick alternation of feeble interests for the former and 
quick alternation of intense interests for the latter; and the phleg-
matic and melancholic, marked by slow excitability of £eebi~ interests 
for the former and slow excitability of strong interests for the lat-
ter.3 (See Figure 1.) 
1 • "Values, Psychology, and Human Existence, 11 pp. 152-62; Man for 
Himself, PP• 46-50; Escape from Freedom, passim; Psychoanalysis and 
Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), PP• 21-64; and in 
somewhat more expanded form in The Sane Society, PP• 27-66. 
2. Man for Himself, P• 52. 3. Ibid., p. 51. 
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One•s character orientation is developed through the ways one re-
lates himself to the world of things (assimilation) and the world of 
people (socialization). These relational patterns, which like temper-
ament types may be classified in terms of broad tendencies, will be 
given somewhat different labels depending upon whether one describes 
them from the standpoint of assimilation or socialization. They in-
clude:1 
(1) Receptive : Masochistic.--The source of all good is outside 
the individual, and the only way to get it is to receive it. 
(2) Exploitative : Sadistic.--The source of all good is outside 
the individual, and the only way to get it is to get it. 
(3) Hoarding : Destructive.--Good is essentially internal, and 
one must keep it there. 
(4) Marketing ; Indifferent.--Good is neither internal nor ex-
ternal, but a function only of what one can do; thus the self is a 
commodity and has value only as exchange value. 
(5} Produetive.--Tbis term covers both Working and Reasoning for 
assimilation and Loving for socialization. In contrast to the other 
four nonproductive orientations, this is what man is meant to be; it 
is, in short, that orientation in which man is able to use his powers 
and realize the potentialities within him; it is marked by genitality 
(minus the Freudian libido theory context), creativity, spontaneity, 
care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge. 2 (See Figure 2.) 
1. In the following list, the first term of each pair refers to as-
similation, the second to socialization. 
2. Man for Himself, pp. 62-117. Of. Escape from Freedom, pp. 141-206. 
Non-productive • • • • • 
Productive . . . . . . 
FIGURE 1 
TEMPERAMENT COMPONENTS 
CHOLERIC 
FIGURE 2 
CHARACTER ORIENTATIONS 
.Assimilation 
Receptive 
Exploitative 
Hoarding 
Marketing 
Working 
Reasoning 
Socialization 
Masochistic 
Sadistic 
Destructive 
Indif'ferent 
Loving 
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c) Man r s values 
From this study o:f man's situation and personality, one can un-
derstand more clearly the basic characteristics o:f value in Fromm's 
system. Values are rooted in all the underlying conditions o:f human 
existence and personality, and any understanding o:f values is predi-
cated upon knowledge o:f these basic needs.1 Man's real sel:f-interest, 
his productive love o:f himsel:f conjunctive with his love o:f others, is 
the resultant objective criterion o:f value. 2 
While values are intimately related to man's needs and tempera-
ment, they are also closely connected to his character, his ways o:f 
canalizing his energy, and are not geneticaily acquired. At times, 
Fromm indicates that values are more relevant to this area even than 
to man's inherited needs.3 It seems to be a weakness o:f his system 
that he never apparently comes to terms with this theoretical incon-
sistency.4 
With values rooted in man's intrinsic nature, value systems may 
be both humanistic and objective. They are humanistic in that the 
source, subject, and regulator o:f the norms is man himsel£, instead o:f 
an external authority which denies man's capacity to make true value 
5 judgments. They are objective in that they depend upon the un:folding 
1 • uvalues' Psychology' and Human Existence' It p. 151 ; Man :for Him.-
sel:f, pp. 20, 220. 
2. "Values, Psychology and Human Exlistenee," pp. 151, 163; Man :for 
Himself, PP• 7, 119-41. 
3. Man for Himsel:f, P• 50. 4. See below, P• 42· 
5. Man :for Himself, pp. 8-13. 
of' man's powers in accord \With the laws of' his nature, and that th~ , 
nature and powers are empirically demonstrable.1 
5. Related Brief' Formulations 
Several other writers have of'f'ered briefer, less extensive con-
ceptual approaches to value in terms of' needs or need satisfactions. 
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Their contributions, though helpful, are of' less importance than those 
already discussed. 
a) Values considered neurologically 
In 1943 at a symposium held at the New School f'or Social Re-
search, Brickner placed the locus of' values within a specific part of' 
the human organism--the brain and nervous system.2 He went on to point 
out that the brain has two parts: the very old thalamus and the very 
new forebrain. This latter has biologically evolved in order to ex-
press human instincts and self-identification. The values which are 
usually expressed in social standards are, as a rule, not consonant 
with what is known of' human nature. But through better education con-
cerning the facts of' man's organic nature, he stated, values could be 
realized which would allow f'or man to live with maximal intelligence 
and health.3 
Bu.ll 1s.f'ormulation was essentially the same, although she did not 
make the rather questionable effort to tie values directly to the 
1. Ibid., PP• 14-20. 
2. Richard M. Brickner, "Man and His Values Considered Neurologic-
ally, tt J. Phil. , 41 ( 1944), p. 225 • 
3. Ibid., PP• 225-43· 
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brain and nervous system.1 To her, values are biologically rooted in 
the individual through the basic motivation of individual and group 
self-preservation. The motivating power of survival as the biological 
basis of values may be seen in such areas as play, patriotism, self-
respect, and emotional maturity. 
Although both of these formulations are interesting and at times 
quite insightful, each has several definite flaws. Brickner takes a 
position which seems to be empirically questionable when he ties val-
ues directly to a particular part of the human organism. The point 
which perhaps he is attempting to make is that since man has some 
neurological differences from "lower" animals a:nd since values are 
uniquely human, they must be rooted directly in these neurological 
differences. However, even this point commits a post hoc fallacy, 
requiring refinement of his position. 
To make self-preservation, even in a somewhat sophisticated form, 
the basic motivation of personality leaves some rather vast areas of 
data unexplained, not least of which is why sheer survival has been so 
often historically rejected as of fundamental value. It is unfortun-
ate that both of these writers overlook a number of problems connected 
with their positions.2 
1. Nina Bull, "The Biological Basis of Value, 11 Sci. mon., 53 (1941 ), 
170-74• Of. Bull, The Attitude Theory of Emotion (11Nervous and Mental 
Disease Monographs, 11 No. 81; New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Mon-
ographs, 1951), PP• 3-13. 
2. Of. Tsanoff, Ethics, PP• 84-102, and Stephen c. Pepper, The Sour-
ces of Value (Berkeley, Calif.~ University of California Press, 1958), 
PP• 612-61. 
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b) Values as need-satisfYing, homeostatic strivings 
In the presidential address of 1953 to,the British Psychological 
Society, C. A. Mace attempted to point out the place values have in 
science generally and psychology specifically.1 Values are what sat-
isfy men's needs, although these must be considered as much psycholog-
ically as biologically. The study of what these satisfactions are, by 
means of empirical observation, is an appropriate task of psychology, 
he concluded. 
This article is, in the opinion of this study, a very sound be-
ginning for a psychology of values based on a ttneed 11 type of defini-
tion. It is unfortunate that it has not been followed up, since Mace 
betrays a satisfying philosophical knowledge and ability to handle 
psychological theory. 
c) Values as generalized secondary needs 
In Thompson's study of child psychology, values were rather loos~ 
ly defined as "generalized secondary-needs," which appear to be social 
and learned.2 They, in turn, seem to rest on the satisfaction of 
man's basic needs together with learning through conditioning.3 There 
is a partial similarity to Murphy's approach, but with much less pre-
cision in term definition and the ability to account for as great an 
amount of data with the theory. 
d) Values as need satisfactions within society 
In his text, Social Psychology, Freeman's definition of value is 
"anything that any individual desires for any reason whatever, tt which 
1. Pp. 200-10. 2. P. 556. 3. Ibid., PP• 124, 129-30. 
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is determined by 11the propensities to approach the pleasant and to 
avoid the unpleasant, to seek whatver is conducive to gratification or 
peace of mind. tt1 Having explicitly postulated this type of psycholog-
ical hedonism as the basis of values, he proceeds to build a descrip-
tion of social change around the concept of value conflict. Much of 
the material is sound and anticipates other theorizing, but on the 
whole his position is not convincingly enough stated nor sufficiently 
grounded in research to be as significant as it might have been. 
B. Research 
The research representing this type of approach to values is not 
so extensive as that of some other groups; nevertheless, there are two 
psychologists who have made significant contributions. White's con-
tent analysis approach is concerned with a variety of values, Maslow's 
with the highest, self-actualization. 
1 • White's Value Analysis 
For purposes of convenience, White's work Will be analyzed in 
terms of its purpose, characteristics, and uses--in that order. 
a) Purpose 
The Value Analysis is a particular application of the general 
technique of content analysis.2 It is an attempt to derive quantified 
1. Ellis Freeman, Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 
1936), PP• 123-24· 
2. Ralph K. White, "Value Analysis: a QUantitave Method for Describ-
ing Qualitative Data," J. soc. Psychol., 19 (1944), PP• 351-58. This 
will be referred to hereafter as 11tlValue Analysis': (article)·" 
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in.formation concerning an individual's or group's values .from any kind 
o.f verbal data.1 
The postulate upon which it rests is that there is al-
ways a tendency .for a person to think about what is 
related to his own needs or values, and to perceive 
his world in terms o.f those values. It .follows, that, 
except where this tendency is counteracted by con-
scious or unconscious tendencies to concealment, a 
person will repeatedly give evidence o.f his needs or 
values wh~never he spontaneously puts his thoughts in-
to words. 
I.f the basic method is used, White contends that data can be ob-
tained which have bearing upon a number o.f psychological .factors re-
lated to values, such as: hostility to other people or persons, sel.f-
approval, social perception and the use o.f stereotypes, sel.f-percep-
tion, ego-ideal, areas o.f .frustration and a ».frustration-satis.faction 
ratio 1 11 ability to take another's viewpoint, perception o.f others' 
values, and values in means-ends relationships.3 
b) General characteristics 
According to White, this analysis has several characteristics 
which a.f.fect its utility as a research instrument. Positively, it is: 
(1) relatively easy to learn and apply;4 (2) .flexible enough to repre-
sent the enormous complexity o.f the data; 5 (3) comprehensible enough, 
when presented with su.f.ficient illustrative material, so that the 
1. Value Analysis: the Nature and Use o.f the Method (New York: Soci-
ety .for the Psychological Study o.f Social Issues, 1951), p. 1. This 
will be re.ferred to herea.fter as "Value Analysis (book)~ C.f. White, 
ttBlack l?oy: a Value Analysis," J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 42 ( 194 7), 
P• 440. 
2. "Value Analysis 11 (article), p. 353. Punctuation is the author's. 
3. Value Analysis (book), pp. 4-9, 17-19. 
4. ttValue Analysistt (article), p. 352. 5. Ibid. 
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reader may know exactly what kinds of data are involved in every con-
clusion reached;1 (4) yielding a larger number of testable hypotheses 
when the fifty basic categories are combined with necessary additional 
ones than a purely ad hoc set of classifications;2 (5) valid in terms 
of describing the content of what a person says when other data is 
available which also sheds light on the original material;3 and (6) 
reliable, with coefficients of correlation from about .70 to about 
.93, as measured by agreement between two analysts on the same data.4 
On the other hand, White notes that although this technique ought 
to be sensitive enough to measure implicit, intangible value judg-
ments, it needs much supplementary qualitative material to be present-
ed with it to convey nuances.5 Broader contexts of meaning can be 
measured if the researcher is careful to take into account the total 
context, the meanings of larger units of material, and qualitative 
1. Ibid., P• 353. Cf. Value Analysis (book), p. 79. 
2. Value Analysis (book), pp. 61-62. 
3. Ibid., p. 84. However, White notes that if by validity one means 
tta mechanically predictable correlation, independent of context and 
independent of the knowledge and insight of the analyst, between a 
content analysis and some sort of psychological fact other than 'con-
tent' itself, u this technique has no validity. 
4. Ibid., PP• 81-82. 
5. "Value Analysis 11 (article), p. 353; Value Analysis (book), P• 59. 
The question may well arise if the measurement of implicit material 
is not asking too much of any type of content analysis. Bernard 
Berelson's definition of this general research technique suggests that 
it applies only to the manifest content of communication; see his ar-
ticle ttcontent Analysis," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social 
Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Col, Inc., 
1 945 ) ' p. 489. 
di~~erences in emphasis.1 Further, Value Analysis is most helpful 
when categories speci~ically tailored to the data are used with it.2 
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This, o~ course, would tend to reduce comparability. When possible, 
too, actions should be included ~or analysis with the verbal data, al-
though actions alone do not proVide su~~iciently reliable in~erences 
about the motivating values) 
c) Uses 
One o~. White's earliest uses o~ this instrument was an analysis 
o~ Hitler's speeches, reported in the section on Attitude and MOrale 
o~ the 1942 American Psychological Association meeting.4 A later com-
parison between these speeches and.Roosevelt 1s o~ the same era was 
made and reported in somewhat more detail.5 A most interesting analy-
sis was also done on Richard Wright's Black Boy and published in1947. 6 
A~ter this work and the 1951 publication o~ the manual, nothing fur-
ther was done with the technique ~or nine years. At present, however, 
White is working on a value analysis comparison o~ Kruschev's and Ken-
nedy's speeches.? No results are yet available on the last. 
1. Value Analysis (book), p. 60. 
3. Ibid., P• 64. 
2. Ibid., P• 61. 
4· "A Quantative Analysis o~ Hitler's Speeches, 11 abs. in Psychol. 
Bull., 39 (1942), 486-87. 
5. ttHitler, Roosevelt, and the Nature o~ War Propaganda, 11 J. abnorm. 
soc. Psychol., 44 (1949), 157-74. 
6. "Black Boy: a Value Analysis," pp. 440-61. 
7 •. Personal correspondence, Sept. 5, 1960. 
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2.<~ Maslow's Studies of Self-actualizing People 
Maslow's work is on-going, but there is a sufficient break be-
tween his first research and that which has followed to deal with the 
initial study separately. 
a) The initial study 
Primarily on the basis of clinical examinations, self-reports, 
anecdotal records, and informal observation, Maslow studied a group of 
people who seemed to be manifesting self-actualization: i.e., the 
highest value. The study was exploratory in nature and without any 
evidence for the usual requirements of validity or reliability. 1 
The subjects included both living, anonymous contemporaries and 
well-known public and historical figures. The total group of fifty-
one was divided into three smaller units, with a breakdown within each 
based on a degree of probability of belongingness.2 
According to his results, these people were found to have the 
following personality characteristics: (1) more efficient perception 
of reality and more comfortable relations with it; (2) ability to ac-
cept oneself, others, and nature in a matter-of-fact manner; (3) rel-
ative spontaneity in behavior, with even more in inner lives; (4) 
problem-centered orientation rather than self~centered; (5) ability to 
enjoy solitude and privacy, and to be objective or even detached con-
cerning surroundings; (6) relative independence of physical and social 
environment; (7) continued fresh appreciation of life 1s pleasures; 
{8) susceptibility to ''oceanic, tt mystic, or npeaktt experiences, in the 
1. Maslow, MOtivation and Personality, p. 2&0. 2. Ibid., PP• 202-203. 
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Jamesian sense; (9) a deep sense of identification, affection, and 
sympathy for humanity; (1 0) deeper and more profound interpersonal re-
lations, though with a smaller group than many; (11) democratic char-
acter structures; (12) deep personal, though not always conventional, 
ethical sense; (1.3) philosophical sense of humor; (14) creativity; 
(15) inner resistance to enculturation and conformity; and (16) con-
current manifestations of common human imperfections.1 
b) Continuing research 
In his continuing study of self-actualizing people, in which it 
is at times somewhat difficult to separate fact from opinion, Maslow 
has enunciated at least one other set of characteristics of self-actu-
alizing individuals. 
With data drawn from various sources, the occurrence of 11B-cogni-
tionn as distinguished from "D-cggnition11 was discovered. This former 
is the cognition of the Being or Essence of a person or thing, com-
pletely apart from its possible utility or relationship to the cog-
nizer.2 "In B-cognition, the experience or the object tends to be 
seen as a whole, as a complete unit, detached from relations, from 
possible usefulness, from expedience, and from purpose.n3 D-cognitio~ 
or deficiency cognition, is the type of cognition most typical of most 
people most of the time, in which things are seen only in relation to 
the perceiver. 
1. Ibid., PP• 203-230. 
2. Note that this suggests a type of unmotivated cognition which is 
in rather sharp opposition to much perceptual theory today. 
3. ucogni tion of Being in Peak Experiences, 11 p. 3. 
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Some of the other more salient characteristics of B-cognition in-
clude; (1) it arises in and is most often a part of the "peak" experi-
ences already alluded to; (2) the percept is fully attended to and be-
comes richer with repeated cognition; (3) B-cognition is less active 
than passive; and (4) the perception tends to be idiographic as op-
posed to rubric, i.e., non-classificatory.1 
C. Evaluation 
The evaluation of this group, as with most of the others, will 
proceed along the lines suggested in Chapter I, covering the material 
from rational, empirical, and heuristic perspectives. Following this, 
some suggestions will be made of points of contact between this psy-
chological work in values and philosophical value theory. 
1 • Ra. tional 
The t~~ principal areas to be covered here have to do with the 
terminological looseness of the psychologists of this group, and the 
tendency displayed by some of them to make a logical leap from the 
valued to the valuable. 
a) Terminological looseness 
This entire group of theorists and researchers, as is true of 
most of the others of the study, is plagued by a lack of precision in 
the formulation of their basic terms and constructs. 
White, for instance, while holding to a basic identity of need 
and value, is by no means clear in his expression of this. His formal 
1. Ibid., PP• 3-23. 
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def'inition of' value 1 f'or instance, is 11any goal or standard of' judg-
ment which in a given culture is ordinarily ref'erred to as if' it were 
self'-evidently desirable {or undesirable).u1 His more fundamental 
def'inition emerges only on closer examination. 
One notes that this suggested def'inition as it appears in context 
is more than a precise def'inition, a partial description instead of' 
the process which he used in arriving at his categories. The equation 
of' needs and values is taken f'or granted, not specif'ied.2 This was 
also done in a discussion of' his value categories under the heading, 
-"No Premature Dogmatism about 'Basic Needs. "'3 This can be further 
seen in his admission that goals and standards of' judgment themselves 
are not easily distinguishable, and that values are likely to appear 
in either of' these f'orms.4 Finally, his list of' values covers exactly 
the same sort of' things which other authors have noted when they set 
out to list needs.5 (See Figure 3.) 
In correspondence, White has clarif'ied his reasoning and con-
f'ir.med the interpretation of' this dissertation. It is quite true, he 
states, that af'ter def'ining a value as a goal or standard of' judgment, 
he tends to ref'er to it as a need or need satisf'action. Why? 11If' I 
have a ~ f'or f'oo.d, my goal is f'ood. u6 
1. Value Analysis (book), p. 13. 
2. 11Value Analysis" (article), P• 353 (quoted above). 
3. Value Analysis (book), p. 14. 4· Ibid., PP• 13-14· 
5. That is, insof'ar as any two lists of' needs tend to agree. 
6. Personal correspondence, Sept. 5., 1960. 
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*From Value Analysis (book), p. 12. 
Maslow himself is not precise in differentiating values as they 
are needs, need gratifications, or capacities.1 Too, while insisting 
on the 11innerness 11 of values, a definite sense of "outernesstt creeps 
in through the introduction of external satisfiers, as in Whitets com-
ment just quoted. This, incidentally, has led Allport to reject this 
whole type of definition as being :t.Q2. "outer. n2 Goldstein 1 s use of 
terms suggests that health is the highest value, the most basic value, 
and the prototype of value. Yet these things are not identical, and 
it is not clear whether or how the relations between health and value 
are to be distinguished in each case. As noted above, Fromm never 
seems to arrive at one explicit definition of value. This may explain 
his difficulty in deciding whether values have to do more with man1 s 
innate biology or his acquired character, although the former tends to 
receive most emphasis. With the exception perhaps of Mace, such con-
ceptual looseness extends to the minor theorists discussed as well. 
b) From valued to valuable 
Psychologists usually have avoided attempts to ascertain the val-
uable, and to deal only with what actually is valued. This group of 
theorists, however, departs from general custom and attempts to estab-
lish a basis for ascertaining the valuable. Their success is open to 
question. 
Maslow, Murphy, and Fromm are motivated throughout by their de-
sire to establish an objective basis for value which is scientifically 
1. See above, p. 17. 
2. Personal correspondence, Aug. 30, 1960. 
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respectable and empirically verifiable. To do this, they have used 
"need" as their key concept. It is held that this robs values of nei-
ther meaning nor motivating power, while at the same time it steers a 
safe course between the Scylla of supernaturalism and the Charybdis of 
ethical relativism. Thus, 
if it could be demonstrated that the organism itself 
chooses between a prior and a subsequent, a stronger 
and a weaker, a higher and a lower, then surely it 
would be impossible to maintain that one good has the 
same value as any other good, or that it is ~ossible 
to choose between them on any permanent basis. 
There is evidence to support the first part of this statement, 
that needs tend to fall into rough hierarchies under specified circum-
stances. It is further accepted by many that values do also.2 But 
there do not seem to be sufficient logical grounds for the latter part 
of the statement in Maslow's ;:positfuo.il. By ruling out supernaturalism, 
he quite evidently means to rule out any kind of metaphysical idealism 
as applied to values. Insofar as needs are organically based, they 
are non-rational, thus ruling out the possibility of a rational basis 
for the choice. Further, it cannot be that there is built into nature 
a set of values necessary to continuing survival, since by Maslow's 
own statements man's highest values are least necessary for survival. 
To state, then, that because organisms act in terms of a rank order of 
1. Maslow, Motivation and Personality:, p. 146. Cf. Ma.slo-vT, 11JHigher' 
and 'Lower t Needs, tt p. 433. 
2. Cf. Urban's point that values, almost by definition, cannot be 
equal. He uses this as an argument for the objectivity of values, in-
sisting that this objectivity is not derivable from identification 
with our experience of them. Fundamentals of Ethics (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1930), pp. 376-79. 
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needs, and therefanevalues, is by itself insufficient for stating that 
they thereby have a ttpermanent basistt for such a value ranking. Mas-
low might either expand his reasons for this conclusion in a manner 
consistent with alternatives so far rejected or specify much more 
closely what he means to be establishing in positing the "objective" 
criterion for value choice. 
2. Empirical 
Maslow, Goldstein, and (to a much lesser degree) Fromm attempt to 
root their propositions concerning value in empirical data. For the 
most part, this is done satisfactorily. However, questions do seem to 
arise at three points: (a) the assumption that a need can be defined 
more empirically than a value; (b) the empirical selection of self-re-
alization and/or health as the basic values, and (c) the demonstration 
of the somatic basis of needs. 
a) Need as an empirical concept. 
A value is often felt to be a term so highly abstract as to be 
unspecifiable in empirical terms. In part to avoid such a difficul-
ty, the psychologists of this group analyze values in terms of needs, 
thus seemingly making it easier to isolate and list them. Maslow, 
Fromm, and White all attempt such lists. When one can thus specify 
the variable, one has presumably become more scientific. This speci-
fication also tends to make quantification easier. Such quantifica-
tion is a well established goal of scientific method. 
But one wonders in point of fact if values have been made more 
amenable to investigation by this, or that they are thereby grounded 
45 
on a sounder empirical base.1 There are many difficulties in making 
lists of needs, as there have been historically in making lists of in-
stincts or drives. White recognizes implicitly that bis quantifica-
tion is not altogether satisfactory when he admits that many intangi-
bles are omitted by his method. MOre to the point, although there is 
some overlap there is also considerable disagreement not only as to 
what items to include in the list, but also on the level of abstrac-
tion to be used in compiling the list. 
Further, almost all those who use need as a key concept come to 
commit a hypostasization fallacy. They tend to treat needs as direct-
ly observable entities--to reify them--when in fact a need is no more 
observable than is a value.2 A need is a construct, derived to ex-
plain behavior, and in that regard is on the same level of abstraction 
as is the concept of value.3 However useful it may be in other re-
spects to eoneeive of values as needs or need satisfactions, one won-
ders still if by so doing values have been made more amenable to ob-
jective description and measurement. 
b) Health and self-realization as empirical concepts 
Empirical problems are raised also by the use of the concepts of 
health and self-realization as central to the system. To Maslow, 
1. David C. McClelland, 11Comments on Professor Maslowt s Paper, tt in 
Jones, p. 34· 
2. Of. Maslow, MOtivation and Personality, p. 66. 
3. Of. Murray, Explorations in Personality, p. 54: 11A need is a hypo-
thetical process the occurrence of which is imagined in order to ac-
count for certain objective and subjective facts.tt 
health (the absence of illness) is the ability to transcend the envi-
ronment, dependent in part on a state of satisfaction of the needs.1 
Goldstein states that health is basic to value, largely because it 
"guarantees man's self-realization.n2 Fromm states essentially the 
same thing and refers to much the same data when he discusses the 
characteristics,. of productivity. 3 
Self-realization as it is usually used here depends largely on 
clinical evidence for validation.4 At the same time, much of this 
evidence suggests that the self is not so much an undivided entity as 
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these psychologists seem to imply. Further, more cognizance might be 
taken of the nonpersonal aspects of value experience(s), including the 
objective demand-nature so emphasized by KBhler.5 
MOre curcial, however, is the point that health and self-realiza-
tion or self-actualization are not purely descriptive concepts, but 
normative ones as well. l~en the selection of people is made who ex-
hibit this, certain (uncriticized) presuppositions seem to be opera-
tive, so that value judgments determine the selection of value charac-
teristics. This is not only empirically questionable, but logically 
as well. Thus, Weisskopf was led to state that: 
1. "Some Theoretical Consequences of Basic Need-gratification, 11 
pp. 409-10. Cf. 11Health as Transcendence of Environment, 11 unpublished 
paper read before the Symposium on Research Implications of Positive 
Mental Health of the Eastern Psychological Association, April 15, 
1960. 
2. 11Heal th as Value, " p. 88. 3. Man for Himself, PP• 218-20. 
4· lYJ.8.slow, npsychological Data and Value Theory, 11 PP• 120-28. 
5. See below, Chapter VI. 
neither the concept of mental or psychological health 
nor the concept of self-actualization in itself seems 
to be an appropriate scientific basis for values be-
cause these concepts are based on implicit value judg-
ments which are not derived from the scientifically 
observed facts.1 
c) The somatic basis of needs 
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Questions must also be raised concerning the extent to which this 
group is able to demonstrate the postulated somatic basis of values.2 
Maslow and Fromm are quite positive on this point, yet both have a 
certain amount of difficulty in demonstrating it. This situation is 
complicated further by their unwillingness to consider a need simply 
as a tension state, which might thus render it in more measurable 
terms. So one notes a tendency to state on the one hand that values 
are biologically based, and on the other to say that some values do 
appear to be learned after all. The question arises if all of the 
data which are used to biologically validate needs might not be ex-
plained equally well on the basis of common cultural learning.3 Mur-
phy and Fromm, while insisting on this physiological base, treat the 
development of values in terms of learning and acquisition.4 It would 
seem, then, that although the hypothesis of the somatic basis of val-
ues is quite tenable, it is not demonstrated beyond question. 
1. Walter A. Weisskopf, 11Comment by Walter A. Weisskopf, 11 in Maslow, 
New Knowledge in Human Values, p. 212. 
2. Cf. McClelland, PP• 32-33. 3. Allport, Personalitz, p. 113. 
4· Cf. Allport's statement that attitudes are biological in origin, 
cultural in influence, and personal in motivation: "Are Attitudes Bio-
logical or Cultural in Origin?" Charact. & Pers., 4 (1936), P• 205. 
3. Heuristic 
The literary quantity produced by this group has been high, and 
their concern for values extensive. Almost, if not all, of Maslow's 
psychological efforts and attempts to understand human nature have 
been motivated by his desire to construct a psychology of value. 1 To 
this end, he has explicitly dedicated h:i.J:nself, and both the quantity 
and quality of his published material bear witness to this fact. 
Fromm and Goldstein, too, have had some influence on the psychological 
study of values. White t a Value Analysis is one of the two or three 
most widely used measuring instruments in this area. 
One must admit, at the same time, that there is some difficulty 
in empirically verifying many of the propositions generated by this 
body of theory and research. Fromm, in particular, seems to have 
stimulated little actual research. However, this group, especially 
Maslow, proves helpful in the areas of value and valuation which it 
seeks to explore. Somet:i.J:nes opening himself to the criticism of ven-
turing beyond the boundaries of psychology into such areas as philoso-
phy, theology, and aesthetics, Maslow has yet made a strong contribu-
tion by his unwillingness to remain within 11safe 11 areas of research. 
Decrying attempts to quantify data too early in the investigative pro-
cess and to rely too heavily on traditional techniques,2 He has stim-
ulated further efforts simply by taking some of the instruments of 
psychology into areas of value hitherto largely unexplored. 
1. Motivation and Personalitz, p. 336. 
2. "A Philosophy of Psychology,tt pp. 225-27. 
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4• Philosophical Relevance 
It has already been suggested that Maslow, Goldstein, and Fromm 
at a number o£ points in their discussions tend to step outside any 
narrowly conceived idea o£ science to bring in material which is dis-
tinctly philosophical in nature. Indeed, one might almost describe 
them as ontologists who began with scientific method and ended in at-
tempting to analyze the na~ure o£ Being and Existence.1 In this they 
provide points for discussion, although perhaps a more sophisticated 
philosophical awareness (such as Allport's) might have helped both 
their philosophy and psychology. 
This group is particularly concerned to root values in man him-
self. Such a concern is likely to meet strong opposition from philos-
ophers and theologians who·find authority for values in some source 
outside man, such as God to Paley2 or Barth.3 
There are points of contact, too, between this group and the· 
nineteenth century utilitarians who saw the highest good in man's hap-
piness as did J. s. Mill,4 or, as in Bentham, in the greatest happi-
1. Cf. Paul Tillich, 11Is a Science of Human Values Possible," PP• 
189-98, and Weisskopf, "Existence and Values, 11 pp. 107-18, in Maslow, 
Nevr Knowledge in Human Values. 
2. William Paley, The Princi les of MOral and Political Philoso h 
(7th. ed.; Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1788 , p. 46. Also cited in 
Alburey Castell, An Elementarr Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Pren-
tice~Hall, Inco, 1954), P• 28. 
3. Karl Barth, The Knowled e of God and the Service o£ God, trans. 
J. L, M. Haire and Ian Henderson New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1939), PP• 18-19. 
4· John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (4th. ed.; London: Longmans, 
Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1871), PP• 9-10. 
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ness of the greatest number.1 One notes also certain parallelswith 
those philosophers who hold some kind of self-realization as a key to 
value and ethics, including Green,2 Mllirhead,3 Urban,4 and Bowne.5 
Possibilities of communication may also exist ~dth exponents of a per-
sonalistic metaphysic. 
Brightman has suggested some questions of importance raised by 
philosophical value theory. They are: 
What are the supreme values of life? On what basis 
ought we to decide that one value i& more valuable 
than another? Are there different types of criteria 
for differen~ kinds of value? Is there an essential 
unity in the whole life of value? Is value objective 
or subjective? Is it essentially an experience of 
personality or not?6 
In these terms, this group of psychologists has attempted to deal 
with, primarily, the personal nature and objectivity of values, and 
the criteria for placing them in rank order. 
1. Jeremw Bentham, Introduction to the Princi lea of MOrals and Ha-
piness, in John Bowring ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Edinburgh: 
William Taitj 1843), Vol. I, p. 1. Cited in.Castell, PP• 42-43. 
2. Thomas Hill Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (4th. ed.; London: Oxford 
University Press, 1924), pp. 206-19. 
3. John H. MUirhead, Elements of Ethics (4th. ed.; New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1932), p. 88. 
4· Fundamentals of Ethics (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1930), 
P• 18. 
5. Borden Parker Bowne, The Principles of Ethics (New York: American 
Book Co • , 1892) , p. 69. 
6. A Philosophy of Ideals (New York~ Henry Holt and Co., 1928),p.211. 
CHAPTER III 
VALUES AS PREDISPOSING SETS 
While the first constellation of psychologists was concerned to 
define values in relation to the biological structure of the individ-
ual, the second (Group Two) is willing to acknowledge that point in 
order to underline the motivational nature of values. It is felt that 
this emphasis on values 1 strong motivational power set against a less 
stringent biological basis can best be made by equating values with 
determining tendencies, predispositions, sets, or some other similar 
term. This group includes some of the most tightly knit theoretical-
experimental investigations (Bruner and Postman) and some of the most 
difficult theorizing (Spranger) to be covered in the dissertation. 
A. Theory 
Two theorists carry the main burden of this group: Spranger and 
Allport.1 Spranger's work was first, but not the better known. Only 
one of his works has been translated into English, although, largely 
through Allport, he has exercised considerable influence on the Ameri-
can scene. To understand Spranger •s treatment of values, one IInlSt 
1. Ross Stagner's definition of value,_though showing some differen-
ces, is in all essentials so similar to Allport's and so brief that it 
will not be considered explicitly here. See his Psychology of Person-
ality (New Yol;'kt McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937), pp. 181-84, and with 
Theodore F. Karwoski, Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 
1952), p. 108 et passim. 
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know first his Geisteswissenshaftliche psychology and its inferred 
methodology, then his types of mental acts, his generic definition of 
value, and the six-fold classification of value types or life-forms 
which follows from them. Allport, with his theoretical debt to 
Spranger, emphasizes heavily the motivational nature of values, in ~e-
lation to and as distinguished from traits and attitudes. 
1 • Spranger t s Life-forms as Value Types 
aO Geisteswissenshaftliche psychology 
To Eduard Spranger, psychology is essentially an appreciative, 
or intuitive, science in the tradition of Dilthey and Jaspers.1 As 
such, it has certain distinct characteristics which set it off from 
other approaches, particularly those prevalent in 1920, the time of 
his first writing of the Lebensformen. 2 
This psychology begins with the understanding (verstehen) of the 
individual. It seeks to sympathize, to enter into the individual men-
tal life, to understand in its unique totality the meaning of mental 
acts and experiences of individual persons.3 As will be seen, its 
purpose is not to analyze nor to dissect, but to empathize and to 
look at in broad perspective. It seeks to comprehend individual men-
1. Emilie Bosshart, DieS stematischen Grundla en der PMda o ik 
Eduard Sprangers (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1935 , passim. Cf. Allport, 
Personality, pp. 227-28, and Abraham Aaron Roback, Psychology of Char-
acter (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1928), pp. 320-36. 
2. Eduard Spranger, Types of Men, trans. P. J. V. Pigors (Halle: Max 
Niemeyer, 1928), P• 7 ftn. · 
3. Spranger, Lebensformen (4. Aufl.; Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1924), 
P• 365. 
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tal events--both through their dominating value set and their place in 
the total context of psychic events. 1 
This psychology is also rooted in philosophy and the cultural 
sciences. Psychology itself focuses upon the subjective, and usually 
the individual, which at first might seem to contradict this culture-
philosophical basis. However, the experiencing subject is always 
viewed within a social and historical context, pereeived as objective 
in relation to the individual and set aside as the particular province 
of the Geisteswissenshaften. Although psychology does not deal imme-
diately with this objective area, it must take note of it at all 
points. Says Spranger: 
One perceives that psychology in this sense always 
can be carried on only in the closest connection with 
the cultural sciences rGeisteswissenshaftenJ.of both 
kinds; the historical-tescriptive and the critical-
normative. As the psychology of perception always 
presupposes a theory of perception, so psychology as 
a whole presupposes the attitude of Geisteswissenshaft. 
The subjective must always and everywhere be reflected 
on the objective. We always, therefore, speak explic-
itly of a §eisteswissenshaftliche psychology.2 
Such a psychology is also a structural (as opposed to elementar-
ist) psychology. Structural psychology, as Spranger uses the term, 
looks for the context of meaning in which any total experience is 
found; it does not focus on the real world as its object, but on the 
subject's cognition of the world; and its approach to understanding 
1. Spranger, Psycholo~ie des Jugendalters (18. Aufl; Leipzig: 
Quelle und Meyer, 1945 , p. 9. 
2. Lebensfor.men, p. 7. Translations are this writer's unless other-
wise noted. 
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mental processes is holistic and synthetic, rather than elementaristic 
and analytic. An elementarist psychology, on the other hand, is mod-
eled on the natural sciences; views the mind-body problem in terms of 
the relations between the psychic and physiological bodily processes; 
looks for the psychic processes which correspond exactly to the objec-
tively determined and accurately determinable external physical world; 
and attempts to understand mental processes through the analysis of 
their elements.1 
The holistic approach is probably the chief distinguishing char-
acteristic of this Geisteswissenshaftliche psychology. 2 It deals with 
the whole complex of experimental contexts, with the total individual 
mind (seale) as a coordinated whole of different value tendencies, 
with meaningfUlly related acts and experiences of a subject. As noted, 
its task is not ultimately to analyze but to appreciate.3 
b) Methodology 
Spranger's approach to the study of the basic life-forms or val-
ue directions is in terms of a particular methodology, which begins 
with isolation and idealization. Particular types are to be isolated 
from experience in an ideal-typical manner. Having isolated each pure 
type, it is then to be related to the others in a totalizing manner. 
If desired, an historical perspective may be added by llindividualiza-
tion," as Spranger refers to it; however, this is beyond his scope.4 
1. Ibid., PP• 3-21. 2. Roback, Psychology of Character, P• 321. 
3. Lebensformen, pp. 3-21. 4· Ibid., pp. 106-107. 
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It may be noted that this methodology is consistent with Spranger's 
approach to understanding by viewing inner processes as parts of lar-
ger wholes •1 
c ) !'-!ental acts 
An understanding of Spranger's definition of a mental act is par-
ticularly necessary to the comprehension of his definition of value, 
for they are very closely related. A mental act is, he states, "the 
weaving-together activity of the self [IchJ through which it brings 
about an effect of overindividual significance. 112 That is, an act is 
an activity of the mental functions which gives meaning independent of 
the individual. It is meaning-giving, spontaneous behavior (the act), 
as opposed to receptive, meaning-given behavior (the experience).3 
Though theoretically distinguishable, in actual practice acts and ex-
periences cannot be so easily separated.4 
These mental acts can be classified into groups according to the 
meaning which each creates, and, as will be seen later, as each also 
therefore realizes a particular class of value. 5 Four of the classes:-
the Economic, Theoretic, Aesthetic, and Religious--do not require a 
second self for completion; the Political and Social do intend another 
person or group. These groups are "pure 11 types, yet are still simul-
taneously present in varying degrees within every single total act.6 
1. Cf. ibid., p. 11, and Allport, 11 The Study of Personality be the 
Intuitive Method, 11 J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 24 (1929), P• 17. 
2. Lebensformen, P• 21. J. Ibid. 4. Ibid., P• 22. 
5 • See below, pp. 5S'-60. 6. Lebensformen, pp. 37, 59. 
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d) Concept of value 
At this point, one has enough information concerning Spranger's 
general approach to turn directly to his generic concept of value. 
According to this view, there are three general ways in which the 
term'value" may be employed. Although Spranger apparently intends to 
suggest that he applies the term in all of these fashions, in point of 
fact he dwells on the third far more than the other two and elaborates 
it to a point at which the summary definition he gives becomes only 
indicative, not exhaustive. The first manner of usage is as a value 
essence, a general species of value such as the Economic, Theoretic, 
~· The second is the realization of value in a real object, so that 
a value essence "appears" in it. The third is the realization of val-
ue in a real psychological subject as a "vailiue experience or value 
act" (Werterlebnis oder Wertungsakt). 1 Although he speaks of values 
at times almost as if they were supraindividual entities, he neverthe-
less seems always to return to say that value has no "real" existence 
apart from a psychic context, and it is in terms of the individual's 
set or attitude (Einstellung) that he develops his work. 
From the point of view of the acting and experiencing individual 
there is, to be sure, a sense in which these values are objective and 
external. They are found in the socially conditioned milieu and, as 
such, are transmitted historically independent of the individual. 2 
1. Ibid., p. 252. 
2. See Spranger, PRdagogische Wahrheiten und Halbwahrheiten (Heidel-
berg: Quelle und Meyer, 1959), pp. 125-26. Cf. Kdhler 1s second type of 
requir~dness below, 
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This seems to be so even though in fact this surrounding objective 
realm is itself rooted in the experiences and creations of human indi-
viduals.1 
It has already been noted that the area of study of Geisteswis-
senshaftliche psychology is the meaning-giving acts and the experien-
ces of the individual mind. This mind, which operates through broad 
patterns of spontaneous activity, operates also through broad patterns 
of value. As acts involve meaning, so also do values. These value 
directions are structured in and articulated through the mind and may 
be classified into type exactly as are the mental acts. 2 In a sense, 
mental acts realize equivalent value types. They are broad disposi-
tions to perceive and to behave in certain ways. 
Thus, one might state concisely and explicitly what Spranger has 
said perhaps unclearly and never in one place. Although values seem 
to be objective to the individual, they are in fact based upon mental 
laws built into the individual. They are interests, attitudes, sets, 
relations to objects, or dispositions to act which predetermine both 
the character and the behavior of an individual. Viewed from the per-
spective of its temporal "enduringness, 11 value is present in a per-
son's character; from an atemporal perspective, in particular behav-
ioral resolutions. Values are not usually conscious nor formulated, 
but may be seen clearly when one abstracts tnem from behavior in their 
llpure forms. 11 They tend to influence the direction of living as a 
whole and each specific act or experience as well. 
1. Lebensformen, p. 26. 2. Ibid., PP· 22-24. 
Spranger, like Maslow, finds values falling into a rough hierar-
chical order. This order is determined by their distance from spa-
tial, temporal, or material attachments and their claim to objectivi-
ty. At the bottom of the list, then, is the Economic value. Next are 
the Aesthetic and Theoretic, v1hich are approximately equal. The Politr-
ical and Social follow, also holding roughly equivalent levels; at the 
top is the Religious.1 
e) The Lebensformen 
Having managed to say this, Spranger proceeded to spend about 
one-fourth of the Lebensformen study in describing the broad types of 
value system (Wertgesichtspunkten) or life-forms. This is the contri-
bution for which he is best known in American psychology and which is 
important for the research which has been stimulated by it. Each of 
these broad value-orientations is determinative of the designation of 
the individual.2 A fUll and detailed exposition of.each type will not 
be attempted here, but rather a briefer description which will serve 
to establish the meaning of each group sufficiently for the purposes 
of this study.3 
(1) Theoretic.--The essential mark of the theoretic or cognitive 
set is objectivity, in which entities appearing in consciousness are 
1. Ibid., pp. 282-304. Cf. Roback, Psychology of Character, PP• 
326-27. 
2. Bosshart, p. 73. 
3. A briefer descri~tion may be found in Spranger, Gedanken zur 
Daseinsgestaltung (Mfrnchen: R. Piper and Co., 1954), pp. 78-95. Cf. 
the Allport adaption of these to be described below. 
59 
so treated that their content is divorced from the subjectivities and 
peculiarities of the perceiving individual. It identifies and distin-
guishes, generalizes and individualizes, connects and separates, rea-
sons and systematizes. The individual displaying this type is guided 
by principles, a desire to be consistent and logical, to be systemat-
ic. Scholars, logicians, and scientists are apt to manifest this val-
ue.1 
(2) Economic.--This is concerned with the useful, the satisfac-
tion of needs and maintenance of life through adjustment to and manip-
ulation of the physical world. 2 This_ individual is motivated by need 
satisfaction in terms of long range adaptation and/or meeting of emer-
gency situations. Merchants, traders, bankers, and businessmen of all 
types tend to be motivated by this value attitude.3 
(3) Aesthetic.--Tbis factor is the "formed expression of an im-
pression" (Geformter Eindruck-Ausdruck).4 In it, an objective picture 
is experienced in its emotional significance and expressed in some ex-
ternal form which somehow harmonizes the interplay of subjective and 
objective factors. The motivation here is the will to form, to rea~­
ize oneself or one's inner form,5 and to be led by a sense of beauty 
or moderation. Artists, particularly those who are creative of them-
1. Lebensfor.men, PP• 109-29. 
2. Note that what Spranger here defines as one value type resembles 
what some of Group One might regard as the prototype of all value. 
J. Ibid., PP• 130-48. 4· Ibid., P• 149. Trans. by Pigors, P• 147. 
5. Cf. self-actualization above. 
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selves rather than of external works, show a tendency to manifest this 
most highly.1 
(4) Religious.--The religious set has to do with the relations 
of single experiences to the total meaning of life; it attempts to 
grasp all of reality in a meaningfully connected whole. The individ-
ual manifesting it is permanently motivated by the desire to create 
the highest and most absolutely satsifying value experience through 
either the affirmation of life, the negation of it, or a dualistic 
combination of both affirmation and negation. ~sticism and pietism 
are movements which contain some of the purest examples of this gener-
al value orientation.2 
(5) PoliticaL--The key word to understanding this is 11power, 11 
particularly in terms of social super-ordination and sub-ordination. 
The prime motivation is the will to power, control, and freedom. This 
ideal type is seen most often in rulers, leaders, and politicians.3 
(6) Social.--The social attitude is marked by sympathy, empathy 
(Sich-im-anderen-fllhlen), the impulse to give oneself to another. It 
is motivated by love, when the intrinsic value of the other soul is 
paramount. Such an attitude is found in philanthropists and Chris-
tians.4 
2. Allport's Concept of Values as :ltt"t,i tudinal Traits 
Both in his theoretical formulations and in his research, Allport 
owes an intellectual debt to Spranger. He has seen in Spranger the 
1. Lebensformen, pp. 149-70. 
3· Ibid., PP• 188-210. 
2. Ibid., PP• 211-48. 
4• Ibid., PP• 171-87. 
motivational and selective power of the subjective values, and has 
taken over this approach in terms of the way value is defined and of 
the categories or classes of value behind the SV (Study of Values). 1 
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This does not mean, however, that he adopted Spranger wholesale or un-
critically. Some modification became necessary in the empirical ap-
plication of the categories, and even the concept itself underwent 
some change as it was used within the framework of Allport's biophysi-
cal definition of personality. 
To appreciate properly Allport's theory of value, one needs to 
understand two other terms employed by Allport. The first is rttrait,n 
the second is "attitude.n 
a) Trait 
OUt of his concern to understand human motivation, Allport has 
appropriated the term "trait" as a concept help.fu.l in understanding 
both the structure and dynamics of personality, as a class term to 
cover any units of organization that any individual has. 2 Trait, to 
Allport, is not just a construct, but is "really there, 11 independent 
of any observer. Trait-names may be inaccurate; traits remain. The 
term refers to "bona fide mental structures in each personality that 
account for the consistency of its behavior.u3 
1. Gordon w. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation 
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1937), p. 295. This will be referred 
to hereafter as "Personality." 
2. Personal correspondence, Aug. 30, 1960. 
3. Personality, p. 289. Of. "What is a Trait of Personality?" J. 
abnorm. soc. Psychol., 25 (1930-31), p. 368. 
6.2 
Traits are built, in part, out of habits, which are regarded as 
specific, stereotyped responses tied to definite stimulus situations. 
Through the fusion and integration of habits, traits arise.1 But they 
go far beyond their beginnings both to direct and to drive behavior; 
they are not only functionally equivalent responses to a wide range of 
stimuli, but also serve actively to select stimuli. 2 
Traits are partially physical insofar as personality is physical, 
but are not directly tied tu basic biological wants. Traits are pri-
marily individual, but groups of individuals may have common traits.3 
Nor are they wholly independent of one another; they are distinguish-
able in terms of their focus, but not any clear-cut, hard and fast 
boundaries.4 They are relatively consistent.5 In summary, then, a 
trait is 
a generalized and focalized neuropsychic system pecu-
liar to the individual, with the capacity to render 
many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate 
and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive 
and expressive behavior.6 
b) Attitude 
Attitudes and traits are alike in several ways: they are· both 
readinesses to respons; both may become dynamic as well; both are 
individualized.? The terms are quite similar and upon occasion may 
1. tt'W,hat is a Trait of Personality?" P• 369. 
.2. Personality, pp • .29.2, 319-.24. 3. Ibid., PP• .297-303 • 
4· Ibid., PP• 3.26-30. 5. Ibid., PP• 30-3.2. 6. Ibid., P• .295. 
7. Allport, "Attitudes," in Carl c. Murchison (ed.), A Handbook of 
Social Psychology (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press, 1935), 
P• 809. 
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even be interchangeable. Allport sees, nonetheless, three usefUl dis-
tinctions between them: (1) while a trait is not closely stimulus-
bound, an attitude has rather well-defined and specific object refer-
ences; (2) a trait is only general, but an attitude may be a specific 
as well as a general state of readiness; and (3) although traits are 
not so clear-cut directionally and are often only stylistic, attitudes 
generally signify approach or avoidance, acceptance or rejection of 
their object.1 
An attitude, then, is: 
a mental and neural state of readiness, organized 
through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic 
influence upon the individual's response to all ob-
jects and situations With which it is related.2 
c) Value 
Values are closely related to both these concepts. Like traits 
and attitudes, they are not found in children but are characteristic 
of the mature personality.3 At times it seems that va~ue, like inter-
est or attitude, may express a given kind of trait.4 
Allport's use of terms reflects this similarity in concepts; 
ttinterest,n "trait," 11value-trait, 11 and "attitudinal trait" are all 
used in defining values.5 Under a topic·dealing with 11personal val-
ues,n he uses the terms "interest" and tlinterest systemu exclusively 
and defines the latter as: 
1. Personality, PP• 293-94· 2. "Attitudes, 11 p. 810. 
3. "Motivation in Personality: Reply to Mr. Bertocci, 11 Psychol. Rev., 
47 (1940), p. 535. Cf. Personality, p. 114. 
4· Personal correspondence, Aug. 30, 1960. 5. Personality, P• 323. 
a tensional condition that may be readily aroused, 
leading to overt conduct in some way satisfying to 
the interest, [and which] also acts as a silent agent 
for1selecting and directing any behavior relating to it. 
Noting these similarities and abstracting from the treatment of 
the terms he has given and the context of his approach to personality, 
one might suggest Allport's short definition of value to be: an indi-
vidual, generalized disposition which is easily aroused and acts not 
only to direct behavior, but to drive it as well. 
B. Research 
The Spranger value classification, which is a deductive, non-em-
pirically grounded system, has proven surprisingly fertile in the re-
search it has produced. This seems to be primarily due to the 1931 
Allport-Vernon A StuQy of Values. This test has been used extensively, 
gone through one revision, and has probably been responsible for the 
independent research that has been based on the Spranger categories. 
In many respects, it seems to be the single value research instrument 
with which all interested psychologists must reckon, either by correc-
tion, supplementation, extension, or direct appropriation. This docu-
ment, then, will be the first to be studied in this section, followed 
by three others designed to correct deficiencies in the SV without re-
linquishing the common theory,2 and concluding with an examination of 
the extensive work on the motivational role of values in perception 
represented by Postman, Bruner, and others. 
1. Ibid., p. 201. 2. But see below that correction which has, p.106. 
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1. Study of Values 
The Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values is an untimed, self-
administering and self-scoring, paper and pencil test designed to 
11measure the relative prominance of six basic interests or motives in 
personality. 111 Originally published in 1931 and revised in 1951, fur-
ther changes were made in the manual in the third edition of 1960.2 
These basic interests or motives are essentially the same as the 
value types of Spranger, to whom explicit credit is given for the the-
oretical inspiration. The only exception to this is the Social type, 
which underwent considerable change in the 1951 revised edition. As 
measured by the test, then, these types briefly are: 
The Theoretical. The dominant interest of the the-
oretical man is the discovery of truth. 
The Economic. The economic man is characteristic-
ally interested in what is useful. • • • 
The Aesthetic. The aesthetic man sees his highest 
value in form and harmony. 
The Social. The highest value for this type is 
love of people. In the Study of Values it is the al-
truistic or philanthropic aspect of love that is meas-
ured. 
The Political. The political man is interested 
primarily in power. • •• 
The Religious. The highest ~alue of the religious 
man may be called unity. • •• 
1. SV manual, p. 3. 
2. All descriptions and references are to the third edition unless 
otherwise noted. A description of the changes made may be found by 
consulting the manual, p. 9. 
3. SV manual, pp. 4-5. 
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The test is constructed in two parts: the first consists of thir-
ty statements or questions with two alternative answers to which one 
indicates his personal preferences with a three-point scoring system; 
the second consists of fifteen situations or statements with four an-
swers or attitudes which one ranks in order. The resultant scores are 
plotted on a chart yielding a profile of the relative positions of 
these values for any individual. (See Figure 4.) The SV has norms 
established on 8369 college students, 5894 male and 2475 female. 1 
2. The Values Inventory: 
a) Lurie 1s initial factor analysis 
The beginnings of the first attempts to correct the SV were in 
1937, when Lurie performed a factor analysis based upon Spranger 1s 
values as an initial rational classification.2 The test constructed 
for the analysis consisted of 144 items, six items for each of the six 
value types covering four classes: the interests of the testee; his 
ideals, standards, and ambitions; his preferences with regard to peo-
ple; and his beliefs and opinions. A score was obtained on each item 
by using a Thurstone-type seven point rating scale from zero for "Com-
plete Rejection" to six for "Complete Acceptance.n3 
Test papers were distributed to 600 students at the University of 
Chicago, yielding 203 usable papers.4 A factor analysis and transfer-
1 • Ibid. , pp. 11-13 • 
2. Walter A. Lurie, "A Study of Sprangerts Value Types by the Method 
of Factor Analysis, 11 J. soc. Psychol. , 8 (1937), pp. 17-37. 
3 • Ibid. , pp • 18-19. 4· Ibid., p. 20. 
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FIGURE 4 
STUDY OF VALUES 
SAMPLE VALUE PROFILES 
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mation were performed on the resulting data, yielding seven factors. 
Folll' of these factors seemed to be primary, while the last three were 
regarded as of less importance. 
Factor I was clearly social and altruistic, having to do with the 
valuing of human relations per se. Factor II was a complex factor 
called the Philistine: aggressive, go-getting, utilitarian, anti-cul-
tural. This factor seemed to include both Spranger's Economic and Po-
litical types. Factor III was plainly theoretical. Factor IV was ~ 
ligious, but probably more closely connected with doctrine and prac-
tice than the sense of unity which Spranger saw. Factors V, VI, and 
VII tended to cut across the folll' basic type classes in that they con-
tributed less to the total variance than the others and showed close 
relationships to some of them. They were tentatively labeled open-
mindedness 1 practicality, and a rather superficial, spectatorial aes-
thetic attitude.1 
b) The construction of the InventopY 
Two years later, Van Dusen, Wimberly, and MOsier bui&t further 
upon Llll'ie t s work by constructing a values inventory?- This seemed to 
have been entitled simply the Values Invento~ and is referred to as 
such here. 
Items were chosen from the first three sections of Llll'ie•s bat-
tery and were arranged into ten item groups designed to yield five 
1. Ibid., pp. 27, 30-32. 
2. Albert c. Van Dusen, Stan Wimberly, and Charles I. MOsier, "Stand-
ardization of a Value·s Inventory, tt J. educ. Psychol., 30 (1939), pp. 
53-62. 
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value scales: Economic (Lurie's Philistine), Social, Religious, Aes-
thetic, and Theoretical. These item groups required choosing subjects 
to teach, reading materials, careers, certain personality traits as 
applied to oneself; and rating magazines, famous people, careers for 
one's children, methods of disposing of a large amount of money, lec-
ture subjects, and the degree of pleasure experienced at a son•s al-
ternative uses of spare time in college.1 
It was scored as was Luriets battery. The standardization group 
consisted of eighty-one male students in introductory psychology 
courses at the University of Florida who satisfactorily completed and 
returned the blanks. Contrary to the authors' suggestion,2 this does 
not constitute a random sample of any universe. 
Results indicated that the test reliabilities were useful for 
group comparisons but too low for individual prediction; they were not 
correlated with intelligence as measured by ACE scores; the Economic 
scale did not seem to measure a unitary trait as Lurie suggested in 
his Philistine scale; low intercorrelations obtained between most of 
the scale scores; a positive relationship existed between first and 
fourth quartile ranks on the scales and scores on the Strong VIB; and, 
with some exceptions, generally positive correlations existed between 
items and scale scores.3 The authors suggested that another revision 
of the test be made on the basis of item analysis and further checks 
with external criteria on validity. This dissertation concurs. Un-
1. Ibid., PP• 54-55. 2. Ibid., P• 55. J. Ibid., PP• 58-60. 
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fortunately, the research was dropped at that point and the recomenda-
tions seem never to have been carried out. 1 
3. The Interest-values Invento;r:y 
In 1939 Glaser and Maller published a values inventory of their 
own designed to improve upon the sv. 2 It was constructed in five 
parts, calling for choices among words, associations with words, al-
ternative answers to· problem situations, a section of words for a 
self-estimate measure, and a final group of questions designed to dis-
tinguish between happy and unhappy individuals. The standardization 
group was unspecified. 
The six value categories of the SV were reduced to four, similar 
to their counterparts in the SV. The Theoretic person was character-
ized by intellectual curiosity and an interest in the discovery of 
truth. The Aesthetic was appreciative and responsive to form, color, 
design, beauty, symmetry, ~· The Social was marked by concern for 
others' welfare. The Economic tended to evaluate things in terms of 
tangible, practical utility.3 
The test was validated by the use of criterion groups of known 
vocational interest and the criterion of internal consistency. Relia-
bility was determined by the test-retest method, with an £ (corrected 
1. Lurie, personal correspondence, Aug. 29, 1960, and VanDusen, 
personal correspondence, Sept. 9, 1960. 
2. Edward B. Glaser and Julius B. Maller, 11The Measurement of Interest 
Values, 11 Charact. & Pers., 9 (1940-41), 67-81. 
3· Ibid., PP• 76-77. 
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for coarse groupings) of .942, and R's ranging from .87 to .93 for the 
individual values. 1 
The authors suggested that this measure improved over the SV in 
that it provided a more uniform Social measure; eliminated the Politi-
cal and Religious values; provided an indirect measure based on word 
association; gave a section of responses in which the alternative 
chosen was independent of the degree of preference expressed for other 
alternatives; and which as a whole vTas a more reliable instrument than 
the sv.2 
4· Shorrts Value Intensity Test 
Eight years ago Shorr published preliminary work on a test at-
tempting to supplement and correct the SV by establishing a test to 
measure absolute value intensity .3 This was to remedy the 11hydraulic 
pump" arrangement of the SV profile and to make finer discriminations 
possible within each scale. 
The Economic and Political scales of the SV were combined and the 
Religious dropped, leaving four categories: Theoretic, Economic-polit-
ical, Aesthetic, and Social. From a preliminary listing, a panel 
rated each item on a Thurstone-type eleven point scale. Two for each 
scale value were chosen for each of the four categories on the basis 
of the panel ratings; negative questions were then eliminated leaving 
a final grouping of eighty items. For scoring purposes, each was 
1. Ibid., PP• 71-74• 2. Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
3. Joseph Shorr, "The Development of a Test to Measure the Intensity 
of Values," J. educ. Psychol., 44 (1953), p. 266. 
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weighted so that the greatest interest yi~lded the highest score with 
a maximum of ten points for any single item. Reliability coefficients 
ranged from .72 to .84 using the split half method for each scale.1 
At the time of initial publication, it was noted that fUrther re-
search was being carried on in order to secure data on various occupa-
tions. Inquiry, however, has failed to uncover any fUrther informa-
tion. 
5. The Role of Values in Human Perception 
In 1947 Bruner and Goodman published a paper having to do in part 
with the role of value in perception~ In an attempt to deal with this 
more adequately and concurrently to evolve a valid general theory of 
cognition, a series of papers followed during the next five years, 
most of them by Bruner and Postman working alone, together, or with 
other collaboraters. 
a) The initial Bruner and Goldman study 
This first study had to do with behavioral determinants involved 
in the size perception of coin•s and medium. gray discs. Several :facts 
emerged: the coins (socially valued objects) were judged larger in 
size than gray discs; the greater the value of the coin, :for the most 
part, the greater the discrepancy between judged size and actual size; 
poor children tended to over-estimate the size of coins considerably 
more than did rich children.3 These :findings were taken to validate 
1. Ibid., P• 272. 
2. Jerome Bruner and Cecile Goodman, 11Value and Need as Organizing 
Factors in Perception," J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 42 (1947), 33-44· 
3. Ibid., PP• 38-.~9. 
the hypothesis that 
the greater the social value of an object, the more it 
will be susceptible to organization by behavioral 
[roughly, learne4} determinants, (anq) the greater the 
individual need for a socially valued object, the more 
marked will be the operation of behavioral determi-
nants.1 
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A corrective study by Carter and Schooler suggested that this was true 
in terms of coin estimation only when the coin was absent.2 
Using discs inscribed with a dollar sign, a swastika, and a 
square, experiments were carried out which indicated that symbolic 
value also was a determinant in organizing perception.3 The relation-
ship, however, 'tvas far from being one-to-one. It was stated that ei-
ther a positive or negative value might have accentuated perceptual 
size, although in some cases certain kinds of negative stmbols might, 
on the contrary, have lead to negative or no accentuation.4 
b) The key research by Postman and others 
In what is perhaps the best known study of the series, Postman, 
Bruner, and Elliott MCGinnies collaborated on the investigation of the 
role which personal values played in the selection of various stimuli.5 
1. Ibid., PP• 36-37. 
2. Iaunor F. Carter and Kermit Schooler, 11Value, Need and Other Fac-
tors in Perception, 11 Psychol. Rev., 56 (1949), pp. 203, 2Cf7. 
3. Jerome Bruner and Leo Postman, 11Symbolic Value as an Organizing 
Factor in Perception,n J. soc. Psychol., 27 (1948), 203-208. 
4• Ibid., pp. 206-207, and Bruner and Postman, 11Tension and Tension-
release as Organizing Factors in Perception, 11 J. Pers .. . 1 15 ( 1946-4 7), pp. 306-3(!]. Cf. Postman and Murphy, 11The Factor of Ittitude in Asso-
ciation Memory, 11 J. exp. Psychol., 33 (1943), 228-38. 
5. "Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception, 11 J. abnorm. 
soc. Psychol., 43 (1948), 142-54· 
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To this end a group of thirty-six words was selected from an original 
list representing the six values of the Allport-Vernon SV (1931 edi-
tion). They were controlled for length and, as fa~ as possible, for 
familiarity. These words were exposed in a modified Dodge Tachisto-
scope to twenty-five Harvard and Radcliffe students for increasing 
lengths of time until correct identification was made. Each student 
was asked to report what he saw or thought he saw. For an indepen-
dent measure of value orientation, the SV was administered individual-
ly to each of the students. This yielded the following data for each 
subject: 
(1) Time of recognition for 36 words representing the 
six Spranger values. 
(2) Attempted solutions preceding recognition of the 
actual words. 
(3) Score profiles on the Allport-Vernon te~t which 
could be evaluated against population norms. 
It was discovered that there was a high degree of association be-
tween value orientation and word time of recognition; 11the higher the 
value represented by a word, the more rapidly is it likely to be rec-
ognized."2 In addition, further suggestive facts emerged when the 
presolution responses or hypotheses were analyzed. These were clas-
sified into (1) covaluant responses, in which a word clearly repre-
seriting the same value area was reported; (2) contravaluant responses, 
in which a derogatory or opposite word in meaning was seen; (3) struc-
tural responses based on the morphological characteristics of the 
1. Ibid., P• 146. 2. Ibid., P• 148. 
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stimulus word; (4) nonsense responses, consisting of groups which were 
not words or of partial descriptions; and (5) unrelated responses, the 
residual category. It was found that the covaluant and contravaluant 
responses discriminated between high- and low-value words at the .05 
level of significance.1 
McGinnies later reported similar results with the influence of 
values on word association time.2 In another corroborative study, 
Vanderplas and Blake found the same effects with sensitization for 
auditory stimuli.3 There is a limited amount of evidence indicating 
as well that the number of associations of a word is correlated with 
its value strength.4 
Shortly thereafter, Solomon and Hawes criticized the Postman, 
Bruner and McGinnies study in part for not controlling for word fre-
quency, as measured by the Thorndike-Lorge word count, and repeated 
the experiment with this additional control.5 Their results tended to 
1. Ibid., p. 150. 
2. 11Personal Values as Determinants of Word Association," J. abnorm. 
soc. Psychol., 45 (1950), 28-36. 
3. James M. Vanderplas and Robert R. Blake, 11Selective Sensitization 
in Auditory Perception, 11 J. Pers., 18 (1949-50), 252-66. 
4· w. A. Bousfield and Gloria Samborski, 11The Relationship between 
Strength of Values and the Meaningfulness of Value Words, 11 J. Pers., 
23 (1954-55), 375-80. 
5. Richard. L. Solomon and Davis H. Hawes, "Word Frequenc,-, Personal 
Values, and Visual Duration Thresholds, 11 Psychol. Rev., 58 (1951), 
256-70. For a penetrating criticism of this article in turn, see Joe 
Adams and Donald R. Brown, 11Values, Word Frequencies, and Perception," 
Psychol. Rev., 60 )1953), 50-54. 
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seriously qualify the conclusions earlier accepted. In response to 
this criticism, a revised experiment was conducted independently b.1 
Postman and Schneider, with results indicating that word frequency was 
still not suf'f'icient to account f'or the dif'f'erences and that rtthe only 
source of' variance which reaches statistical signif'icance is value 
rank. 111 
C. Evaluation 
1. Rational 
Two areas of' comment are called f'or in this f'irst section of' dis-
cussion and evaluation: the degree of' conceptual consistency adhered 
to throughout b.1 these psychologists, and the SV1s theoretical debt to 
Spranger. 
a) Degree of' conceptual consistency 
As Maslow and others in Group One were motivated in their f'ormu-
lations b.Y a desire to place values within the human organism, Allport 
was moved by a concern to emphasize not only their inner nature, but 
more particularly their motivational nature. He wished to have his 
discussion of' values always understood 11in accordance with this sub-
jective (inner) view of' personal dispositions. 112 
His precision in the use of terms, however, may not always 
make this as clear as he might wish. Perhaps the best single illus-
tration of this f'act is in The Individual and His Religion, in which 
1 • Leo Postman and Bertram H. Schneider, 11Personal Values, Visual 
Recognition, and Recall, 11 Psychol. Rev., 58 (1951 ), 271-84. 
2. Personal correspondence, Aug. 30, 1960. 
Allport defines a value as ''anything that yields a satisfaction or 
provides a means for such satisfaction.u1 This definition does not 
seem to be entirely consistent with his over-all concern. It would, 
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in fact, seem more in line with the need satisfaction kind of defini-
tion of Group One. 
When queried concerning this, he defended the usage on a contex-
tual basis. After noting that this use was perhaps more 11outer 11 than 
11inner 11 as he usually used the terms, he stated: 
There may be a contradiction, but I can only plead 
that we all use terms to fit a context. (The word 
11round 11 can be used as adjective, noun, or verb--
depending on context. )2 
After discussing a different use of the word as covered in Group Three 
(Chapter IV of this dissertation), he further said: 
The term is--as you have turned up--used at three lev-
els. And this is simply a fact. I see no right or 
wrongA or even any inconsistency. Terms are like 
that.-' 
Allport, then, admits to a difference in usage; whether this dif-
ference is an inconsistency or not seems to be the issue. To this 
study it seems reasonably clear that the difference is real and not 
simply a matter of convenience--certainly not a grammatical difference 
in which the same basic term is used as a different part of speech.4 
A value may well be an inner disposition without being an item which 
yields satisfaction, and vice versa. If Allport intends that this 
1. New York: Macmillan and Co., 1957J p. 13. 
2. Personal correspondence, Aug. 30, 1960. 
4. One wonders if Allport selected this particular illustration some-
what hurriedly and might perhaps revise it upon closer examination. 
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latter be taken as part of the definition, it probably would be just as 
well for him to make this explicit. Otherwise, one must hold to the 
belief that Allportts use of the term--at least in this case--is suf-
ficiently different from the rest of his work so as to constitute a 
real break from it: in short, an inconsistency. 
Bruner and Postman, on the other hand, have worked from a well-
defined and steadily maintained conceptual framework to a higher de-
gree than any covered in this study. Significantly enough, a partial 
statement of their theory appeared in their first published article. 
At that time, two types of perceptual determinants were distinguished: 
autocthonous and behavioral. Autocthonous determinants ' .. are those 
which ttreflect directly the characteristic electrochemical properties 
of sensory end organs and nervous tissue, 11 which are highly predic-
table and immediately organically deter.mined. 1 Behavioral determi-
nants are also doubtlessly organically based, but the connections are 
as yet not understood. This latter group includes 11those active, ad-
aptive functions of the organism which lead to the governance and con-
trol of all higher-level functions, including perception. n2 
In the act of perception, the perceiver himself actively performs 
four functions : 
~fuat is seen is, first of all, a selection from a near 
infinitude of potential stimuli. The stimulus adequa-
cy or potential of the environment is too great for an 
organism to perceive 11everything. 11 Secondly, 'percep-
tion is the result of organization. What is seen is 
seen as an organized configuration. The perceiver, 
moreover, accentuates certain percepts at the expense 
1. Bruner and Goodman, P• 34 2. ~· 
of' others. Parts of' the stimulus f'ield are more high-
ly vivified and dominate perceptual organization more 
than other parts. Finally, taking into account the 
time dimension, what is 11habitually seen" in any given 
perceptual situation is a function of' the fixation of' 
past perceptual responses in that situation.l 
79 
These functions are all directly influenced by behavioral deter-
minants. And value, as it is used throughout these experiments, is 
simply a type of' behavioral determinant. It is "an active, selective 
dispositionn which influences perception through the perceiver.2 The 
term is intended to ref'er to a dynamically influential state of' readi-
ness, exactly as it is with Allport.3 Thus, the theory and research 
ref'lect consistently the desire to investigate the role played b.1 val-
ues in the perceptual phenomena which guide behavior.4 
b) The SV's theoretical debt to Spranger 
The SV leans heavily on Spranger for much of' its theory. This 
dependence was one of' the explicit postulates upon which the SV was 
based.5 However, Vernon and Allport's dependence upon Spranger was 
1. Bruner and Postman, 11An Approach to Social Perception, tt in Wayne 
Dennis et al., Current Trends in Social Psychology (Pittsburgh: Uni-
versity of' Pittsburgh Press, 1948), PP• 83-84. 
2. Postman, .Bruner, and McGinnies, P• 148. 
3. McGinniss, p. 35. Cf. Elliott McGinniss and "t-1arren Bowles, 11Per-
sonal Values as Determinants of' Perc~ptual Fixation, 11 J. Pers., 18 
(1949-50), P• 231. 
4. Jerome .Bruner and George S. Klein, liThe Functions of' Perceiving: 
Ne"l.v Look Retrospect 1 11 in Bernard Kaplan and Seymour Wapner ( eds. ) , 
Pers actives in Ps cholo ·cal Thea (New York: International Univer-
sities Press, 1960 , p. 63. This article is a good, up-to-date qver-
view and evaluation of' the whole ttmovement 11 represented here. 
5. Philip E. Vernon and Gordon w. Allport, 11A Test f'or Personal Val-
ues," J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., ~6 (1931), P• 232. 
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selective, not exhaustive. They adopted his belief in the importance 
of values for understanding personality, and his six-fold classifica-
tion. They were, and presumably are, neutral toward other tenets, 
such as: 
(1) The doctrine of an 11overindividualtt mental struc-
tural context of which we living individuals are a 
part. 
(2) The predestination (entelechy) of the Lebensform-
en in the individual, with minimal emphasis upon the 
role of environment; likewise, the historical, as con-
trasted to the psychogenetic, determination of person-
ality. 
(3) The ordering of the six categories of value in 
respect to their ethical worth. 
(4) The defense of the ultimate adequacy of the six 
types, and the reduction of other important spheres to 
these six. 
(5) The doctrine of 11personal and objective under-
standing" (Verstehen) with the rejection of inference 
and analogy as bases of our knowledge of personality. 
(6) The belief t~at the totality of mind exists in 
every mental act. 
It is interesting to note that Allport does not ever seem to give 
explicit credit to Spranger for influencing his concept of value per 
~' as operationally defined in the test. The relationship, however, 
seems clear enough, particularly since Allport•s thinking was influen-
ced by his early acquaintance with the German Verstehen school. At any 
rate, soon after its introduction, he made explicit the definition used 
in the SV: "generalized dynamic dispositions of personality which di-
rect and determine the type of response which an individual will make 
1. Ibid., P• 232 ftn. 
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to the varied situations confronting him in his daily life.n1 There 
is, then, good eYidence for a connection, be it explicit or implicit, 
with Spranger both at the point of value classification and value defi-
nition. 
2. Empirical 
An empirical evaluation of this group suggests that some atten-
tion be paid to Spranger 1s possible relation to objective idealism, in-
eluding the kinds of data he uses to support his theory, followed by an 
examination of the variables which perhaps are actually being measured 
by the SV. 
a) Spranger as an objective idealist 
Maslow, it has been noted, derives value from biological facts; 
Allport finds confirmation of value there, but not derivation.2 
Spranger does neither. The question arises, then, of the kinds of em-
pirical data, if any, which Spranger uses for evidence of his theoreti-
cal system. 
Let it be said first that his system was arrived at deductively, 
not as an explanation of some body of experimental data. His value 
types are ideal types, and do not necessarily manifest themselves in 
specific individuals. Nor is Spranger very much bothered by this. 
Rather, he states, these types are validated by their ttface validityn 
and their apparent ability to explain a rather extensive range of men-
1. H. Cantril and Gordon w. Allport, 11Recent Applications of the Study 
of Values," J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 28 (1933-34), P• 265. 
2. Weisskopf, "Comment by_ 1-Ialter A. Weisskopf, 11 P• 210. 
82 
tal phenomena.1 This, so far as he is concerned, seems to be quite 
sufficient. 
The question might then arise as to where these values are to be 
found; i.e., if they are not directly derived from experience) in what 
sense are they empirical at all? Evidence is not altogether lacking 
which indicates that Spranger is an objective idealist, that he lives 
in a world of absolute concepts, and that his values also reside in 
this Platonic realm of absolute Ideals. 2 If so, this would tend to 
remove them from the area of scientific investigation. 
There is, however, an aspect of his theory which does give a ba-
sis for empirical investigation and weakens the evidence suggesting 
that he is an absolute idealist. To be sure, Spranger does postulate 
an overindividual milieu of genuine, normative values which set the 
criteria for judging how the individual evaluates and point, not to-
-,;vard things as they are, but as they should be. But "normative, 11 as 
he intends the term, has to do not with metaphysics but with standards. 
Since this by definition indicates a future state, not a present, he 
can then conclude that values, at least in the present, do not have 
any existence in a metaphysically objective sense.3 This does not 
sound like idealism. Too, overindividual is used only in a sociologi-
cal sense; value actually has life in (and only in) the focal points 
of individual minds.4 As already noted, he states that this realm is 
1. Lebensformen, P• 319. 
2. Allport also points this out in personal correspondence, Aug. 30, 
1960. 
3. Lebensformen, pp. 16-17. 4· Ibid., P• 401. 
.·rooted in individuals and emphasizes most heavily that it is (only) 
perceived by the individual as objective) Finally, in the closing 
pages of Lebensformen, he concludes that the value types are leit-
motifs by which one understands the internal thrust and direction of 
developing individuality.2 
Thus Spranger does not appeal to many of the kinds of empirical 
data usually cited to support positions in the area of psychological 
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value theory. Nevertheless, by insisting in his work on the individ-
ual locus and ttsettt nature of his types, he has left the door open for 
the type of empirical investigation which his thinking has stimulated. 
b) Variables measured by the SV 
Apart from methodological criticism of the test as a whole out-
side the scope of this study, questions have arisen concerning the 
variables actually being measured by the SV. It has been suggested, 
for example, that Part I of it may be measuring a response set to mark 
items in a particular way, rather than the set intended by the au-
thors.3 Mbre directly, Adams and Brown state their belief that the SV 
confounds to some extent two psychological dimensions 
which can be separated, namely interest and value. An 
individual can be interested in a given area even 
though he has a strong disagreement with individuals 
or institutions operating in that area. For example, 
a militant atheist may be very interested in religion 
though harboring little value for religious beliefs or 
experiences. Because of the way in which the Allport-
Vernon test (1931 edition; no changes in the revision 
1. See above, p. 56. 2. Lebensformen, P• 391. 
3. N. L. Gage, review of Study of Values (rev. ed.), in Oskar Krisen 
Bures (ed.), Fifth Mental Measurements Year ~ok (Highland Park, N. J.: 
Gryphon Press, 1959), P• 201. 
would affect the point being made] is constructed and 
scored, it seems to us that interest and value are 
confounded, though no doubt these two variables are 
correlated to some extent.1 
It seems to this~udy in turn that the criticism, although cer-
tainly worth noting, presents some difficulties itself. First, the 
SV explicitly equates interest and value and defines what it means by 
these terms. Rather than implying that the study unknowingly con-
founds two separate variables, Adams and Brown might better say that 
the theoretical concept of value used seems inadequate. Second, one 
wonders if these authors have examined closely enough the theoretical 
backgrounds of this test, including the particular way in which the 
term "interest" has been used and defined by Allport et al., and the 
ideal-typical nature of the categories. Since, however, Adams and 
Brown do not clearly define their own terms nor present any alterna-
tives which might clarify their meaning, it must for the present be 
concluded that they, too, have been somewhat limited by the conceptual 
imprecision which has seemed characteristic of too many psychologists 
working in the area of values. 
The question might also be raised as to whether the construction 
of the test might not imply a definition of value as a preference or 
judgment, similar to Group Tb.ree.2 Adams and Brown hint that this 
might be their personal alternative definition, but do not say so 
' 
specifically. Certainly the test is so built as to ask for prefer-
1. Pp. 50-51. 
2. Cf. William A. Scott, 1~irical Assessment of Values and Ideolo-
gies," Amer. sociol. Rev., 24 (1959), p. 301. 
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ences, when perhaps some sort of study of time investment or of per-
caption might be more appropriate. If this confusion be so, it would 
help to explain why Sumner's Ed. D. dissertation defined values in 
terms of preferential behavior following MOrris, but used the SV to 
measure it. 1 
3. Heuristic 
Spranger, principally through Allport, is the source of most of 
the research carried out b.1 psychologists described and interpreted in 
this chapter. His theories have not actually been directly tested, 
nor is the SV itself or any of the other instruments developed here a 
direct validation of them. 2 Nevertheless, this group has been the 
most productive of research in values. The last published biblio-
graphical listing in Bures referred to 143 entries for the sv.3 Cer-
tainly, the Bruner and Postman group has undertaken a significant task 
in its series of investigations, and has handled it quite satisfactor-
ily. Thus, this group as a whole has shown an amazing vitality, com-
paratively speaking, in its ability to suggest ideas, produce empiri-
cal propositions, and even to arouse disbelief, resistance, and there-
fore further research. 
1 • Earl David Sumner, I!Qn the Relation of Manifest Needs to Personal 
Values: A Factor Analytic Study Involving R and Q Techniques, 11 ab-
stract of an Ed. D. dissertation, Diss. Abstr., 1S (1958), P• 2219. 
2. William Stephenson, review of Study of Values (1951 ed.), in 
Bures, Fourth Mental Measurements Yearbook (Highland Park, N.J.: 
Gryphon Press, 1953), p. 157. 
3. Fifth Mental Measurements Yearbook, PP• 201-202. 
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4. Philosophical Relevance 
This group as such seems to present limited direct relevance to 
particular positions in philosophical value theory. There is some 
similarity between these definitions and Hilliard's, who defines value 
as Uaffectivity occurring in the relational contexture determined by 
the reaction of an organism to a stimulus object," and thereby locates 
value specifically in the organism's reaction which structures the 
stimulus context. 1 On the whole, however, since this group is in 
something of a mediating position between Group One and Group Three, 
the rele~ce is better discussed directly in terms of these latter 
groups. 
This group is concerned with the personal nature of values, and 
it makes its chief contribution by its stress on their motivational 
nature--that they both initiate and direct behavior. This would, of 
course, tend to oppose any· .. a:xiological position which would see them 
as being exclusively verbal or semantic (a position, incidentally, 
which seems no more popular in philosophy than psychology). 
1. A. L. Hilliard, Forms of Value (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1950), P• 42. 
CHAPTER IV 
VALUES AS PREFERENCES 
Thus f'ar in this study, def'ini tiona of' value have been examined 
which relate values either entirely (Group One) or primarily (Group 
Two) to the human organism. At this point, another group of' def'ini-
tiona emerges which, while recognizing the biological background 
shared b.1 all human beings, yet insists that values arise only when 
choices are made. These choices contain an intellectual or rational 
element, and it is sometimes stated that the more this element is al-
lowed to operate, the better the choices and the sounder the values. 
Together with environmental determinants, this category emphasizes a 
dif'f'erent set of' variables in understanding what is meant by value. 
A. Theory 
Dewey's theoretical pioneering in this group is unmistakable, not 
only as a philosopher and educator, but as a psychologist too. Be-
cause of' this and because of' his already implied temporal priority, he 
will be studied f'irst. M:>rris, whose theory bears obvious parallels 
to Dewey's, will be noted next, concluding with that of' Asa.hel Wood-
ruf'f', whose writing seems to be uniquely his own. 
1 • Dewey's Theory of' Values as Behavioral Choices 
'
6 Although Dewey's early theory, like Spranger's, anteda tea the 
material which is the foundation of' this study, his inf'luence has been 
almost undeniable. Hull has identif'ied his own position specifically 
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with Dewey;1 Thorndike's limited work in this area evinces an almost 
identical theory. 2 To trace the contributions which provide the foun-
dations for this influence, then, one can best discuss Dewey's generic 
value theory from two aspects: (a) the context of human experience 
within which valuation takes place, and (b) the relation of value 
judgments to other types of practical judgments. 
a) Values in human experience 
Despite some evidence to indicate that in the closing years of 
his life Dewey felt that the term ttexperiencen may have lost its spec-
ial usefulness in his system through misinterpretation, be still used 
it consistently to designate, in part, the context within which values 
arise. It was mainly intended to suggest the idea of organic transac-
tion with and in nature--continuity, fluidity, process, event, con-
text, situation--which is yet also social.3 
Experience and nature viewed thus are inseparable. Experience 
constitutes not only all of man's commerce with the universe, but is 
the means of discovering or knowing this universe as well.4 So he 
summarizes it: 
1. Clark L. Hull, uvalue, Valuation, and Natural-science Methodology," 
Phil. Sci. , 11 ( 1944) , p. 125 • 
2. Edward Lee Thorndike, Selected Writings from a Connectionist's 
Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), P• 333. 
Cf. H. G. Schrickel, nan the Objectivity of Aesthetic Values, 11 PsychoL 
~' 50 (1943), P• 624. 
3. Cf. George Geiger, John Dewey in Perspective (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 195S), p. 16. 
4. Thus the title of his volume, Experience and Nature. 
Nature and experience are not enemies or alien. Ex-
perience is not a veil that shuts man off from nature; 
it is a means of penetrating continually further into 
the heart of nature. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Experience is of as well as in nature. It is not ex-
perience which~s experienced, but nature •••• 
Things interacting in certain ways ~ experience; 
they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other 
ways with another natural object--the human organism--
they are how things are experienced as well. Experi-
ence thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. It 
also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent.1 
Experience is also continuous within itself. It is of a simgle 
piece, containing within it episodes, pauses, consummations--if you 
will, semicolons rather than periods. With the unity of experience 
and nature thus understood, a traditional dualism is broken down which 
leads directly to the downfall of other apparent dualisms~ subject-ob-
ject, mind-body, individual-social, and ends-means.2 
The breadtdown of this last dualism is paramount to an under-
standing of values, for values have to do directly with individual re-
flection on ends-means relationships.3 Ends traditionally have been 
thought of as some kind of final goal; ends are said to be ultimate 
and means instrumental. This is false, claims Dewey, for ends and 
means are of a single piece.4 The rhythms of life give rise to dif-
1. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (2nd. ed. rev.; Chicago: Open 
Court Publishing Co., 1929), pp. iii, 4a-1. 
2. Ibid., passim. 
3. Cf. John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics (rev. ed.; New York: 
Henry Holt and eo., 1932), PP• 197-200, 229-30. 
4. Theory of Valuation ("International Encyclopedia of Unified Sci-
ence," Vol. II, No. 4; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), 
P• 43. 
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£erent perspectives for viewing acts, but this is all; the difference 
is simply a distinction in judgment, not a division in reality.1 As 
Dewey puts it: 
the ttend 11 is merely a series o£ acts viewed at a re-
mote stage; and a means is merely the series viewed at 
an earlier one. The distinction o£ means and end 
arises in surveying the course o£ a proposed line o£ 
action, a connected series in time. The 11end 11 is the 
last act thought of; the means are the acts to be per-
£ormed prior to it in time. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(Ends] are not, as current theories too o£ten imply, 
things lying beyond activity at which the latter is 
directed. They are not strictly speaking ends or ter-
mini o£ action at all. They. are terminals o£ delib-
eration, and so turning points ~ activity.2 
Within this continuity o£ experience, values also relate to the 
sense of consummation which marks off particular episodes or experien-
ces. In this sense, values are immediate, and, to this extent, Dewey 
shares thinking with all of the theorists noted so far. But to say 
that values are immediately experienced is to say only the first thing 
about them, neither the last nor the most distinctive? Values do in-
deed involve prizing, desiring, holding dear, and the like, but are 
not to be equated with them.# The further necessary perspective is to 
1. Human Nature and Conduct (MOdern Library edition; New York: Random 
House, Inc., 1930), p. 36. 
2. Ibid., pp. 34, 223. The italics are Deweyts. 
3. Theory ofValuation, pp. 177-97. Cf. Dewey, 11Some Questions about 
Value, tt J. Phil., 41 (1944), 451-53. 
4. "Valuation Judgments and Im.m.edia te Quality, 11 J. Phil. , 40 € 1943 ) , 
p. 312. Cf. Dewey, Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 
Inc., 1946), p. 254· 
understand values in their conative preferential aspect, insofar as 
they are a particular kind of practical judgment. 
b) Values as practical judgments 
Values arise in immediate experience when the experience of en-
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joyment begins to compete with other enjoyments or desires or when it 
begins to grow stale--in short, when a problem arises. 1 When this 
happens,. some sort of decision or choice must be made. When, further, 
this decision has reference to some future course of events to which 
one is committed by making the choice, the decision is said to be a 
"practical judgment, tt a judgment of practice. 
All judgments to be sure are to some degree intellectual or theo-
retical, but practical judgments have certain characteristics in Dew-
eyts thinking which serve to differentiate them. Since value judg-
menta, b,r definition, partake of these characteristics, it would be 
well to point them out. 
(1) "Their subject-matter implies an incomplete situation.u2 
It is a judgment about the nature of the situation (which involves the 
self) in which the subject matter is somehow incomplete, not wholly 
given, unterminated. 
(2) "Their subject-matter implies ·that the proposition is itself 
a factor in the completion of the situation, carrying it forward to 
its conclusion. u3 The proposition is a judgment that some type of 
1. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago: University of Chic-
ago Press, 1916), p. 367. 
2. Ibid., p. 337. 3. Ibid., p. 338. 
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action be taken in order that the completed situation will have a par-
ticular subject matter. Since the type of action is determined by the 
way in which the proposition is put, the proposition itself becomes a 
factor in the fulfillment of the situation. 
(3) 11 The subject-matter implies that it makes a difference how 
the given is terminated; that one outcome is better than another, and 
that the proposition is to be a factor in securing (as far as may be) 
the better.u1 There is something at stake which is more than subjec-
tive in the manner in which the proposition is made; the judgment has 
to do for better or v1orse with what is "requiredll (to use K8hler 1s 
term) for the completion of the given. 
(4) 11A practical proposition is binary. It is a judgment that 
the given is to be treated in a specified way; it is also a judgment 
that the given admits of such treatment, that it admits of a specified 
objective ter.mination."2 This judgment concerns ends insofar as it is 
a judgment about what situation is to exist at the semicolon in experi-
ence, but it also is a judgment that this condition is amenable to 
certain intermediate acts which are appropriate to it. 
(5) liThe judgment of what is to be done implies • a state-
ment of what the given facts of the situation are, taken as indica-
tions of the course to pursue and of the means to be employed in its 
pursuit.n3 
(6) The truth or falsity of a practical judgment is determined 
by the results. Ends-means determination is hypothetical until the 
1. Ibid., P• 339. 2. Ibid., p. 340. 3 • Ibid. , p. 345 • 
action has been carried through. 11The event or issue of such action 
is the truth or falsity of the judgment.n1 
9.3 
Values, then, are practical, and values or value judgments are a 
type of practical judgment.2 They are appraisals which arise in par-
ticular existential situations involving tension, lack, or ntrouble" 
of some type; they have to do with ends-means relationships in which 
the individual has some stake; and they are scientifically verifiable 
in terms of the results actually attained compared with those intended • .3 
2. Morris's Approach to Valuing as Preferential Behavior 
Although Charles w. MOrris's contributions have often been 
thought of as philosophical, his theorizing concerning human behavior 
and his work within psychology as well as philosophy bring him vdthin 
the scope of this study.4 His theoreti~al debt to Dewey will become 
reasonably obvious as his position emerges. 
After publishing several works, at least one of which foreshad-
owed later research,5 MOrris made his first approach to defining value 
in his study of semiotic, or semantics. Here he briefly stated that 
11The use of signs to cause preferential behavior to certain objects, 
needs, preferences, responses, or signs is to use signs valuatively. 11 6 
1. Ibid., P• .346 • 2. Ibid., pp • .360, .364. 
.3. Theory of Valuation, pp. 19-.3.3 et passim. 
4. Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Charles MOrris (Roma: Fratelli Bocca, 195.3), 
p. 16. This volume also containes a complete bibliography of MOrris' 
work to that time, PP• 271-74. 
5. Charles w. Morris, Paths of Life (New York! Harper and Bros., 
1942). 
6. Signs, Language, and Behavior (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1946) , p • 99. 
94 
Thus he set the stage for his definitive description of valuation as 
preferential behavior. "Valuing," which refers to all preferential 
behavior, is to be technically distinguished in his usage from neval-
uating,n which refers to the decision as to type of behavior to be se-
lected through determination b,r signs.1 
Within this general approach, there are finally three specialized 
ways of using the term 11value.u The first has to do with the tenden-
cies or dispositions of living beings to choose between objects; the 
second has to do with such behavior when it is governed by the antici-
pation of the outcome; the third has to do with what is regarded as 
preferable, whether it actually is preferred or not. The first usage 
of the term refers to what may be designated as operative values, the 
second as conceived values, the third as object values. 2 All of them, 
however, have to do with some aspect of preference--either what is 
preferred or what is preferable--and the study of value can then be 
defined quite simply as the science of preferential behavior.3 
3. Woodruff's Definition of Evaluative Behavior 
Although Woodruff's theory is difficult to discuss based only on 
his published material, his fundamental concerns and contributions 
1 • Cf. "Axiology as the Science of Preferential Behavior, n in Lepley, 
Value: A Cooperative InquiFI, p. 212. Dewey would tend to prefer 
"evaluatingu in speaking of values in order to connote the appraisal 
nature of the activity. 
2. Varieties of Human Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1956), pp. 10-12. 
3. Ibid. , p. 12. 
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have been clarified through correspondence. To Woodruff, value in its 
general meaning derives from the utility an individual discovers in 
any object, force, or circumstance. It is a subjective estimate (pos-
itive, neutral, or negative) of the manner in which the object influ-
ences the individual's attainment of whatever he is trying to achieve. 
Thus the individual may make some kind of evaluation of anything with 
which he comes in contact, and the point of reference for determining 
value is the individual's aspirations and goals.1 
Values grow concurrently with concepts. To define concepts, 
Woodruff begins with the Webster Collegiate Dictionary's second defi-
nition and modifies it, stating that 
a concept may also be defined as the total of a per-
son's recognized experience with some object, force, 
or circumstance. It is necessary to distinguish 
sharply between information a person has picked up 
verbally and memorized on the one hand, and the re-
sults of his perception of real things on the other 
hand. It is the latter to which I apply the term 
11concept. 112 
As value perceptions, in the broad sense, accumulate, so also do con-
cepts of objects. One never has a value concerning something for 
which he does not have a concept.3 
Thus, one is led to the more pointed sense of the term 11value 11 as 
11a value," which is "some major condition of living which the individ-
ual has come to perceive as having either a positive, neutral, or neg-
ative effect on his life.n4 Values will be positive if they seem to 
1. Asahel D. Woodruff, personal correspondence, Oct. 21, 1960. 
2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 
4· Ibid. Cf. Asahel D. Woodruff and Francis J. DiVesta, 11 The Rela-
tionship between Values, Concepts, and Attitudes," Educ. psychol. 
Measmt, 8 (1948), 645-59. 
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contribute to the individual's well-being, neutral if they have no ef-
fect, and negative if they seem to interfere.1 The individual tends 
to attempt to promote his positive values, but, when conflict breaks 
out, the higher will be promoted over the lower.2 
Values are to be distinguished from attitudes, which are the ex-
pressions of an opinion of "how things are going for himtt in the light 
of the person's values. Attitudes are functions, not just of the val-
ue pattern, but of specific situations. Thus they are secondary to 
the less changeable values (later capitalized to nvaluesrt) which are 
more directive of behavior.3 Although closely related, values are al-
so to be distinguished from concepts. Values refer to the relation of 
an object to ends or goals, concepts to the ideational image.4 Con-
cepts are more fUndamental than attitudes, in that a change in them 
can cause a change in attitudes.5 
This summary of basic definitions of terms presents a combination 
both of Woodruff's earliest and latest thought. However, there is 
another, transitional, period in which he wished to extend his theory 
by introducing a number of concepts relative to values by means of 
1. Woodruff and DiVesta, PP• 645-46. Cf. Woodruff, Psychology of 
Teaching (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1951), p. 35· 
2. Woodruff and DiVesta, p. 646. 
3. vJoodruff, 11Personal Values and the Direction of Behavior, 11 Sch. 
~' 50 (1942), P• 33. 
4. Personal correspondence, Oct. 21, 1960. Cf. Woodruff and DiVesta, 
P• 648. 
5. Woodruff and DiVesta, p. 657 et passim. 
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which any act of purposive behavior could be understood. 1 This exten-
sian may have been at the expense of clarity, the result of which was 
a formidable list of three factors in behavior, four aspects of behav-
ior, and five resultant roles of value. 
Briefly, the factors in behavior are the UYAamic, the Directive, 
and the Situation. The Dynamic is a state of unrest or imbalance 
which has to do with the production or release, but not the direction, 
of energy.2 The Directive consists of the individual's concepts to-
gather constituting a pattern of meaning. Every choice in behavior is 
determined by this pattern, whether it is conscious or unconscious, 
verbalized or not verbalized.3 The Situation is the complex of af-
fairs at a given moment of action, particularly that complex of which 
the individual is aware. The interpretation of this situation and the 
action to be taken as a result of it both depend on the Directive fac-
tor.4 
The aspects of behavior are the Evaluative, the Executive, the 
Affective, and the Expressive. The Evaluative, according to Woodruff, 
includes sensing, perceiving, recognizing, conceiving, concluding, de-
ciding, choosing, logical reasoning and non-logical preference. It is 
1. "The Concept-value Theory of Human Behavior,'' J. gen. Psychol., 
40 (1949), 141-54. 
2. Ibid., p. 149. This is similar to some definitions of need. 
3. Ibid., p. 150. Cf. "The Relationship between Functional and Ver-
balized M::>tives," J. educ. Psychol., 35 (1944), 1.01-107. 
4. 11The Concept-value Theory of Human Behavior, 11 p. 152. 
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empirical and experience-centered. 1 Through this aspect, the individ-
ual gains his concepts.2 The Executive includes the performance of 
the action determined by the Evaluative. "It is the overt part of ad-
justive behavior, moving toward the elimination of the stimulus. n.3 
The Affective, also determined by the Evaluative, has to do with the 
amount of tension or tone characteristic of the organism.4 Later this 
seems to have been called the Energic aspect, with emphasis upon its 
visceral and autonomic basis.5 The Expressive is attitudes. It is 
the overt physical expressions about the things which stand as means 
in relation to goals. "It is communication, postural, gestural, and 
especially symbolic,n6 and "depends on the value pattern, and the con-
cepts of the individual, and the manner in which he perceives and in-
terprets the situation.u7 
In evolving his roles of value, Woodruff quoted Dewey on the re-
lation of means and ends, insofar as the distinction between them was 
only one of judgment, not reality. Apparently thinking somewhat more 
highly of this distinction than did Dewey, Woodruff proceeded to build 
1. liThe Relationship bet1-reen Functional and Verbalized Motives," 
P• 101. 
2. "The Concept-value Theory of Human Behavior, 11 pp. 1.44-45. 
3 • Ibid. , p • 146. 4. Ibid. , p • 14 7. 
5. "The R~lationship between Functional and Verbalized MOtives," 
P• 102. 
6. Ibid. The punctuation in this and the succeeding quotation is 
Woodruffts. 
7. tiThe Concept-value Theory of Human Behavior, 11 P• 148. 
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on it for more terminological distinctions. The last act, or end, 
is to be referred to as the ultimate goal, or Value (capitalized). 
The intermediate acts, usually called means, are to be referred to as 
processes. Concepts, already described as being closely connected 
with values, may then be grouped as goal-concepts or process-concepts. 
Process-concepts have value (lower case). 1 
These terms lead finally to the five roles which value has and 
to the terms used to designate each role. Thus: 
(1) Major functional Values are highly generalized and direct 
long term trends in behavior. 
(2) Major verbalized Values are those shared verbally, without 
affecting any 11need-fulfilling behavior. •1 They seem to be related 
more to the Expressive than the Evaluative aspect of behavior. 
(3) Functional process-concepts have value as means to ends and 
so direct specific acts in that manner. 
(4) Verbalized process-concepts perform the same function as 
major verbalized Values, but apparently operate at a more specific 
and less generalized level of behavior.2 
(5) Objectively established values indicate the fifth role of 
values, but are not clearly defined. Woodruffts only reference to 
them is at the beginning of a discussion of a 11serious problem in 
social values, 11 when he states: 
1. nThe Relationship between Functional and Verbalized Motives, 11 
PP• 98-99. 
2. Ibid. , p. 1 03 • 
Social scientists, both professional and amateur, 
have immersed themselves in human behavior over his-
torical periods, and ttdiscovered" principles upon 
which society advances or declines. This is done 
within their evaluative aspect of behavior. These 
are true empirical discoveries for them, within the 
personal experience of the researchers, because they 
have relived what happened and lived it in its full 
perspective. Here is value in a fifth role, that of 
objectively established productive goals and paths.1 
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What Woodruff seems to have been saying throughout his theory is 
this; in the ongoing stream of behavior, certain preferences are ex-
pressed for acts or states toward which one moves, and for ends-in-
view which will help to realize them. These behavioral choices are 
practically interchangeable with values. "Values emerge from choices, 
and choices express values.u2 There is an equation between a:n:y act of 
valuing something and any choice of a line of action. Concepts have 
to do with ideation, values with this action. Thus, values are at 
root the preferential decisions which an individual makes in the 
course of behaving as a human. 
B. Res~arch 
Both Morris and Woodruff have carried on research in rather large 
quantities. Mbrris has followed up his theory with a cross~cultural 
study of conceived values, Woodruff with a problem-solution approach 
to value research. Two other research reports belonging to this group 
exist as well. Wickert has been concerned with the relations between 
specific and general preferences, while Grace and Grace have studied 
the relations between verbal and behavioral value measures. 
1. Ibid., P• 104. 2. Personal correspondence, Oct. 21, 1960. 
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1 • Morris 1 Ways of Living 
In Morris' Paths of Life, a book intended as a npreface to a 
world religion,u1 he first described some of the ways to live which 
were to become the basis of his research instrument. Six years later 
(1948), these were modified and expanded to a list of thirteen. These 
are his basic classifications used in the Ways to Live document. They 
express patterns of value in which men and women have lived and died, 
and in highly condensed form are as follows: 
Way One.--One participates actively in the world, but is guided 
· by restraint and intelligence so as to preserve the best that man has 
attained. 
Way Two.--The individual is to 11go it alone," seek privacy, sim-
plification, and inward living, to cultivate independence of persons 
and things. 
Way Three. --This way is marked by ltr'"f' unselfseeking affection 
and sympathetic concern for others. 
Way Four.--Life is to be enjoyed with relish and abandonment, to 
delight in new experiences and yet to be aware of one 1s own self--to 
experience festivity and solitude in alternation. 
Way Five.--Social and interpersonal activities are the core of 
living, and one should act and enjoy life through group participation. 
Way Six.--Activity is necessary to keep life from stagnating and 
the good from mastering the better; one must be constantly mastering 
changing conditions. 
1. P. 6. 
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Way Seven.--All the ways of living have something to offer at 
various times, and life 1s goal is in the dynamic interplay and inte-
gration of diversities, of action, enjoyment, and contemplation. 
Way Eight.--The carefree enjoyment of simple, easily obtainable 
pleasures is the keynote of life. 
Way Nine.--The good things of life come in quiet when desires and 
passions have died down and one waits in quiet receptivity. 
Way Ten.--Life is directed by ideals and reason, and its keynote 
is stoical self-control. 
Way Eleven.--Man finds satisfaction by turning from the outer 
world to contemplation and meditation on the inner life. 
Way 1\relve.--The way to live is to use onets physical energy 
through activity in the tangible present and to chance adventurous 
deeds. 
Way Thirteen.--A person should be open to be used by other per-
sons and by the great purposes of the universe. 1 
The students to whom this document was given were located in the 
United States, China, India, Japan, Norway, and Canada. In addition 
to basic information concerning age, sex, religion, and socioeconomic 
status, they were asked to do two things with the instrument. The 
first was to rate each Way on a seven-point scale ranging from tti like 
it very much tt to "I dislike it very much. tt After completing this, 
they were asked to rank their preferences of the thirteen Ways in or-
1. All of the above are listed most clearly in The Open Self (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), pp. 74-80. Cf. Varities of Human 
Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 15-19. 
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der with the best first, and so on.1 Further information was obtained 
on some of the samples from the Thurstone Temperament Schedule, the 
Cattell Sixteen Factor Personality Test, standardized interviews, and 
somatotyping.2 
Factor analysis of some of the United States results indicated 
that five factors seemed to be operating within the thirteen Ways. It 
was suggested that these might be described as social restraint and 
self-control, enjoyment and progress in action, withdrawal and self-
sufficiency, receptivity and sympathetic concern, and self-indulgence 
or sensuous enjoyment.3 It seemed more usefUl, however, through most 
of the study to deal with the data in terms of three somewhat more in-
elusive categories. These categories were labeled, in part because of 
their use in earlier studies, as "dependence,n "dominance,n and llde-
tachment,n although the author suggested that other terms, such as 
"receptivity," "power, n and 11restraint, 11 might have been more precise.4 
In terms of the characteristics of the national samples them-
selves, the United States rated Way Seven highly, with Ways Three and 
Six significantly lower. The India sample rated Way One highly, but 
with a notable diversity in preferences for all the other Ways; Japan 
was similar but vrlth vlay Three given top priority. The Chinese group 
gave its highest regard to Ways Thirteen and Five, with Six and Three 
coming a close second. Ways One, Three, Six, and Seven dominated the 
1. Varieties of Human Value, pp. 15, 18. Since the report on the 
findings of this research runs to better than 54,000 words, the sum-
mary vrlll of necessity be highly selective. 
2. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 3. Ibid., PP· 33-34· 4· Ibid., PP• 39-40. 
Norwegian sample, which gave this sample rather a mediating position 
in terms of value extremes. Although there were a number of divergen-
cies among the groups, there were also a number of similarities in the 
generally high ranking of Ways One, Three, and Six, and the low rank-
ing of Four, Nine, and Eleven.1 
MOrris initially hypothesized that value similarities and differ-
ences could be approached through the context within which evaluation 
took place over a period of time: i.e., the biological, psychological, 
social, and ecological. The study as set up did not yield enough data 
to warrant discussing the ecological, but some treatment of each of 
the other three areas was attempted. Morris' own conclusions concern-
ing these different variables perhaps provide the best summary of 
their influence. 
Evidence was given that the ratings of the Ways 
(and hence the value factor scores) varied with dif-
ferences in sex, somatotype, temperament, character, 
intracultural conditions, economic status, and size 
of community in which the subjects were raised. The 
methods employed did not permit a precise determina-
tion of the relative contributions which the various 
determinants made to the ratings. It was evident, 
howeFer, that the differences between the cultures 
studied tend to be larger than the variations in the 
above determinants within a culture. As to the in-
tracultural determinants, psychological and consti-
tutional d~fferences seem to play the greatest part 
in the ratings of the Ways, with population varia-
tions and economic status next in importance, and 
with sex and body-size differences playing the 
smallest part.2 
1. Ibid., pp. 41-66. 
2. Ibid., p. 186. ¥~rris suggests that the most important single 
point to emerge from this is that no one of the intracultural deter-
minants accounts decisfuvely for the ratings of the Ways. 
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2. Woodruff's Study of Choices 
Woodruff's basic instrument to measure personal values, called A 
Study of Choices, consisted of the presentation of three problems with 
a series of responses to each. The author believed this to be an im-
provement over the SV in that it reduced the rigidity of the latter 
and allowed for more highly individualized patterns of value to be ex-
pressed.1 Each of these problems consisted of enough varied and keyed 
alternatives to give finally, when scored, a pattern of twelve values: 
Comfort, Excitement, Friends, Homelife, Intellectual Activity, Person-
al Attractiveness, Political Power, Religion, Security, Social Ser-
vice, Society, and Wealth.2 
The testae was asked to record in a separate answer book the fol-
lowing things: after a preliminary reading of the problem and its 
eight alternatives, the two most and the two least attractive courses 
of action; a series of favorable or unfavorable comments on each of 
the courses; 11a detailed analysis' by means of a series of paired com-
parisons; 11 and a final choice of the most and least attractive courses 
of action.3 These things, according to Woodruff, would in turn yield 
the following for each person: 
(1) an index of the individual's insight into the val-
ue meanings of each problem and its courses of action; 
(2) an index of the individual's tendency to change 
his choices as he analyzes a problem; (3) an index of 
1. "An Approach to the Cultural Personality Type,n J. educ. Social., 
18 (1944), P• 45. 
2. "Personal Values and the Direction of Behavior, 11 pp. 36-37. 
the extent to which the individual is aware of' the 
changes that he makes in his choices; and (4) an in-
dex of' the consistency of' the individual's choices 
within the three problems.1 
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After making these claims for the test, the author was unable to offer 
any statistical evidence either for reliability or validity, but he 
did predict reliability coefficients of from .75 to ·86 based on value 
pattern consistencies between problems within the test.2 
Woodruff later used his same initial data to explore the possi-
bility of a national type based upon value patterns and using the sam-
ples obtained from different portions of' the United States. The tech-
nique seemed to have promise, but the data were not sufficient to make 
any final conclusions.3 
3. Wickert's Test for Personal Goal Values 
Wickert's initial research problem was to study the interrela-
tionships among several measures of' general preferences and to analyze 
the relationships of specific preferences to these.4 As a partial 
means to this, he devised a test of his own to supplement the SV which 
would provide a measure of relative interest rather than more general 
goal-values.5 
1. Ibid., P• 35. 2. Ibid., P• 41. 
3. 11An Approach to the Cultural Personality Type, 11 p. 50. 
4· Frederic Wickert, 11 The Interrelationships of Some General and 
Specific Preferences,n J. soc. Psychol., 11 (1940), 275-302. 
5. ttA Test for Personal Goal-values, 11 J. soc. Psychol., 11 (1940), 
259-74-
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After a survey of the literature which dealt with motivational 
categories and classifications, Wickert evolved deductively the fol-
lowing nine categories to be used: Freedom, HelpfUlness, New Experi-
ence, Power, Recognition, Response, Security, Submission, and Workman-
ship.1 
A paper and pencil test was then devised based on these categor-
ies, with the subject asked to rank in order four "alternatives" to a 
situation briefly presented. Eighteen situations were used with the 
items so arranged as to compare each category with every other cate-
gory ttaboutu the same n~ber of times. Like the SV, this test oper-
ated on the hydraulic principle, so that a high score in one area 
would tend to lower scores in other areas.2 The standardization group 
consisted of 1 00 University of Chicago undergraduate male students in 
the arts and sciences.3 
Statistically, item analyses showed that the categories were in-
ternally fairly consistent, but that further revision was definitely 
necessary. Reliabilities were too low to permit individual predic-
tion, but this (fortunately) was not the author's purpose.4 
4• A Combination of Direct and Indirect Measures 
In an attempt to develop and compare behavioral and verbal meas-
ures of values, Grace and Grace constructed both a paper and pencil 
1. Ibid., p. 263. 2. Ibid., PP• 264-65. 
3. Ibid., p. 266, and liThe Interrelationships of Some General and 
Specific Preferences, 11 p. 278. 
4. · nA Test for Personal Goal-values, 11 p. 27 4· 
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and a sociometric test.1 After grouping values into categories des-
cribed as personal-centered, interpersonal-centered, and target-cen-
tered, the paper and pencil test consisting of twenty items with three 
alternative answers to each item was made. This test presented vari-
ous situations with possible alternative courses of action, each ac-
tion representing one of the value-families. At this point, it was 
much like Wickert 1s and Woodruff's situational tests. Concurrently a 
series of three questions requiring a choice of three persons for each 
was drawn up to represent the categories in the order indicated above. 
These questions were: 
(1) Which persons in your group seem to act most 
closely and consistently in accord with their own per-
sonal standards and principles? 
(2) Which persons in your group seem to be most in-
terested in getting along with other people? 
(3) Which persons in your group seem to be most in-
terested in getting things done in the most direct and 
efficient way?2 
The samples studied were of two groups: ninety-three delegates at 
the second summer session of the National Training Laboratory in Group 
Development, and twenty-seven college students in undergraduate psy-
chology courses at the University of Illinois. Each of the samples 
had been participating in small groups over a period of time. Thus, 
state the authors, "sociometric measures were assumed to be relative-
1. Gloria L. Grace and Harry A. Grace, 11 The Relationship between Ver-
bal and Behavioral Measures of Value, 11 J. educ. Res • , 46 ( 1 952 ) , pp • 
123-31. 
2. Ibid., pp. 124-25. 
109 
ly adequate independent measures since they were based upon a variety 
of experiences occurring over a period of time.u1 
Correlations are relevant here, since they indicate relationships 
between scores obtained on both of the measures. Listed for each of 
the samples, they were:2 
Value Category 
Personal-centered 
Interpersonal-centered 
Target-centered 
N. T. L. 
+.206 
-.175 
-.049 
Ill. 
+.126 
-.396 
+.093 
These were interpreted to indicate that for the personal-centered 
group there was a direct, but slight, relationship between the meas-
ures; for the interpersonal-centered an inverse, though also slight, 
relationship; for the target-centered a chance relationship.3 
These data might be explained in either of two possible ways: 
(1) there may be a real difference between an individual's reports of 
his values and his value-behavior in a group; or (2) there may be sim-
ply a difference between his self-perceptions and the perceptions held 
by others. Although the study could not determine which of these al-
ternatives presented the better explanation, the conclusion finally 
made was that "individuals tend to think they would act in vrays dif-
ferent from those in which other people perceive them to be acting.n4 
C. Evaluation 
1. Rational 
A discussion of this group using rational criteria will include 
some comments on the contextual nature of evaluation assumed by these 
1. Ibid., p. 125. 2. Ibid., P• 128. 3. Ibid., p. 129. 4· Ibid. 
110 
psychologists, their use of terms within their conceptual frameworks, 
and specifically on the levels on vlhich the term 11 choice 11 is used. 
a) The contextual nature of evaluation 
One of the conceptual elements common to the theory and research 
of this group in addition to its locus of value is its agreement on 
the contextual nature of evaluation.1 Although this point is not em-
phasized so strongly as in the case of Group Five (Chapter VI), it is 
nonetheless present. Dewey notes it when he insists that values are 
located within the continuity of human experience; MOrris reflects 
awareness of it in his conclusion that evaluation is a function within 
a field. Woodruff does so by suggesting that the evaluative aspect of 
behavior depends on the situation for the basic data on which it oper-
ates. 
In the research, this is more implicit than explicit, more evi-
denced by the manner in which the research is set up than by what is 
said. Morris exhibited this when he set up his study of students' 
values on a cross-cultural basis. Wickert included it by setting up 
a series of situations in which values were to be operative, as did 
Woodruff. Wickert, however, may have departed from it somewhat when 
he attempted to abstract common elements from them. Results of the 
Grace and Grace work are open to the interpretation that values may be 
so highly dependent on the social context that they vary independently 
of the individual's verbalizations of them. 
1. Cf. the research conclusion of Harding below, p. 124. 
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b) Terminological precision 
This group as a whole seems to exhibit more obvious difficulties 
with the precise use of terms than any other single group. Those 
within it who have a philosophical background show less difficulties, 
but even they are not clear of this problem. 
Dewey has not set an altogether helpfUl example.1 Throughout his 
whole philosophical system he tends to use common terms in new ways, 
and this has carried over into his psychology of values. This pouring 
of new wine into old wineskins has caused a great deal of communica-
tive misunderstanding, part of which is implied already in this study~ 
attention to an understanding of specific terms as the key to under-
standing Dewey's value theory. MOrris tends to be consistent, like 
Dewey, but is clearer in that he does not connect specialized meanings 
with common words. Woodruff, on the other hand, seems to use such 
concepts as "referrent,tt "value concept,n 11 concept, 11 "conditions of 
living," "goal,u and npreference" almost interchangeably with value. 
Yet these terms are by no means synonymous. Wickert also shows dif-
ficulties of this type with such terms as 11preference, 11 11attitude, 11 
ttgoal,tt "interest,n and "motive.n Though perhaps too harsh to be com-
pletely applicable, Hill's comment concerning a related group of ethi-
cal theorists has a certain relevance to this group of psychologists: 
[They] so overemphasize and misapply the very concep-
tions which give rise to their chief contributions 
that their thought remains seriously confused and ob-
viously fails to achieve that degree of consistency 
1. Cf. Irving Singer, "John Dewey's Theory of Value: A Critical Anal-
ysis (unpublished honors thesis, Harvard College, 1945). 
and precision which is required of a satisfactory mor-
al theory.1 
c) nchoicen as method and as definition 
One specific instance of conceptual difficulty which deserves 
separate mention is the manner in which the term 11choice 11 is used. 
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Commonly, it is used in two senses by those of this group: either 
(choice1) to refer to the essential defining characteristic of value, 
or (choice2 ) to the essential operation performed on it as a means of 
investigation and/or measurement. The position taken by this disser-
tation is that these two senses are not identical, and that the psy-
chologists of this group have, implicitly, at least, used the term 
both ways in varying degrees. 
Dewey carried on no value research; his work was entire1y thea-
retical, thus using the term as choice1 • Morris, Woodruff, and 1rJick-
ert did both, and in their research used a technique involving the re-
cording of preferences. Thus they used the term both as choice1 and 
choice2• Grace and Grace, however, explicitly used it only as choice2, 
not as choice1.2 This leads to the somewhat larger question of the 
degree to which each of these two uses implies the other. 
Ultimately such a question will be answered in terms of the over-
all matter of the degree to which any research method implies a defi-
nition of the thing being studied, and vice versa. In terms of this 
study, it is believed that there is a reciprocal relation between the 
two, although neither rigidly nor precisely. Certainly if valuation 
1. Contemporary Ethical Theories, P• 172. 
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is preferential behavior, then it would seem that the best way to 
measure it is to set up some type of situation evoking such preferen-
ces. Conversely, if choice behavior accurately measures a variable, 
then it must also indicate at least in part that the variable is so 
definable. Operations do define concepts and vice versa (to a degree1 
although an extreme position of operationism is not defended here. 1 
2. Empirical 
The rational problems of term usage lead to the empirical ques-
tions which take the principal form, 11What does the research actually 
measure?" This will be discussed in relation to the work particularly 
of Morris, Grace and Grace, and \oJoodruff. 
a) Conceived values as preferential behavior 
Morris 1 research was motivated by his desire to further the at-
tainment of a 11scientific axiology," which requires in part the devel-
opment of experimental programs. 2 Translating his key terms into work-
ing definitions, one finds suggested that operational values may be 
discovered in the factors found through analysis of preferences among 
non-symbolic desires; conceived values may be discovered in the fac~ 
found through analysis of preferences among symbolic desires; while 
object values are without a working definition.3 His research as ac-
tually carried out was a study of conceived values, which the author 
1. Cf. Percy W. Bl:'idgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (New York: Mac-
millan Co • , 1927 ) , p. 5 • 
2. "Axiology as the Science of Preferential Behavior, 11 P• 219. 
3. William R. Catton, Jr., "Theory of Value, 11 Amer. social. Rev., 
24 (1959), P• 312. 
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acknowledges. In fact, it was even more specifically research into 
one kind of conceived value, na study of' the conceptions of the good 
lif'e. n1 
MOrris claims, however, that it was not limited to this, for in-
f'ormation concerning the other types of' pref'erential behavior seemed 
to be unearthed as well. When one seeks f'or the determinants of' pref'-
erences f'or conceived values, operative values come under f'ocus and 
can be tapped by some of the psychological instruments MOrris used. 
Contact with, though not measurement of, the realm of' objective values 
occurs when one discovers that various objects, or ways of' lif'e, dif'-
fer in the capacity to sustain preferential behavior, according to 
both individual capacities and socio-cultural requirements.2 
Whether knowledge of' these other types of' value actually comes 
from this study is something of' a moot point. Some might even ques-
tion whether or not all these terms should be included as types of 
value. In any case, one wonders if Mbrris has chosen to measure this 
particular type of value, not because it is closest to the wellsprings 
of' motivation, but because it is the most accessible to a paper and 
pencil questionnaire.3 
b) Different measures of value 
Grace and Grace attempted to set up two different measures of 
values, one behavioral and one verbal. The correlations discovered 
1. Varieties of Human Value, pp. 13, 186. 
3. See below, p. 131. 
2. Ibid., PP• 187-88. 
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between them for the various groupings seem to be rather slight to 
permit much in the way of conclusions. There is the further question, 
not answerable here, of whether this sociometric technique used is 
really a sociometric measure, or simply a paper and pencil test of an 
individualts perceptions of the meanings of others' actions.1 Al-
though the intent of the study is good, the results would seem to be 
questionable in the light of possible inconsistencies between the con-
cepts as defined and the concepts actually measured. 
c) Woodruff's concepts as defined and as measured 
Woodruff's A Study of Choices is strong in that it is constructed 
in an effort to tap the actual process of evaluating. It is a worth-
while effort in an area that is almost completely unexplored. How-
ever, the results obtained do not altogether indicate to what extent 
this purpose has been realized. 
There is fUrther empirical (with overtones of rational) difficul-
ty with the relations between his theory and his research instrument 
as far as it is a basis of theory validation, extension, and/or revi-
sion. Many of his technical definitions and theories seem to move in-
to the background when the business of research begins. For instance, 
it is not altogether clear how the results of this study relate to his 
distinction between values (lower case) and Values (capitalized). 
Whether the individual is dealing with goal-concepts or process-con-
cepts; in what sense this measures the Evaluative as distinguished, 
1. Cf. Gardner Lindzey and Edgar F. Borgatta, "Sociometric Measure-
ment," in Lindzey, p. 406. 
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for instance, from the Executive or Expressive aspects of behavior; and 
the degree to which functional instead of verbal values are measured--
these things do not seem to be indicated. The research is troubled, 
finally, b.Y the almost total lack of statistical data to support the 
claims which are made for it. 
J. Heuristic 
This group has shown a distinct ability to generate both discus-
sion and research. The research, to be sure, has been handicapped 
somewhat by the lack of contact with the theory which has generated it, 
yet it still gives evidence of distinct promise. From this group one 
might logically hope for further inquiry into the evaluational process 
and concern for the contexts within which evaluation takes place. The 
work in some areas of social psychology should find distinct relevance 
to the interests of this group, particularly in establishing some of 
the parameters of evaluational contexts. 
The discussion generated by this group has been stimulated in 
large measure by Dewey. Since Dewey was a philosopher and educator, it 
is not surprising that much of this discussion has been within these 
circles rather than those specifically psychological. Nevertheless, 
his emphasis on the on-goingness of evaluation, the part played b.Y rea-
son in making judgments, and the dissolving of the sharp distinction 
between fact and value have all been influential within psychology.1 
1. E. g., see Hull, ttValue, Valuation, and Natural-science Methodol-
ogy' tl pp. 124-41 • 
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4. Philosophical Relevance 
The work studied in this chapter has several possible points o.f 
contact with philosophical positions. The contextual nature o.f evalu-
ation is emphasized by these psychologists, perhaps to the point o.f an 
axiological or ethical relativism. Metaphysically, they would tend to 
connect with naturalistic or realistic positions. Dewey has directly 
influenced such contemporaries as Geiger, 1 Lepley, 2 and Rudner.3 An-
other bridge appears here both with the contextual nature o.f evalua-
tion and the naturalistic emphasis in the work o.f Wieman.4 Values are 
validated by a process and through their objectively ascertainable 
consequences. At this point, the similarity to the English utilitar-
ians mentioned in Chapter II seems clear. There is also some emphasis 
on the place o.f reason in making choices, although its exact role is 
defined somewhat di.f.ferently by psychologists and philosophers. 
In regard to the questions by Brightman noted be.fore, this group 
would insist that values are not strictly comparable, but are to be 
decided upon only in relation to specific ends, and that this pragmat-
ic kind o.f test applies to all values. Dewey, by his own witness, 
would probably add that the supreme values o.f li.fe are to be .found in 
problem-solving and the democratic process. 
1. "Can We Choose between Values? 11 J. Phil., 41 (1944), 292-98. 
2. Verifiability o.f Value. 
3. Richard Rudner, 11The Scientist gua Scientist Makes Value Judg-
ments, 11 Phil. Sci., 20 (1953), 1-6. 
4. The Source o.f Human Good, P• 6. 
CHAPTER V 
VALUES AS CONCEPTS 
Three categories of definitions have been dealt with thus far, 
all using the term 11value tt in somewhat different ways. Group Four, 
to be considered now, represents another use, equating values with be-
liefs or concepts (terms used interchangeably by this group) which 
are, for the most part, intellectual in nature. 
A. Theory 
Interestingly enough, very few psychologists have been willing to 
defend this equation of values with concepts in any thoroughgoing sort 
of way.1 English and English have used it for their second definition 
of value;2 Harding recognized it implicitly when he noted that there 
was an operational difference between what he meant by values and what 
was mean both by Allport and v1ickert; Corey used several paragraphs of 
her study defining value in this way. This is nearly all. 
1. However, within the field of anthropology see Clyde Kluckhohn ~ 
al., who define value as t1a conce:e_t of the desirable • • • , It in "Val-
ue and Value-orientations in the lheory of Action,n Talcott Parsons 
and Edward A. Shills (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 395; and in sociol-
ogy, William A. Scott, 11Empirical Assessment of Values and Ideologies,n 
!mer. sociol. Rev., 24 (1959), P• 301. 
11S 
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A possible theoretical exposition o~ this de~inition is by Trow, 
who has concluded in his 1953 presidential address to the Division o~ 
Educational Psychology o~ the American Psychological Association that, 
"values, however named and categorized, are concepts, i.e., verbal 
constructs representing classes o~ objects or conditions cathected by 
individuals or groups. 111 Un~ortuna tely, it is not clear whether Trow 
is suggesting an identity between an individual's values and his con-
cepts, or emphasizing the not-directly-observable nature o~ values~ 
B. Research 
Research holding to his approach is rather more common. There 
are several studies which set out to measure values by inquiring into 
the individual's intellectually held concepts. They include Jacobs' 
suggestions ~or developing several types o~ measuring instruments, 
Hartmann's brie~ study o~ a select group o~ pacifists, Harding's tests 
o~ values, Kalhorn t s study o~ rural children, and Corey's research 
with students in education. 
1. Jacobs' Suggestions o~ Value Tests 
In an attempt to summarize the types o~ tests which might be used 
to measure students' values, Jacobs suggested some examples of two. 2 
Although one was a check list and the other a problem presentation 
1. William Clark Trow, "The Value Concept in Educational Psychology," 
J. educ. Psychol., 44 (1953), p. 460. Note that his de~inition is to 
be distinguished ~rom MUrray's cathectual approach (Chapter VI) in 
that Murray locates values in the cathexis itsel~. 
2. George Jacobs, "Investigating the Student's System of Values, 11 
Cal. J. secndry Educ., 14 (1939), 339-41. 
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similar in construction to the two types used by Harding, in both the 
items tended to indicate that values and beliefs were to be equated. 
The check list presented a series of statements, such as, "It 
would be wicked for me to smoke,tt and "Smoking is all right if one 
does not smoke too much, tt to which the testae would indicate whether 
the value as stated would be held by parents, self, or community.1 
These answers would be keyed to a more general set of value categories, 
such as, respectively, value based on dqgmatic assertion of some kind 
or value based on a belief in temperance and moderation.2 The problem 
type test presented a situation in which one first ranked a list of 
factors to be considered in making a decision relevant to the problem, 
and then indicated the decision itself. These answers would also be 
keyed to broader value categories.3 
This article was intended to be suggestive of the ways in which 
individual values could be measured. It would seem that Jacobs had 
not actually used the instruments he described, but was instead writ-
ing an essay on how he thought it should be done. Neither did he at-
t6mpt any explicit definition of value; that which emerged was implic-
it in the construction of the test items. 
2. Hartmann's Study of Pacifists 
In 1940 Hartmann read a paper at the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Psychological Association in which he suggested that an individu-
al's values migh~ be functionally eq~valent to a ratts latent regula-
tive system of preferences or goals used in most problem-solving maze 
1. Ibid., P• 339. 2. Ibid., p. 340. 3. Ibid., PP• 340-41. 
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behavior.1 This was followed up by a study of pacifists one year later 
which seems to have had rather few points of contact with his earlier 
theoretical statements.2 
The results of the study were taken to prove that values held by 
pacifists relative to war were superior to those held by non-pacifists. 
One suspects that the survey was initially designed with this thought 
in mind. The basic instrument used was an essay question included as 
part of the final examination of a summer school course offered through 
the Teachers College of Columbia University. The 235 students were 
given twenty-four hours at the end of the course prior to the objec-
tive-type section of the final to write on the following: 
Explain as fully as possible why you are, or are not 
an absolute pacifist at the present time. Be as 
straight-forvmrd as you can. Make full use of all 
the concepts you have learned in this course, and of 
any other experiences you may have had during the past 
year. Consider this an exercise in analyzing your own 
motives with respect to an important current social 
issue.3 
All the papers were then subjected to a rough content analysis, lead-
ing to a list of values held by pacifists and those held by non-pacif-
ists.4 These values were stated as concepts, which is to be expected 
simply from the test instructions themselves. 
1. George Hartmann, 11High-level Choice Behavior and Its Determination 
by the Organism t s Primary Values, 11 Psychol. Bull., 37 (1940), 420-21 • 
2. "Pacificism and Its Opponents in the Light of Value Theory, 11 l!_ 
abnorm. soc. Psychol., 36 (1941), 151-74. 
3. Ibid., P• 184. 
4· His technique of essay analysis is reminiscent of Raths 1 suggested 
ad hoc approach, above, PP• 8-9. 
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Fbr pacifists, they included: democracy applied to the interna-
tional scene forbids war; war is neither good, true, nor beautiful; 
history is correctly read against war as being useless and unintelli-
gent; individuals are more precious than group organizations; and war 
is an indecent and unkind act.1 For non-pacifists they were: aggres-
sion of any nation must be controlled; democracy and its values must 
not perish; human nature makes war inevitable; pacifism is impractic-
al; pacifism is immoral in its refusal to support a righteous war; and 
finally, war and personal death are less evil than the loss of the 
things which make life worth living. 2 
Hartmann concluded by postulating a criterion composed of inclu-
siveness, permanence, irrevocability, congruency, cognitive complete-
ness, and survival as a basis for comparing values. As noted, the 
values held by pacifists (of which he is one) were, on this basis, de-
cided to be superior to those held by non-pacifists.3 
3. Harding's Value-type Instruments 
As part of a doctoral dissertation written in 1940 and 1941 at 
Ohio State University, Harding constructed two tests both designed to 
give measures of an individual's values or concepts.4 Although one was 
a general questionnaire calling for a response to each item and the 
other the presentation of problem situations involving a response to a 
1 • 11Pacificism and Its Opponents in the Light of Value Theory, tt p. 160. 
2. Ibid. , p. 163 • 3 • Ibid. , pp. 165-69. 
4-,. _-!l>wry w. Harding, 11A Value-type Generalizations Test, 11 J. soc. 
Psychol., 19 (1944), 53-79, and "The Value-type Problemmaire, J. soc. 
Psychol., 19 (1944), 115-44. 
123 
list of statements about each problem, the two tests were based on the 
same definition of value, used the same categories, were presented to 
the same subjects, were scored similarly, and were, in short, designed 
to give different, but directly comparable, measures of the same vari-
able(s). 
Five value categories or continua were evolved, which, together 
with the extremes for each, were as follows: (1) conceptions of the 
nature of the desirable social organization: from democracy to author-
itarianism; (2) conceptions of the nature of final causation: from 
naturalism to transcendentalism; (3) conceptions of the place and func-
tion of the individual in society: from socialization to.personal se-
curity; (4) conceptions of the desirability of social transition: from 
progress to status quo; and (5) conceptions of the nature of the 
learning process: from activism to passivism.1 
After extensive preliminary work, involving the construction of 
matched statements for each pole of each category and a series of rat-
ings of these statements by groups of judges, a test consisting of 150 
items was evolved. These items were made up of fifteen statements, 
keyed for each of the value sub-groups, and were arranged in random 
order. The subjects were instructed to rate each item on a five point 
scale ranging from "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly.u2 
The second test, a problemmaire, involved similar preliminary 
work in order to arrive at a series of realistic problem situations 
1. 11A Value-type Generalizations Test, 11 pp. 57-58. Of. 11The Value-
type Pro blennnaire, n pp. 119-21 • 
2. ttA Value-type Generalizations Test, 11 PP• 60-65. 
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and response items which would yield a different measure of the same 
value areas. Finally, a series of fifteen problems was devised, hav-
ing ten response items for each problem which were to be individually 
ranked as with the generalizations test.1 
Out of all those to whom the tests were administered, a group of 
315 took both. This consisted of students in three colleges in three 
states, about equally divided among the four years in college.2 
A complete summary of the results of these tests is unnecessary 
for the purposes of this study. Data was given, however, to show that 
the tests were reliable enough in the judgment of the author to use 
with both individuals and groups. This reliability, together with the 
logical construction of the categories, was taken to be the best sin-
gle (and available) evidence of the tests' internal validity.3 Final-
ly, although the tests were intended to measure the same thing from 
different aspects, there was strong evidence to indicate that in fact 
they measured two different things relative to value. This suggested 
that values were either general and remote or quite specific and rele-
vant to situations.4 
4. Kalil.orn 1s Study of Rural Children 
Although Kalhorn's contribution to value research was published 
within a literary context which would lead one to expect a situational 
1. llThe Value-type Problemmaire, 11 pp. 121-32. 2. Ibid., P• 133. 
3. "A Value-type Generalizations Test, 11 p. 72, and 11 The Value-type 
Problemmaire, 11 p. 138. 
4. Harding, trExperimental Comparisons between Generalizations and 
Problems as Indices of Values," J. gen. Psychol., 38 (June, 1948), 
PP• 41, 48. 
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relationship type of definition (Chapter VI:), such is not the case. 
Growing out of a general interest in social values and their develop-
ment in the individual child, a study was undertaken of a group of 
Mennonite children in Iowa contrasted with a matched group of non-Men-
nonite rural children.1 The aim was 
(1) to present and evaluate a technique for measuring 
quantitatively certain social values; (2) to determine 
the difference in ideology between two groups of rural 
children • • • in relation to the areas of approved 
and disapproved activities and the sources of author-
ity.2 
Social values were defined for the purposes of this research as 
group ideology.3 This, of course, on the individual level would be a 
belief or concept. The study was fUrther limited not only to ideology 
as opposed to some type of overt behavior, but more specifically to 
the 11official11 ideology which may or may not have been the individual 
or operational.4 Although Kalhorn seemed not to rule out the defini-
tion of values in terms of other variables as well, other possibili-
ties were certainly excluded for the purposes of the research. 
Having arrived at this definition, Kalhorn used a questionnaire 
to obtain the basic research data. Essentially, the experimenterasked 
1 • Joan Kalhorn, "Values and Sources of Authority among Rural Chil-
dren, n in Kurt Lewin et al., Authority and Frustration (t1Studies in 
Topological and Vector Psychology, 11 No. 3; ttUniversity of Iowa Studies 
in Child Welfare," Vol. XX; Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1944), 
PP• 99-152. 
2. Ibid., p. 109. 
3. For the background of her theory and research technique, see Alex 
Ba.velas, 11A Method for Investigating Individual and Group Ideology, 11 
Sociometry, 5 (1942), 371-72. 
4· Kalhorn, p. 110. 
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each group of children interviewed to write answers to a series of 
questions concerning what a child could be doing at home that was good 
(or bad), very good (very bad), or very, very good (bad), and for 
which someone was praising (scolding) him much, very much, etc. In 
each case the child was also asked who was doing the praising or 
scolding. A total of 135 children in the fourth to eighth grades of 
one-room schoolhouses were tested, seventy-one of whom were Mennonite.1 
This, coupled with basic sociological information about each 
child, yielded data which gave a series of value categories used for 
further analysis. In addition, the study included the number of chil-
dren mentioning a particular category and the number of responses per 
child within each category, sources of authority for the values, and 
the relations between these variables. 2 
Several conclusions of interest emerged. The first was that 
areas which were either completely accepted or completely taboo seemed 
to be excluded from the responses given. Thus the test tended to tap 
areas in which there was some conflict between values held and actions 
pursued.3 The patterns of value differed between the two groups, with 
the Mennonite children emphasizing morals and religion more heavily, 
as one might expect.4 Finally, there was some evidence which indicat-
ed that the non-Mennonite children tended to find their sources of 
values in interpersonal relations more frequently than superior au-
thority.5 
1. Ibid., pp. 111-14. 
Ibid. , p • 142. 
2. Ibid. , pp. 115-35 • 3 • Ibid., P• 137. 
5 • Ibid. , p. 145 • 
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5. Corey's Study o£ Future Teachers 
When Corey set out to conduct an exploratory study o£ the values 
held by students in teachers colleges, she set £orth her proposition 
that a value was an "attitude, a standard, or a belie£ which the indi-
vidual has selected and reconstructed £rom the many concepts that be-
set him in his environment and the feelings that struggle within him. 111 
Though stable, she continued, values are constantly undergoing change, 
and, with maturity, the change is more intelligent. The integrated 
system of values helps the individual to gain central tendency and 
continuity in li£e. Although value systems are uniquely individual, 
they are not exclusively so.2 
After a preliminary survey of the literature on values over a 
twenty-five year period and a pilot study, ten major value areas were 
isolated and labeled. They were (1) belief in the dignity and worth 
o£ every individual, (2) belie£ that every person has a right to some 
freedoms, (3) belief that each individual is responsible £or becoming 
a mature and productive member of society, (4) belief that man has a 
responsibility to maintain his own integrity, (5) belief in the broth-
erhood of man, (6) belief in man's capacity for goodness, (7) belief 
in the centrality o£ the monogamous £amily as a social unit and in 
chastity outside of marriage, (8) belie£ in the methods o£ democracy, 
(9) belie£ that happiness comes from love and personal resources as 
1 • Fay L. Corey, Values o£ Future Teachers (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Teachers College Bureau of Publications, 1955), p. 5. 
2. Ibid. 
well as possessions, and (10) belief in the power of knowledge and 
thought to liberate man. 1 
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The basic instrument was a set of 112 items to which the student 
recorded an 11agree,u 11undecided," or 11disagree" response. It was ti-
tled Student Beliefs,and instructions indicated that the document was 
intended to discover "what young people really believe.n2 A total of 
843 questionnaires were recorded and supplemented by tape recordings 
of discussions and interviews of twenty students in four groups.3 
These yielded the basic data of the study. 
The results of the poll, greatly condensed, indicated that: (1) 
the majority valued the importance of every individual, regardless of 
race, color, religion, ~;4 (2) the individuals theoretically be-
lieved in traditional democratic values, but tended in point of fact 
to take rather authoritarian stands on specific issues;5 (3) the 
group believed that the individual must assume initiative for a respo~ 
sible position in society and the consequences of his own actions;6 
(4) they upheld a belief in integrity, but many times acted in a man-
ner rather inconsistent with it;7 (5) the group believed in the broth-
erhood of man and tended to see this more clearly on an international 
than national or local level;8 (6) they believed in man's goodness, 
but did not necessarily trust their associates;9 (7) they by and large 
1. Ibid., PP• 7-8. 
4· Ibid., P• 31. 
7. Ibid., PP• 67-68. 
2. Ibid., P• 9. 
5. Ibid., p. 46. 
8. Ibid., P• 79. 
3. Ibid. , p. 17. 
6. Ibid., P• 54. 
9. Ibid. , p • 91 • 
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upheld the traditional beliefs on marriage and the family;1 (8) they 
were rather divided on their belief in democratic methods when these 
were spelled out within an educational context;2 (9) they agreed that 
personal resources and human relationships were important aspects of 
life;3 and (10) they tended to uphold the importance of thinking and 
knowledge.4 For all those statements which indicated a majority opin-
ion, however, there was in each case a decided minority which would 
dissent. Further, one finds interesting nuances in the ways the be-
liefs were expressed that should be consulted directly in detail to be 
fully appreciated. 
c. Evaluation 
The usual categories used in discussing the groups in this dis-
sertation do not hold up well in this chapter because of the absence 
of theoretical data. Accordingly, this fact itself will become the 
focus of evaluation, together with some comments on the relations be-
tween this body of research and some points in philosophical value 
theory. 
1. Research without Theory 
The striking characteristic of the material treated as data in 
this chapter is, of course, the research efforts with little corres-
ponding theoretical treatment of values using the same kind of defini-
tion. An analysis of the bac~ground of this fact suggests two factors 
which may help to explain it. 
1. Ibid., PP• 100-101. 
3 • Ibid. , p. 114. 
2. Ibid., PP• 107-108. 
4· Ibid., PP• 119-20. 
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The first has to do in part with the nature of beliefs as they 
relate to the kinds of definitions of value offered by other psycholo-
gists. In the thinking of most of those theorists and researchers: 
discussed in this study1 values are concepts connected in one way or 
another with the problem of motivation. To Allport this is an explic-
it, cardinal characteristic of value; to the others it seems to be im-
plicit. Beliefs or concepts, on the other hand, are terms usually 
connected with learning and learning theory. Thus, the tendency to 
equate values with some dimension of motivation would seem to be de-
nied, at least prima facie, by equating them with cognitive concepts 
often thought of as non-motivational. That is, beliefs are p~rceived 
by psychologists as lacking motivational significance and so are con-
sidered unacceptable as explanatory concepts for values. Thus, those 
in other areas of social science who do tend to define values as be-
liefs (or concepts) are also quick to invest them with motivating pow-
er.1 
The second reason has to do with the occurrence of the research 
itself in spite of the dirth of theoretical justification. There are, 
in turn, two facets of this. In the face of the movement toward re-
jection of beliefs as adequate defining parameters of values, there is 
a minor countermovement which sees some relationship between the two.2 
This countermovement, while not equating them, would be strengthened 
1. Kluckhohn et al., P• 395. 
2. ~' Edward c. Tolman, "Cognition Motivation Model, 11 Psychol. 
Rev., 59 (1952), 389-400. 
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by the Deweyian tendency to break down the distinction between judg-
ments of value and judgments of fact. Thus, some theory provides sup-
port for at least assuming that measuring beliefs will somehow lead to 
something about values. The other facet, which seems to suggest the 
presence of research in the absence of much theory, is that fact that, 
relatively speaking, beliefs are found in the realm of manifest data 
and as such are fairly easily ascertained. Though difficult to meas-
ure in its influence, it is suggested that this may be a strong reason 
for at least initial research in values using this definition.1 
2. Philosophical Relevance 
Philosophers, like psychologists, have tended to avoid attempts 
to define values as beliefs or concepts, probably for much the same 
reasons. Pepper does indicate that beliefs play a part in valuation, 
but seems to suggest that their power is more directing than driving.2 
Brightman sees a possible relation between the two, but implies the 
motivating power of values by distinguishing a value as being an ideal 
realized within experience from the ideal itself which is a concept.3 
Other than these points, there are few places of communication with 
philosophy in defining values. 
1. One notes that none of the researchers covered in this chapter has 
followed up his single study with a second using the same kind of def-
inition. 
2. Stephen c. Pepper, The Sources of Value (Berkeley, Calif.: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1958), pp. 77-99, especially PP• 85-87. 
3. Nature and Values, pp. 72-73, and A Philosophy of Religion, pp. 
88-91. 
CHAPTER VI 
VALUES AS SITUATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Approaches to the definition of value have been studied which 
equate them with biologically rooted needs (Group One), behavioral 
predispositions (Group Two), selected action alternatives or preferen-
ces (Group Three), or individual beliefs or concepts (Group Four). 
The fifth and final constellation tends to see values as if they were 
environmental functions--some type of relationship between objects and 
people or objects and other objects in the environment. 
A. Theory 
ft Kohler's gestalt formulation, the original and the most influen-
tial of this group, will be analyzed in terms of its phenomenological 
orientation and definition of value as requiredness. Lewin, who sees 
value as a power-field, and Asch, who uses requiredness within a so-
rr 
cial context, both owe a theoretical debt to Kohler. MUrray, the last 
theorist, provides something of a bridge between this group and Group 
Two (predispositions) in his definition of value as a cathexis between 
object and subject, viewed externally. 
It 
1. Kohler's Gestalt FOrmulation 
11hl t •t• As suggested, the best method of interpreting Ko er s pos~ ~on 
is through an analysis of what he means by 11phenomenology, n the con-
text of his definition, and by ttrequiredness," the synonym for value. 
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a) Phenomenology, the context of definition 
The field in which value operates is understood to be the phenom-
enal world. In order to understand the field of immediate experience, 
one examines one's perceptions of the real physical world exactly as 
they are presented to him.1 Thus, the field of inquiry of all psy-
chology is the phenomenal fieldj and the method the phenomenological.2 
Within the phenomenal field, all items are perceived as things. 
The bodily self is a percept as well, like other percepts of which we 
are aware. Some things seem to be attached to or 'v.ithin the self, and 
these things are the ones usually called "subjective." Things not at-
tached to this particular percept are in other parts of the phenomenal 
space and are thus called "objective.n3 Despite the usual distinction 
in terminology, concepts, ideas, images, the self, and other items are 
all experienced alike. 
Several points follow from this. First, things which are often 
regarded as objects may or may not be in fact. The way things are 
perceived does not necessarily indicate the way they really are. As 
K8hler puts it, "The meaning of 'objective' in the phenomenal field 
has no direct connection with physical existence outside the physical 
organism.u4 It would follow as well that not only might things per-
1. Cf. English and English, p. 387 ( ttphenomenology11). 
2. Wolfgang K8hler, The Place of Value in a World of Fact (New York; 
Liveright Publishing Co., 1938), pp. 104-105. Phenomenology is to be 
sharply distinguished, says K8hler, from metaphysical phenomenalism 
which asserts that there is nothing real about phenomena. This latter 
is a world view; his phenomenology is a method. 
3. Ibid., P• 69. 4· Ibid., p. 70. 
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ceived as objective be not outside the physical organism, but that 
things perceived as subjective be not within it. 
Further, the property attached to some object in this field may 
or may not be there inherently. One may have learned to localize this 
property there, and one may even be aware of this. Things once at-
tached to the self may now be attached to objects, and vice versa. 
But this changes neither the percept as it is nor the boundary between 
the objective and subjective as now experienced. Properties experien-
ced as belonging to objects do not necessarily have to belong there in 
reality. The important thing is the percept exactly as it is given in 
the phenomenal field. No amount of explanation nor genetic localizing 
can change a phenomenon or its place as presented in the field.1 
Finally, though not crucial, it is helpful to know in terms of 
future comments in this study that Kghler postulates an isomorphism of 
form between percepts and cortical fields.2 Thus, although he talks 
almost constantly of the phenomenal field as external (and thus value~ 
by definition), it always corresponds to an internal field within the 
brain. 
b) Value as requiredness 
nRequiredness" is the term which K8hler uses synonymously with 
and definitive of value. If one remembers the elements of phenomenal-
ogy as the context of his theory, then the analysis of value as re-
1. Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
2. Ibid., PP• 185-232. Cf. K8hler, Gestalt Psychology (New York: 
Liveright Publishing co., 1929), pp. 64-65, and DYnamics in Psychology 
(New York: Liveright Publishing Co., 1940), pp. 49-106. 
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quiredness becomes much less complicated than K8hler himself sometimes 
seemed to make it appear. 
His definition is begun qy extending and supplementing Perry's 
more philosophical definition of value in terms of interest.1 Some 
contents of the phenomenal field, according to this view, seem not to 
have direction or directedness while others do. A piece of paper on a 
table does not point toward something and is an instance of the former. 
Interest, however, does have direction and is an instance of the lat-
ter. Those things which have this property of directedness are to be 
called "vectors.tt Further, vectors not only have direction, i.e., 
point toward something, but are also experienced as issuing from a 
definite part of the field. Interest, for instance, is one type of 
vector, characterized qy being experienced as issuing from that item 
in the field called 11oneself" toward some other item. Since this is 
only one example of the general case in which facts seem to 11belong 
together," other descriptive types must be found.2 
For a total description, value may then be seen in any one of 
three ways, all having a vector aspect. First, the vector may be ex-
perienced as going from the self to an object.3 This, as suggested, 
K8hler sees as being exactly synonymous with Perry 1s identification of 
value with an object of interest.4 B.Y vectors of love, hate, fear, 
contempt, etc.; the self acts to accept or reject an object. But this 
1 • General Theory of Value, p. 26 et passim, and Realms of Value 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 3. 
2. The Place of Value in a World of Fact, P• 73. 
3. Ibid., P• 74. 4• Ibid., P• 75. 
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subjective approach to value, although correct as far as it go~s, is 
incomplete and one-sided. 
The opposite of this situation may be true also; i.e., the vector 
may be experienced as issuing from some external point in the field 
toward the self.1 A police officer makes demands on the individual; a 
college sets tasks which issue from outside the self and influence it. 
But neither does this type exhaust the possibilities of requiredness. 
In both of these instances, value has involved the relationship 
between two objects in the phenomenal field, one of which was the selL 
In one case an object other than the self was the source of the vector, 
in the other it was the object. This leads directly to the final way 
of seeing value. This is value experienced as issuing from one point 
in the field toward another point, nei~her of which is the self.2 The 
feeling of incompleteness following certain chord sequences in music, 
or the manner in which certain colors seem to llfitu, is an instance of 
this type. 
It is this third point_of view which seems both most common and 
most important in KBhler's formulation. It is this, also, which has 
led him to emphasize that: (1) value appears as an attribute of things 
themselves, not as the result of activity of the self; (2) value as 
experienced between objects has a demanding character which directly 
relates to structural or relational aspects of the situation; and (3) 
this demand is perceived as an attribute of the things themselves.3 
-... ·::.-· 
1. Ibid., p. 87. 2. Ibid., P• 96. 
3. uvalue and Fact," J. Phil. , 41 (1944), 203-207. 
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Thus he is led to the generic definition of value as requiredness, 
ttthe vector-aspect of phenomenal contexts. u1 It is the relationship 
between any set of objects within the phenomenal field, a gestalt, ex-
perienced as a quality of the objects _and the context involving them.2 
2. Lewin's and Asch's Debt to K8hler 
Kurt Lewin and Solomon Asch have both based their theories of 
value on the general position stated by K8hler. They have each, how-
ever, emphasized different aspects of it and made some changes in it ·. 
to suit their own particular frameworks. 
a) Value as a power-field 
Lewin has picked up the field aspect of KBhler's thinking and 
built his definition on this. Of the great amount of work produced by 
Lewin, however, only a relatively small amount dealt explicitly with 
values. One article from the mid-1940's contains his best theoretical 
statement.3 
Force, he stated, is a tendency to locomotion (within a field) 
which has the character of a vector. A force-field is the distribu-
tion of forces in space, which is to be distinguished from a power-
field. The latter refers to the possibility of inducing forces, but 
not to the actual exerting of pressure itself. Values are synonymous 
with power-fields in this respect. 
1. The Place of Value in a World of Fact, p. 101. 
2. Cf. Tamara Dembo, 11A Theoretical and Experimental Inquiry into 
Concrete Values and Value Systems, 11 in Kaplan and Wapner, PP• 79-81. 
3. "Constructs in Psychology and Psychological Ecology, 11 in Lewin et 
al., Authority and Frustration, PP• 1-29. 
Values influence behavior but do not have the char-
acter of a goal (that is, of a force-field). Fbr ex-
ample, the individual does not try to 11reachtt the val-
ue of fairness but fairness is llguiding" his behavior. 
It is probably correct to say that values determine 
which types of activity have a positive and which have 
a negative valence for an individual in a given situa-
tion. In other words, values are not force-fields but 
they ttinduce n force fields. 1 
The term 11valence,u introduced in the quotation, is usually used 
to indicate either attractive or rejective forces, according to wheth-
er they are positive or negative. Valence, however, is not the same 
as value in Lewin's terminology, a mistaken interpretation commonly 
made. 
From within a different framework, Tolman has also distinguished 
values from valences in a relevant, but not identical, manner., Val-
ues, he states, are independent variables, specified by the behavioral 
degree to which animals consistently and repeatedly approach or avoid 
a goal. Valences, on the other hand, are intervening variables which 
have to do with the animal's "expectationtt of ttgoodnesstt or "badness." 
These valences may or may not correspond to the actual values. Ac-
cording to Tolman, this may be put in Lewinian terminology by stating 
that ttthe valences are in the animal's 'life space,' whereas the val-
ues are in the effects of the actual environment upon the organism. u2 
1. Ibid., p. 14. Cf. Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1951), p. 41. Note too the distinction here between 
KBhler who refers to values ~ vectors and Lewin who sees in values 
the possibility of vectors. 
2. UPrinciples of Purposive Behavior, 11 in Sigmund Koch (ed. ), Psy-
chology: A Study of a Science (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 
1959), :Vol·. ·rr, p. 109. 
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A year after his principal article appeared, Lewin dealt, within 
a series of more general articles, with the manner specifically in 
which individual values might change. 1 Value change :profound enough to 
influence an individual's actions comes, he stated, through a re-edu-
cation process, or a change in the person's culture. Since any indi-
vidual confronted with a set of strange values in a new culture will 
resist attempts to force the new sets of beliefs and values on him, 
the problem of re-education in the face of hostility becomes the key.2 
This can be done through the establishment of an 11in-group" to which 
the individual may feel he belongs. The change will then begin if and 
as the individual freely accepts membership in this group. Values are 
not changed item by item, but gradually as a whole as the individual 
comes to feel a part of the group or culture holding these values.3 
b) Requiredness in the social context 
Asch has emphasized the phenomenon of requiredness, but set this 
quite squarely within a social context. Requiredness in his usage is 
applied particularly to ethical values which cannot be reduced to 
preferences or any internalized hedonistic motives.4 Requiredness 
thus used has to do with the incompleteness or demands of a social 
situation which evokes from the individual a (set of) relevant mo-
1. Kurt Lewin and Paul Grabbe, "Conduct, Knowledge, and Acceptance of 
New Values,u in Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts (New York: Harper 
and Bros., 1948), pp. 56-68. 
2. Ibid., pp. 65-66. 3. Ibid., PP• 66-68. 
4. Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1952), p. 355. Cf. Max Wertheimer, 11Some Problems in the Theory of 
Ethics, 11 Soc. Res., 2 (1935), 353-67. 
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tive(s) and emotion(s).1 The particular nature of this requiredness 
is to be defined Py reference to social approval and disapproval which 
usually correspond to the intrinsic appropriateness or harmfulness of 
behavior as it affects other people.2 
3. Murray's Cathectual Analysis 
Murray's primary definition of value equates value directly with 
his term 11cathexis.n3 This is also closely connected with his concept 
of sentiment, and, unless the distinction between the two is carefully 
noted, one might be led erroneously to classify his definition with 
those of Group Two. 
When Murray uses the term 11sentiment," he refers to a ttmore or 
less enduring disposition (predilection or readiness) in a personality 
to respond with a positive or negative affect to a specified entity.n4 
In this respect, Murray's term means essentially the same thing as is 
often mean by 11attitude.n A value and a sentiment are quite closely· 
connected, and refer to the same psychological phenomenon.5 In this 
sense, one might even say that to investigate one's sentiments is to 
investigate one's values and vice versa.6 However, though the terms 
1. Cf. Dewey's first characteristic of a practical judgment, above, 
2. Asch, p. 359. 
3. IIPreparations for a Scaffold of a Comprehensive System," in Koch, 
Vol. III, p. 30. Cf. Lewis S. Feuer, Psychoanalysis and Ethics 
(Springfield, Ill.: Charles c. Thomas, 1955), p. 6. 
4. Henry A. Murray and Christiana D. Morgan, ttA Clinical Study of 
Sentiments, 11 Genet. Psychol. ].1onogr., 32 (1945), p. 11. 
6. Ibid., P• 7. Cf. Explorations in Personality, P• 717. 
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are similar and even depend on and refer to the same data, they are 
not synonymous. 
A sentiment refers to the relation between a subject and an ob-
ject, viewed from the subject's disposition to respond to the object. 
The term cathexis or value, however, views the relation between a sub-
ject and an object from the external side in terms of the object's 
power to stimulate the subject.1 The response evoked by some entity 
may be either positive or negative, and may be manifested subjectively 
I 
as a feeling and/or objectively as behavior or physiological change.2 
It may further be of either momentary or extended duration, although 
the term valence is usually preferable to indicate the former in Mur-
rayts system.3 In any case, when the relation is viewed externally 
from the object's influence on the subject, cathexis or value is the 
term to be used. 
The use of this external term(s) may be applied to any entity, 
so long as it is the focus of a sentiment. Perceptually, it will al-
ways appear as an object. This usage is particularly helpi'ul when one 
wishes to llrepresent the appeal or repellence of a specified object to 
the members of a society or special group, 11 or to "portray the subject 
as a social stimulus, as an evoker of feelings and drives in others. 114 
1. Ibid., P• 11. 2. Ibid., P• 22. 3 • Ibid. , p • 23 • 
4. Ibid. Cf. Explorations in Persona:lity, p. 106, and 11Preparations 
for a Scaffold of a Comprehensive System, 11 p. 30. 
142 
B. Research 
In the preceding chapter, a group was presented characterized by 
research with little theoretical formulation. Here the opposite situ-
ation prevails. Although there is a distinct body of theory availabl~ 
there is apparently little research actually employing this type of 
definition. 
The best example is the study by Hartley, in which some of Lewin's 
assumptions concerning value change and group membership were tested 
empirically.1 Based upon a ranking of a list of fourteen value items 
by the 146 male freshmen students at City College of New York, one hy-
pothesis of the original three was definitely confirmed, that 11the 
greater the compatibility between the values of the individual and the 
perceived values of the new group, the more likely the individual is 
to accept the new group as a reference group."2 
Cartwright catalogued research relevant to this concept, but his 
list turns out to be misleading.3 The work by Lewin which he mention-
ed presented theory and some practical suggestions for value change, 
but no empirical data. Kalhorn•s study, also listed, actually used a 
different definition and was examined within the more appropriate con-
text of Group Four (Chapter V). White t s Value Analysis was studied in 
1. Ruth E. Hartley, "Relationships between Perceived Values and Ac-
ceptance of a New Reference Group, 11 J. soc. Psychol., 51 (1960), 
181-90. 
2. Ibid., P• 189. 
3. Dorwin Cartwright, "Lewinian Theory as a Contemporary Systematic 
Framework," in Koch, Vol. II, PP• 44-45. 
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connection with Group One (Chapter II). Finally, Wright t s study was 
intended to measure moral behavior rather than values generally.1 
C. Evaluation 
1. Rational 
With a scarcity of research as characteristic of this group as 
the scarcity of theory was for the last, this fact becomes the point 
of major focus in this section of evaluation. Some attention will be 
paid as well, however, to several of the less obvious implicit prob-
lems of the theories. 
a) Research scarcity 
The lack of research which is noticeable in this final grouping 
might at first seem to be an empirical matter. Such is not the case, 
since some tentative reasons for it can be suggested by an examination 
of rational aspects of the theories which tend to inhibit research. 
K8hler's basic definition of value is as requiredness, a vector 
aspect of perceptual fields. This requiredness with its demand char-
acter refers to the relationship between various items within the 
field. As noted, KBhler used several illustrations for these. The 
very illustrations betray a weakness in K8hler 1s theory: he seems un-
able to differentiate that requiredness which makes value situations 
different from other situations.2 It is not clear how value required-
1. Beatrice A. Wright, "Altruism in Children and the Perceived Con-
duct of Others, 11 J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 37 (1942), 218-33. 
2. Louis 0. Kattsoff, review of K8hlerts The Place of Value in a 
World of Fact, J. soc. Psychol., 11 (1940), P• 497. 
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ness is distinguished from, ~' physical causality or logical impli-
cation. If this weakness be granted, then one can understand the dif-
ficulty of doing research specifically on values, for the variable 
distinguishing values from other types of requiredness is unclear be-
for the research and its operating definitions is even begun. 
Lewin, it has been noted, defines value as a vector potentiality 
rather than an actuality. Thus, although Lewin 1s influence has been 
exceptionally great in several areas of psychology, the possible re-
search in values generated qy his theory would be stifled by the prob-
lem of having to investigate potentials.1 This difficulty apparently 
seems almost insurmountable, since little or no research has been done. 
b) Implicit problems 
KBhler's isomorphism suggests a dualism of phenomenal and cortic-
al states, if not a pluralism of transphenomenal world, phenomenal 
world, cortical states, and underlying neurological conditions.2 It 
seems also to be implied that there is a pre-established harmony or 
correspondence between them. But, like many such theories, K8hler's 
has difficulty explaining this harmony and why or how it operates. 
In Lewin's brief treatment of values and value change, one pos-
sible difficulty comes out which may or may not have been intentional. 
If value change comes about by changing group membership, then values 
as power-fields are basically non-rational in nature. This indicates 
1. Cf. Harold N. Lee, 11A Precise Meaning for Objective and Subjective 
in Value Theory, n Psychol. Bull., .36 (19.39), 59.3-94· 
2. Kattsoff, P• 497. 
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a kind of social reductionism in which group membership would be the 
determinant of values. Any such non-rational reductionism as this 
rais~s the question of why rational communication concerning it is 
thereb,r attempted, and what value is seen in the attempt. 
2. Empirical 
On 'the whole, both Lewin and K8hler are aware of empirical vali-
dating material for their positions. II Kohler has some very sound (al-
though not unequivocal nor uncontradicted) data available which does 
in fact seem to support'. his postulation of an isomorphism between 
perceptual units and psychological units.1 Lewin, appropriating and 
adapting mathematical units, finds supporting and validating data 
within the field of social psychology.2 Asch finds data from both of 
these areas. None of them, then, are cut off in their conceptualiza-
tion from material which would lend scientific support to it • 
.3. Heuristic 
It has already been suggested that because of some rational 
II 
shortcomings in their definitions, Kohler and Lewin have not been re~-
sponsible for as much work and discussion in the specific area of val-
ues as one would hope. MOst of the work resulting from this general 
area of concern has to do with group standards or norms, not values.1 
1. Ibid., p. 496. 2. Cf. Cartwright, P• 83. 
3. ~' see the following: Leon Festinger, S. Schachter, and K. w. 
Back, Social Pressures in Informal Groups (New York: Harper and Bros., 
1950); L. Coch and J. R. P. French, Jr., "Overcoming Resistance to 
Change," Hum. Relat., 1 (1948), 512-.32; Harold H. Kelley and John w. 
Thibaut, ''EJ{perimental Studies of Group Problem Solving and Process, 11 
in Lindzey, pp. 735-85. 
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In sUlJJillB.ry, one might turn to Cartwright, who suggests for the future 
some critical areas for Levdnians to explore: 
The most urgent task is to determine the conceptual 
pro:Qerties to be attributed to the construct 11value,tt 
[an4) to obtain answers to questions like these: How 
do values become established in an individual's life 
space? How does a value become activated? How do 
values relate to one another? What effects do values 
have? In what ways do values differ from needs or mo-
tives?1 
4. Philosophical Relevance 
Both KEhler and Lewin present a number of points of contact with 
philosophical positions on value. If Castell's summary of Kant's pos-
ition is correct, then 11requirednessu holds some overtones.of the lat-
ter 1s insistence that 11right" confronts one as a demand which is cate-
gorical (without qualification), universal (holding for all men), and 
necessary (binding for all men).2 Mandelbaum has taken K8hler's phen-
omenological approach and used it for a philosophical analysis of mor-
al experience.3 Urban, though not beginning vdth either phenomenal-
ogy or field theory, presents a point of contact tv.ith his insistence 
on the objective character of value.4 It has, of course, already been 
suggested by KBhler that his own position holds much in common with 
Perry 1s.5 
1. P. 83. 2. Castell, PP• 79-80. 
3. Maurice Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (Glen-
coe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955). 
4. 11Knowledge of Value and the Value Judgment, 11 J. Phil., Psychol., 
sci. Method, 13 (1916), p. 682. Cf. his Fundamentals of Ethics, 
P• 378. 
5. See above, P• 135. 
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Pepper has discussed some aspects of' Lewinian field theory as it 
relates to his position in philosophical value theory.1 Otis Lee has 
proposed a locus of' value quite similar to Le1vln 1 s, but with something 
of a Deweyian overtone.2 Insofar as Wieman's identification of value 
with the total complex context involves the situation as well as the 
person, there is another point of contact.3 T<)o, an early article by 
MOrris suggested the importance of' society in the growth of' individual 
values.4 
As to the questions Brightman has suggest1:ld are raised by philo-
sophical value theory, this group would be coneerned to stress the 
unity in value experience and in the types of c~riteria for different 
kinds of' value, while stressing equally the objectivity and non-per-
sonal aspects of' such experience. 
1. Pp. 410-54-
2. ttValue and the Situation," J. Phil., 41 (1944), p. 342. Cf. Lee's 
11Value and Interest," J. Phil., 42 (1945), 141--61,. 
3. P. 6. 
4• "The Total-situation Theory in Ethics," JE.t. J. Ethics, 37 (1927), 
258-68. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Summary 
1 • The Initial Categories 
The aim of this dissertation has been to discover~ study~ and 
evaluate the meanings assigned to the term "va:Luett in psychological 
value theory and research from 19.30 to 1960. :Based upon preliminary 
research~ the material to be studied was tentatively arranged into 
five categories or clusters~ each marked by colllllll.On emphases in the 
meaning to be given to value. These categories provided the methodo-
logical framework of the dissertation. They were treated in the in-
troductory chapter, together with the problem of definition~ the lim-
itations of the study~ and a summary of previous relevant literature 
and research. 
The second chapter~ then, began with the study of that constella-
tion of theorists and researchers which stressed the relations of val-
ues to the inherent biological requirements of the organism. To ex-
press this most adequately~ values were explained as needs or need 
satisfactions. Maslow gave the most thoroughgoing and comprehensive 
account of this, emphasizing not only the constitutional basis of val-
ues, but their hierarchical nature together with some possible value 
classifications. Goldstein elaborated the idea of health as the high-
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est value 1 while Murphy dealt primarily w.i th value development. The 
contemporary psychoanalytic orientation o~ Fronm underlined the neces-
sity to understand man's situation and personality as prerequisites to 
understanding his values. 
Two bodies o~ research were studied which used this type o~ de~i­
ni tion. White 1 s Value Analysis 1 a ,type o~ coni;ent analysis, was exam-
ined in regard to its general characteristics, its value categories, 
and its uses. Maslow's research was concerned with the characteris-
tics o~ sel~-actualizing people; his early inve1stigation was analyzed 
separately ~rom his later research speci~icall)' into B-cognition and 
D-cognition. 
An overview o~ this ~irst category suggested that, on a rational 
basis, there was some lack o~ precision in the ~ormulation o~ basic 
terms and constructs, and that the theorists te1nded to infer the valu-
able ~rom the valued. The suggested empirical bases o~ the concepts 
o~ need, value, health, and self-actualization were compared. The 
demonstration o~ the somatic basis o~ needs (an.d values) was ques-
tioned. The heuristic ability o~ this group to stimulate research in 
hitherto unexplored areas was suggested, together with the group t s re-
lations to some philosophical points of view. 
The third chapter moved on to Group Two, 'l'hose emphasis on the 
innate roots of values was milder and whose co.n.cern was with the mo-
tivational nature o~ values. In this regard, values were viewed pri-
marily as predispositions or sets to act in spe,cific ways, operating 
prior to behavior itsel~. The original theorist o~ this category was 
Spranger, with his Geisteswissensha~tliche psychology and its irlerred 
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methodology, his types of mental acts, and his generic definition of' 
value and six-fold classification of value types or life fol'mS. All-
port, theoretically related to but not entirely dependent on Spranger, 
stated clearly the motivational nature of values and their relations 
to traits and attitudes. 
The research studied began with the widely used Allport-Vernon-
Lindzey Study of Values. This was f'ollowed by Lurie 1 s factor analysis 
based on Spranger's value categories and the Values Inventory by Van 
Dusen, Wimberly, and M:>sier which built on Lurie's work. Other meas-
uring instruments designed to supplement or correct the SV by Glaser 
and Maller and by Shorr were also examined in this connection. This 
section concluded with the extensive experimental research on motiva-
tional influences of values in human perception by Bruner, Postman, 
and others. 
The degree of conceptual consistency maintained by the whole 
group and the theoretical debt of the SV to Spranger were discussed in 
reference to rational criteria. Empirically1 Spranger's possible ob-
jective idealism and lack of empirical basis for his concepts were 
studied, as were the variables actually measured by the SV. It was 
noted that this group had stimulated a great amount of research and 
discussion, principally through this instrument. The relation of this 
group to Hilliard's philosophical position was suggested as well. 
Group Three in the fourth chapter was firmly convinced that val-
ues arise only when problem situations demand the expression of behav-
ioral choices. Dewey was carefUl in his theory to stress the experi-
ential context of evaluation and the function of values as a type of 
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practical judgment. J!.Drris, an intellectual relative and student of 
Dewey, asserted that valuing is preferential behavior and axiology the 
science of preferential behavior. Woodruff, while postulating several 
new concepts relative to values, also equated them with choices. 
Research within this framework was done b.1 the theorists, Wood-
ruff and Morris, and by Wickert and Grace and Grace as well. MJrris 
followed up his theory with a cross-cultural study of conceived val-
ues, while Woodruff used a problem-solution approach. Wickert exam-
ined the relations between specific and general preferences. Grace 
and Grace attempted to study values using a sociometric and paper and 
pencil test, assumed to be behavioral and verbal measures, respective-
ly. 
It was pointed out in evaluating and discussing this group that 
all of the theory and research assumed this highly contextual nature 
of values, that both theorists and researchers were not always consis-
tent in their use of basio terms, and that the use of the term 
ttohoice 11 provided a case in point. There was some empirical question 
about the fact that Morris may have claimed too much for the results 
of his research, that Grace and Grace's behavioral measure was not 
truly such, and that Woodruff's research seemed rather disconnected 
from his theory. The category had, however, shown distinct a bill ty to 
generate discussion and research and to provide points of contact with 
philosophy. 
In the fifth chapter, Group Four rather tended to ignore the or-
ganism and its behavior by specifically equating values with intellec-
tually held concepts or beliefs. There was a distinct, though small, 
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body of research data but little theoretical formulation. After the 
suggestions made b,r Jacobs, Hartmann studied the beliefs of pacifists 
in a course at Columbia University. Barding evolved two types of mea.s-
urea for beliefs, while Kalhorn compared the group values of a group 
of rural Mennonite and non-Mennonite children. Corey conducted an ex-
ploratory study of the values held ey prospective teachers. 
The most obvious point for evaluation was the limited amount of 
theory to represent this point of view. It was suggested ey way of 
explanation that beliefs, as synonyms for values, would be regarded as 
implying too little motivational significance by psychologists, and 
that beliefs, because of the relative ease of investigation, might be 
studied even in the absence of adequate theoretical justification for 
their equation "With values. Some points of contact and contrast "With 
philosophers such as Pepper and Brightman were also indicated. 
In the sixth chapter, Group Five defined values almost exclusive-
tl ly as functions of the situation. Kohler's gestalt formulation, the 
earliest and most extensive, was analyzed in terms of its phenomeno-
logical orientation and its equation of value with requiredness. 
Lewin, who saw value as a power-field, and Asch, who used requiredness 
t1 
within a social context, both owed a theoretical debt to Kohler. Mlr-
ray's definition was then studied, which saw value as the relation be-
tween an object and a subject, viewed externally. 
In contrast t1o· the constellation defining values as concepts, 
Group Five was characterized by distinct theory but limited research. 
In evaluating this, it was suggested that reasons for it could be 
found in the nature of the defini tiona which did not sufficiently dif-
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ficiently differentiate values from other situational relationships or 
which called for the measurement of potentials, rather than observ-
u 
ables. other problems included the pluralism implied qy Kohler's iso-
morphism, and Lewin's implicit reduction of values to the sole deter-
minant o:f group membership. Empirically this group had strong support, 
but it was hueristically disappointing because of its rational inade-
quacies. The relevance of this position to a number of philosophical 
points of view in value theory was indicated. 
At the beginning of this study, certain evaluative criteria were 
suggested. Each of these criteria implied an ideal, in terms of which 
particular theories were discussed as just indicated. In general, the 
theories have not measured up well to the ideals. (See Figure 5.) 
The rational coherence and clarity varied from the lucidity of MOrris 
and of Allport and Postman and Bruner to the difficulties exhibited qy 
Grace and Grace, Wickert, and Woodruff. In regard to the degree to 
which various theories were grounded in empirical data and provided 
clear operational concepts, Postman and Bruner, together with Allport, 
lifted Group Two to a high posi tio.n in spite of Spranger's deductive 
approach. Groups One and Five began with empirical data for the most 
part, but tended not to account for it so well and to depart from it. 
Froup Four showed only a very limited amount of evidence for its equa-
tion of values with concepts. Insofar as the categories were able to 
yield testable hypotheses, stimulate discussion, and/or promote :fur-
ther research, the increasing interest and work of the last thirty 
years has presented a somewhat more hopefUl picture, at least for the 
future. Group Two again seemed to be the best in terms of research 
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FIGURE 5 
RANK ORDER OF REPRESENTATIVE THEORISTS 
ON EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
-
Theorists Rational Empirical Heuristic 
Group One 
Maslow . . . . . . . . 4 3 3 
Fronnn • . . . . . . . . 7 7 9 
Group T\-¥0 
Spranger . . . . . . . 6 9 2 
Allport . . . . . . . . 2 1 1 
Group Three 
Dewey . . . . . . . . • 3 5 5 
Morris . . . . . . . . 1 4 4 
Woodruff . . . . . . . 8 6 6 
Group Four . . . . . . . . 9 8 7 
Gro~~ Five ~ 1hler . . . . . . . . 5 2 8 
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generated, with Group One turning out a large quantity as well, and 
Group Four generating less diffieult research and little discussion. 
Group Five has been responsible for very limited research. 
2. Emergent Descriptive Attributes 
As initially hypothesized, certain substantive dimensions do in-
deed emerge common to each constellation and to most theorists in 
varying degrees. While some individuals have not produced work exten-
sive enough to warrant the use of these descriptive characterizations, 
those seven which are isolated as common factors are applicable to the 
majority of categories. (See Figure 6.) Unlike the evaluative cri-
teria, these attributes possess no implications of norms which may be 
used as standards of judgment. Bather, they simply seem to reflect 
theoretical issues facing psychologists when they attempt to define 
and study tlvalue.n In this sense, then, they provide a new set of op-
tions or dimensions in terms of which this material might be summar-
ized. 
First, there is considerable variation on the relative emphasis 
given to the specific organic connection of values. Although all of 
these theorists would grant that man is a biological organism, they do 
not agree on whether value behavior is closely tied to this character-
istic. Maslow, Murphy, Fro:mrD. and Wb.i te all make this a cardinal char-
acteristic of values with the particular conceptual difficulties which 
have been noted; Postman and Bruner also postulate this organic con-
nection, bo.t confess an inability to trace out the specific links. 
Allport, Spranger, and Dewey explicitly grant this point, but tend to 
FIGURE 6 
DIMENSIONAL COMPARISON OF SELECTED VALUE DEFINITIONSa 
--------- --
--------~---~- ---- -------~----- -----
~ ~ f-1 k Q) +> IJ ~ m bO f-1 ! I'll ~ Q) ~ 0 11 i i ~ 'Tj I'll 0 g. f-1 0 ii & ~ A ~ ~ 
Organic H H H H M M M M L L connection 
Environmental L H H L M L L M M M determinants 
Hierarchical H L L L H L L L L M arrangement 
M:>tivating M M M M H H H M H M power 
Stability M H M M H H H M H M 
Experienced L L L M L L L M M M uniqueness 
Extra-psychological 
grounding 
Philosophy H L H L H L 'L R H M 
Biology H H H M L L H M M L 
Social sciences M H H M M M M M M L 
---
a. Key: ~~ high (emphasized); M, moderate; b, low (de-emphasized). 
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pay less attention to it in their somewhat differing searches for bet-
ter distinguishing characteristics. 
Theorists face an option, as well, on the amount of emphasis 
which is to be given to environmental determinants of value. This is 
a question which is to be answered separately from the matter of or-
ganic connections, although the reverse might at first seem to be im-
plied. The general tendency, to be sure, is to stress the organic 
connections to the exclusion of environmental factors or vice versa. 
Thus Maslow and \-Jhite emphasize the former almost entirely, 'tvhile 
Lewin stresses the latter exclusively. But Murphy, Fromm, and Murray, 
as one might expect from their broader theoretical positions, see the 
organic and environmental influences as both being extremely necessary 
to arrive at an adequate definition of value. 
Most of the psychologists are not concerned to attempt any hier-
archical arrangement of different values or classes of value. Tb.e 
general consensus seams to be that insufficient evidence exists to di-
vide values into various types and then to state that some values are 
11highern than others. However, there are some interesting exceptions 
to this, usually on the part of theorists w.i th a somewhat philosophi-
cal bent. Maslow and Spranger quite clearly enunciate hierarchies of 
value, and both are relatively well versed in philosophy. Hartmann, 
who in this respect is a clear exception to the otherwise unif(l)Dm 
;~ 
trend in Group _,four, also presents the same combination. Allport, on 
the other hand, states explicitly that he did not accept Spranger's 
value hierarchy along with his value categories. This would seem to 
suggest, then, that philosophical concerns and a desire for order lead 
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some to make generalizations upon their data which are either not ac-
ceptable to psychologists generally, or which, apart from any matter 
of acceptability, are not seen as being conclusions belonging to their 
province qua psychologists. 
There is general unanimity on the motivational significance of 
values. Whether this be a matter of external "pulls" or internal 
11pushes 11 is not settled, nor is the relative importance of this moti-
vational significance. Nevertheless, nearly all theories assume this 
point while Group Two stresses it repeatedly. Only Group Four seems 
to take exception to the general trend and is thus usually seen by 
other theorists to be inadequate in its definitional approach. 
Wide spread agreement exists, too, on the relative stability of 
at least some values. Whether all values are seen as being stable, or 
only a fe"ttT which are then given a high degree of prominance , is the 
point on which disagreement e:x:i.sts. Murphy points out that canaliza-
tiona, which are more important than conditioned responses in the de-
velopment of values, are never truly subject to extinction and thus, 
with frequent conditioning reinforcement, provide for their continu-
ity. Spranger, Allport, Postman and Bruner was well emphasize the 
relative enduringness of the broad value directions which they see op-
erating as behavioral predispositions. others imply this characteris-
tic rather than stating it directly. By' and large, those who empha-
size the organic connections of values tend also to emphasize stabil-
1 ty in whichever form is more congenial to them. 
In contrast, considerable disagreement exists on the experienced 
uniqueness of values. One faces an option in assuming whether or not 
" 
,, 
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value experience as it is perceived by the experiencing individual is 
sufficiently distinct to separate it from the total range of the in-
dividual's experience. Although this dissertation will take the posi-
tion below that some kind of uniqueness is (necessarily) implied by 
II 
all of these psychologists 1 only Kobler explicitly attempts to treat 
this as cardinal characteristic from a phenomenal point of view. 
tl 
White probably comes closer to Kobler than anyone else when in his 
:formal, but preliminary, definition be equates values with particular 
aspects of a culture whose desirability (or lack o:f it) is perceived 
as self-evident. Representative of the other extreme is Spranger, who 
notes that values can be seen clearly only when treated in an ideal-
typical manner, since they are usually neither conscious nor formu-
lated. 
Insofar as their treatment o:f values is concerned, these theories 
betray varying amounts of extra-psychological grounding in several 
other disciplines. M:>st o:f them, h01-1ever, do evince some desire to 
relate psychological concepts to the concepts and findings o:f other 
disciplines in order to define value. Those disciplines most often 
used are philosophy, biology, and other social sciences (such as an-
thropology or sociology). One notes, too, that there tend to be less 
11moderate11 amounts of emphasis here than elsewhere. Apparently, one 
either borrows rather extensively from disciplines outside psychology 
or one does not borrow at all. Particularly is this dichotomous as-
pect true in reference to philosophy and biology, a :fact which may 
reflect the general anti-philosophical bias of most psychologists and 
the lack of experimentalist representation in this total group. With 
160 
the possible exception o:f Allport, whose philosophical sophistication 
does not directly show in his value theory and research, these empha-
ses in value theory tend to reflect prior decisions concerning the de-
sirability o:f extra-psychological grounding in personality theory. 
Group Four, whose definition o:f values is in many ways the least ade-
quate, is the only group which does not display even moderately exten-
sive reliance on at least one other discipline. 
The :first six o:f these seven dimensions, it appears, tend to de-
scribe speci:fic characteristics o:f an individual's theoretical posi-
tion, while the last ("extra-psychological groundingn) tends more to 
indicate the manner in which the position is stated and the types o:f 
concepts which are used. On these :first six, then, only Dewey and 
Woodru:f:f occupy generally mediating positions on most o:f the points. 
Other than this, individuals do not clearly present pictures o:f either 
regular high or low emphases, but instead a mixture. 
It has been suggested already that the trend is :for those who see 
importance in possible organic connections to emphasize in some manner 
value stability as well. This is not altogether surprising, since as 
seen b,y most o:f these theorists, development is treated as relatively 
gradual with a number o:f constants remaining throughout, which would 
tend toward stability o:f the things dependent upon them. Allport, who 
views personality development in a more discontinuous :fashion, sees 
values as a function primarily o:f maturity, thus maintaining their 
stability. 
Concurrently, there is a tendency for those who :find significant 
organic connections to see little individually perceived uniquenesses 
161 
in value experience. A possible explanation of' this is that experien-
ces which are viewed as being tied to organic conditions or states 
tend, except under unusual circumstances such as deprivation, to be so 
much a constant quality of' all experience that an individual does not 
separate them into isolated experiences or isolated attributes of' all 
experience. This is in line 1vith Maslow's notation that needs are seen 
most clearly when unsatisfied, Dewey's contention that values begin to 
arise in problem situations or situations of' lack, and Ka.lhorn 1s find-
ing that her data yielded information primarily on areas in which 
there was an optimum degree of' conflict present. 
Insofar as there are connections between any of' the first six di-
mensions and the last with its sub-groupings, one discovers that those 
who draw upon biology most heavily tend also to emphasize the organic 
bases of' values. Conversely, those who emphasize more strongly the 
environmental determinants draw more heavily from social sciences. 
This is exactly as one might expect and contains no particular sur-
prise. 
With the exception of' the general trends just noted, the place-
ment of' an individual on one particular dimension does not necessarily 
place him at a particular place on another. Too, these general dimen-
sions or issues seem to be equally characteristic of' theorists rela-
tively early and relatively late in the time period under scrutiny. 
The variation on particular dimensions is random with no trends ob-
servable on a chronological basis. 
Finally, then, so far as these substantive attributes are con-
cerned, the total group of' value theorists studied here is character-
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ized by a readiness to emphasize the motivating power and stability o:f 
values, with a disinclination to speci:fy any hierarchical arrangements 
or particular individually perceived uniquenesses. Concurrently, they 
seem rather unwilling to remain within the narrow limits of psychology 
for data explanation and theoretical elaboration, but pre:fer to borrow 
usefUl constructs and models from other disciplines when and where 
helpfUl. 
B. Conclusions 
1. Category Usefulness 
The categories used as the methodological framework of this dis-
sertation provided a convenient system :for analysis, but will probably 
prove to have outlived much of their usefulness in the future. Their 
chief contribution here is the manner in which they have fUnctioned to 
reveal the substantive dimensions by means o:f which the material was 
summarized in the immediately preceding section. Although they did 
provide an initial set of sufficiently exclusive and exhaustive cate-
gories to clarify and simplify the study of the basic data, they have 
shown a tendency to break down under close scrutiny. For instance, 
there was a discernable tendency for the edges of the categories to 
blur, and for individuals to combine the emphases of different cate-
gories. Since these constellations were derived empirically, not log-
ically, this is not altogether surprising. The varying approaches o:f 
these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive; although in 
fact individual theories do tend to gather into such distinguishable 
clusters, there is no logically compelling reason why they~ :fall 
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into such groups. Thus, the constellations provided a somewhat ~alae 
view o~ the basic data i~ they were viewed as completely discrete en-
tities, while the emergent substantive dimensions provide a more use-
ful and accurate tool of description and analysis. 
2. Theorists' and Researchers' Intercommunication 
Communication between those doing theory and those doing research 
is poor, even when done by the same person. Woodruff 1 s theory and re-
search is the most obviously compartmentalized, while Bruner and Post-
man's is the most closely and consistently interwoven. There also 
seems to be some lack of communication between groups. For example, 
MOrris, who sees values as operative in choice behavior directed to-
ward speci~ic ends, displays little awareness of Postman's work which 
suggests that values may operate prior to this behavior through the 
perception o~ possible end, thus limiting the choices available. Mas-
low, defining values as needs, shows little familiarity with the op-
II posing, yet supplementing, positions of Kohler and Lewin. 
3. Value Theorists in the Field of PsychologY 
On the basis of the facts and relationships which have emerged in 
this study, one can now state that the psychologists studied here who 
are concerned with value theory and research are not representative of 
psychology as a whole. Psychologists with interests such as animal 
experimentation or learning theory tend to he absent. Although this 
whole value theory group does not represent any single kind of inter-
est within the total professional field, they share come common char-
acteristics with personality theorists. In this respect, several o~ 
Ball and Lindzey's characterizations of personality theorists are 
strikingly reflected.1 Ball and Lindzey note in part that personality 
theory historically has occupied something of a ~ssident role in psy-
chology, rebelling against accepted theory and defined problems. Cer-
tainly this is true of value theorists, who, es.pecially in earlier 
years, have been a numerical minority and have approached a problem 
avoided b,y psychologists was a whole. Ball and Lindzey suggest as 
well that personality theories are functionally oriented in that they 
are concerned with questions which make a difference in the adjustment 
of the individual. Values are certainly perceived by these theorists 
as making just such a difference, a point explicitly noted by Dewey. 
Personality theorists, too, have usually assigned critical importance 
to the motivational process, and it has been pointed out already not 
only that this is characteristic of value theorists, but also that one 
of the reasons for lack of theory in Group Four is a belief that such 
a type of definition lacks just this motivational significance. 
Not only is this whole group generally marked off by its rela-
tions to personality theorists, but it is distinguished as well by 
certain presuppositions, largely implicit and uncriticized. These in-
clude the beliefs that: 
a) Valuation is a unitary phenomenon, as distinguished from val-
ues themselves which may be either specific or general. That is, al-
though there may be different categories or types of values, underly-
ing them is a single element common to all value experiences which 
makes one general definition of value possible. Thus the initial de-
1. Pp. 4-7. 
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cision to limit this study to those who assume a single theory of val-
ue is supported by the fact that theorists themselves take for granted 
the desirability of such a single definition. 
b) Values or their effects are at least potentially measurable 
and/or open to empirical description. If not directly observable, 
they are associated with definite behavior i~explicable without refer-
ence to them. 
c) Values are largely personal experiences. They depend ul ti-
mately upon an experiencing or observing individual who is able to 
specify that experience or behavior which is to be isolated as involv-
ing value. This again may be a reflection of the interest in person-
ali ty theory which does much to define the immediate context within 
which psychological value theory operates. 
d) Value experience is a type of experience that may be separat-
ed from other experiences, rather than a quality which may somehow at-
tach to any experience or to experience as a whole. Possible implica-
tiona of such a starting point have not even begun to be faced by psy-
ehologists. 
Thus a picture emerges for this dissertation of these value the-
orists and researchers as a group of psychologists forming a numerical 
minority in the total professional field, w:oosaiefinitions of value, 
despite differences, are marked by variation on common substantive at-
tributes, common strengths and weaknesses i~ respect to the evaluative 
criteria listed above, a common set of presuppositions, and a series 
of distinct similarities to personality theorists. One notes, in 
. ' 
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fact, that many of the value theorists studied here are also distin-
guished for their contributions to personality theory. 
4. Toward a Summary Definition of Value 
Although there is at present no agreement on any single meaning 
to be given to the term "value" by psychologists,· the findings of this 
study suggest that some kind of summary statement would be both useful 
and desirable. If this be so, it would theti seem that any adequate 
future psychological definition would have tO include the following 
areas: 
a) Values are not directly observable entities, but are inferred 
constructs. Although some of the theorists of Group One sometimes im-
ply the hypostasization of values, no one deliberately and intention-
ally does so. This is wise, for unless this construct-nature is kept 
clearly in mind, one may overestimate the extent of one's knowledge 
concerning values and empirical evidence for them, and begin to con-
fuse phenotypical and genotypical dimensions. 
b) Values primarily have motivational significance. Group Two 
makes this a cardinal part of its definition o:f values as predisposing 
sets, while. most of the other groups take it for granted. Questions 
do arise as to whether or not Group Four takes this point seriously, 
and on this basis whether or not the variables measured in this con-
stellation ought really to be designated as values. As suggested 
above, the exact nature of this motivational significance is a point 
of issue reflecting larger issues in general motivation theory. 
c) Values are perceived as being to some degree qualitatively 
distinct from other experiences. Most of the theorists suggest that 
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value behavior is unique as perceived by an observer, in that it can 
11objectivelytt be separated from other types of behavior. Others sug-
gest that this uniqueness can be discerned better by the experiencing 
individual himself. There is little agreement on the exact nature of 
II 
the uniqueness by anyone. Kohler attempts to specify it from the 
viewpoint of the experiencing individual in terms of value's demand 
quality, yet he fails sufficiently to distinguish it from other types 
of such requiredness. White, too, as has been pointed out, first sees 
values distinguished as somehow being self-evident. However, clear 
specification of the characteristics which do seem to mark off the 
perceived uniqueness of value experience is .a task which has not yet 
I. 
been achieved and has been too largely neglected. 
d) Values do not operate independently either of the biological 
organism or of the social field, a statement concerning motivational 
determinants as they are related to values. The point made by Group 
One that values are not imposed from without but are somehow natural 
to man is well taken. Spranger, Allport, and even Dewey assume this 
also. On the other hand, neither can the effects of the immediate 
situation nor the social environment be ruled out, as Dewey suggests 
and Lewin very clearly states. Although the relative inf'luence of' 
each is by no means a settled issu:e:, cognizance must somehow be taken 
of both these perspectives in attempting to arrive at a definition .for 
value. It is for this reason, if no other, that an interdisciplinary 
approach to the study of' value experience Will provide, in all proba-
bility, the most fruitful information in the future. 
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e) Preferential behavior and value behavior are intimately re-
lated, though not directly synonymous. The nature of this relation-
ship is one of the most difficult questions facing value theory ana 
research in psychology, for it involves in part the separation of de-
scripti ve from causative factors--a task not • ·yet sufficiently accom-
plished by any presently in the field. The results of the discoveries 
of this dissertation do suggest, however, that while preferential be-
havior serves as an operational indicator of values, it cannot in and 
of itself be directly equated with values. In this sense one sees 
that Dewey and MOrris have somewhat overstated their point, and that 
Allport, Bruner, and Postman are moving in a more fruitful direction 
i:n terms of their practice, if not always their theory. 
f) Values demand some sort of process •for confirmation. All, 
save perhaps Group Four, suggest this. Maslow and Goldstein see the 
process in terms of the realization of indi~dual potential capacity. 
Dewey, MOrris, and Woodruff (in part) view it as one involving utility 
in which effects are brought about which are amenable to direct scien-
tific observation. Group consensus is implied by others such as Lewin 
and Asch as the verification process. Allport, on the other hand, 
seems to see little of such an aspect. 
If one were to summarize, then, it might be suggested that a po-
tentially useful operational definition of value would be: values are 
inferred motivational constructs associated with perceived differences 
in goal-directed behavior and indicated by the selection of action al-
i 
ternatives 'Within social situations. This is in no sense a complete 
definition, and certainly is as significant for what it does not say 
• 
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as £or what it does. There are as yet insuf£icient data £or a com-
plete psychological de£inition, but these suggested limits are intend-
ed to mark o££ the area in which psychologists might most profitably 
work in the future. 
G. future Directions in Value Research 
This dissertation has explored the work of psychologists inter-
ested actively in value theory and/or research. A picture has appearEd 
of a group o£ psychologists not representative of the psychological 
profession as a whole, influenced by the characteristic attitudes of 
personality theorists, and willing to do some borrowing from other 
disciplines if necessary. Given this kind of a group together with 
the perspectives brought out b,y this study, what specific directions 
might research take in the future? 
The summary definition given above sets down certain limits with-
in which it might be well to remain. With this to chart the general 
area, future research should also be dictated by the fact that most 
research to date has been almost exclusively an effort to measure in-
dividual values seen as end points in the valuation process. Although 
Maslow most clearly has been concerned to identify and describe some-
thing of the characteristics of those manifesting his highest value, 
and others, such as Morris, Ka.lhorn, and Gorey, have used individual 
measures to make statements about group characteristics, there has 
been no significant departure from this trend. 
This suggests the necessity £or more imagination in devising 
techniques to supplement these and to tap other dimensions of valuing. 
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FUrther, more refined, efforts are needed to reveal something of the 
process of evaluation, some'tvhat as Woodruff attempted. Clinical stud-
ies should prove helpful, at least in discovering the individual con-
ditions under which valuing takes place and in specifying its unique 
phenomenal characteristics. If valuation is a social phenomenon as 
well, then much work needs to be done to develop the implications of 
such a belief. Further refinement is also in order on some of the ex-
isting choice techniques; behavioral observation in social situations 
and perhaps some individual time s-tudies will prove helpful. 1 Fin-
ally, if research methods imply variable definition, the methods se-
lected must be conconant with the definition of value used. 2 
Several areas have been revealed, as well, which need to be taken 
more seriously than has yet been done. Kalhorn t s research findings 
indicate that she received information only in value areas in which 
there was some degree of conflict. The possible discovery of value 
conflict as a measurement variable needs to be explored much further, 
for if her results are confirmed, considerable reappraisal in the 
field of value measurement may be necessary. The very existence of 
Group Fbur in the initial classification suggests that cognitive proc-
eases may indeed influence value selection; though philosophers have 
made this assumption fairly regularly, it needs to be examined more 
1. Friedman, pp. 197-204, took some preliminary steps in this area. 
2. Fbr an attempt to use stochastic system theory in value defini-
tion, see Nicholas M. Smith, Jr., "A Calculus for Ethics: A Theory of 
the Structure of Value, Parts I and II,u Behav. Sci.., 1 (1956), 111-42 
and 186-211. 
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carefully and tested empirically by psychologists. Finally, a ques-
tion has not even been seriously faced which must be if further phe-
nomenal research is to be effective: does "value 11 refer to a particu-
lar type or ldnd of experience as assumed by most psychologists, or 
does it refer to a particular quality which may be characteristic of 
any experience? 
Further research might well be done, too, which would more spe-
cifically supplement the work of this dissertation. Seven substantive 
dimensions have emerged which seem to provide a more useful system for 
analyzing various positions. These dimensions might well become the 
basis for a further analysis of psychological value theory and re-
search, or for a comparison with the substantive dimensions, if such 
exist, of value theories in other disciplines. Bridges to philosoph-
ical theories have been suggested, but ought to be further explored in 
the light of these attributes. Though no significant historical 
trends have come forth in the period covered by this study, such might 
not be the case if a larger perspective and a more extensive time seg-
ment were studied. Certainly if the suggestions of this dissertation 
were to be followed, certain trends would emerge in the fUture. 
Psychological value theory and research today face many prob-
lems--~th few obvious answers. Yet the situation is not hopeless, 
and though confusion does exist, one may hope that the situation will 
improve in the years ahead. 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem of this dissertation is to discover and analyze the 
meanings assigned to the term ttvaluett in modern psychological value 
theory and research. To this end, both theory and research have been 
systematically arranged into tentative clusters or categories, each 
tending to emphasize a particular variable as being critical to defin-
ing values. 
Group One, the first cluster, defines values as needs or need 
satisfactions. Maslow, Goldstein, Mlrphy, and FrolDID. show representa-
tive theoretical positions, while Maslow and White have produced cor-
responding research. An overview of the group suggests that while it 
has difficulty in the precise formulation of basic terms and in over-
emphasizing, perhaps uncritically, the 11objectiven basis of needs,. 
health, self-actualization, and value. 
Group Two, while granting the biological basis of values, prefers 
to stress their motivational nature as predispositions operating prior 
to behavior. Spranger and Allport are the theorists of this group; 
Allport, Lurie, Glaser and M'iller, Shorr, ~er and Postman, the 
principal researchers. The category as a whole keeps a high level of 
conceptual consistency and empirical verification, despite questions 
raised concerning aspects of Sprangerts position. MOst of the re-
search in this group (and some others) has been stimulated by the All-
port-Vernon-ldndzey Study of Values. 
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Group Three states that values arise only when problem situations 
demand behavioral choices. Dewey, M:>rris, and Woodruff exemplify this 
in their theory; M:>rris, Woodruff, Wickert, and Grace and Grace have 
done so in their research. It may be noted that this group implicitly 
assumes the highly contextual nature o:f values. However, some members 
have not always been overly consistent in their use o:f terms, includ-
ing "choice» itsel:f, nor does the research seem too closely related to 
the theory. 
Group Four virtually ignores the organism and its behavior by' 
equating values with intellectually held concepts or beliefs. There 
is little theoretical formulation of this, but research has been done 
by Hartmann, Harding, Kalhorn, and Corey. The theoretical lack might 
be explained by the :fact that concepts are seen as having too little 
motivational significance, while the research presence may be connec-
ted ~th the relative ease o:f measurement of concepts and beliefs • 
. Group Five sees values as different kinds of situational rela-
n 
tionships. Kohler, Lewin, Asch, and Murray variously suggest this 
theoretically, but have influenced limited research. Although there 
n 
may be problems in Kohler's implied pluralism and Lewin's implicit 
reduction o:f value determination solely to group membership, the chie:f 
shortcoming is research scarcity. This is probably due to the defini-
tiona, which either do not sufficiently differentiate values from oth-
er types o:f situational relationships, or which call for the measure-
ment o:f potentials instead of observables. 
The initial groupings prove to have been use:f'ol chiefly to reveal 
seven descriptive dimensions in terms of' ;-which psychological value 
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theories might better be described and analyzed in the future. These 
dimensions or issues to be considered b,y each psychologist in defining 
value might be labeled: organic connection, environmental determin-
ants, hierarchical arrangement, motivating power, stability, experi-
enced uniqueness, and extra-psychological grounding. 
Results of the study also suggest that the communication between 
theorists and researchers is poor, even when the same individual acts 
in both capacities. TOo, the value theorists studied here are not 
representative of the total professional psychological field, but are 
marked by a set of common presuppositions and resemblances to person-
ality theorists. Finally, it is suggested that although there is no 
agreement on any single meaning to be given to the term "value 11 b,y 
psychologists, a potentially usei'ul summary definition would be: val-
ues are inferred motivational constructs associated with perceived 
differences in goal-directed behavior and indicated by the selection 
of action alternatives within social situations. This definition cer-
tainly is as significant for what it does not say as for what it does. 
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